Contribution
My Lords, I start from the position that we on these Benches support the right to jury trial in serious cases. I expect fully that we will support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, in opposing this clause, should they put it to a vote, as I certainly expect them to on Report.
I agree with every word of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, and so many others in respect of jury trial. I agree with all those, in this Chamber and in the country at large, who believe that jury trial is one of the cornerstones of our liberty, and that the right to trial by one’s peers is trusted and relied on as a protection against arbitrary abuse of power. I entirely accept that the public trust juries. By and large, they believe that the secret deliberations of 12 jurors in the privacy of the jury room are more likely to produce a fair and unbiased result than the decision-making of one judge. Judges differ, to our knowledge and experience, in background, influences, prejudices and therefore conclusions, from other judges hearing the same evidence and determining the same case.
I also believe that the jury system democratises our justice by bringing the public into the process of making findings of guilt or innocence. My experience of how seriously jurors take their duty when sitting on juries—although it is a distant experience, because I have not practised criminal law for a long time—reinforces that belief in how seriously they take their duties, as does the experience of talking to members of the public who have served on juries.
I agree with all those who see it as a strange and unjustified position that we should take a step as radical as removing the right of election for an ephemeral reason, such as reducing the Crown Court backlog, when there are other ways of reducing the Crown Court backlog. I accept it is dreadfully serious but it is already being tackled in other ways, and quite successfully. In any event, the evidence that removing the right to elect will have the effect of reducing the backlog is painfully thin.
For there to be a right to jury trial, there has to be a right of election in cases that are serious enough to be indictable only or triable either way. But that is not to say that the classification of which offences should be triable either way or, indeed, indictable only cannot change. Of course it can. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, conceded that point, along with others; the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas Cwmgiedd, made the point as well. However, I suggest that we would lose a democratic right of great value if we were to abolish the defendant’s right of election.
I turn to Amendment 1, on the importance of good character in the determination of the appropriate allocation for trial, which is in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who explained it fully and eloquently, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie. I argued in the King’s Speech debate, at a stage when the likely length of sentence was going to be the determinant of a right to jury trial—now, thankfully, gone from the Bill—that defendants of good character were at risk only of a low sentence and therefore were much more likely to be denied a trial by jury than defendants with serious criminal records.
Of course I accept that justice needs to be equal for everyone and that everyone has the same human rights, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee explained. Nevertheless, I am forced to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, on that point. No one is arguing that not all defendants deserve justice. However, the fact is that defendants of good character are at serious reputational risk from a conviction, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee explained. They face not only the risk of the sentence but risks to their careers and to their relationships, to which one can add risks to their mental health and well-being. For defendants with many previous convictions, the likely sentence would be much higher. The effect, therefore, of taking into account only sentence and treating sentence as the determinant is that the defendants of bad character, or with previous convictions, are much more likely to get a jury trial.
It is idle to suggest that the chances of acquittal in the magistrates’ court are the same as the chances of acquittal in the Crown Court. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, explained the difference in connection with speech offences, but the experience of the public at large and of the legal profession is that defendants of good character, at least, have a better chance of acquittal before a jury than they do before magistrates. It is therefore of great importance that good character is taken into account at the allocation stage, otherwise we would not be treating all defendants equally. We would be according a jury trial to defendants with previous convictions but not to those of previously unblemished character. We ignore that at our peril. Those who say that it is an equal playing field between magistrates’ courts and Crown Courts are drawing the wool over their own eyes.
My understanding, though, is that it is intended in the Bill that magistrates will be guided by the seriousness of the alleged offence and will be expected to leave out of account considerations of character and history. I would be grateful if the Minister would elucidate that, and explain and justify—without reference necessarily to the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and others—the guidance that is expected to be given to magistrates on the criteria for allocation between Crown Courts and magistrates’ courts in contested cases.
I turn to the right of appeal against allocation by the magistrates’ court, which my noble friend Lady Hamwee’s Amendment 7 would provide and which we support. Why should a decision of such fundamental importance be treated as no more than a case management decision for the magistrates alone? Magistrates do not, as a matter of course, have experience of jury trials. They do not know or need to know how jury trials work. The people most qualified to determine whether a case warrants a jury trial are the Crown Court judges who hear jury trials day in, day out. There should plainly be a right of appeal against the refusal of a jury trial. I argue that such an appeal should lie with the Crown Court, with the judge having the right to reverse the magistrate’s allocation decision simply if he or she took the view that it was the wrong decision.
I turn finally to the Clause 2 stand part notice in my name. I have notified the Government that that is not to be pursued. I ask the Minister to treat it as probing and ask him merely to explain how the mechanism in Clause 2 would work. By removing the right to object to the venue for a trial when the case comes before the magistrates, it is proposed that the decision on allocation is for the magistrate alone, but Clause 2 introduces a right to make representations.
I am not objecting to the right to make representations; it is a question of how that right is to be exercised and what the representations can cover. Is a representation to be only on the question of whether the sentencing powers of the magistrates’ court would be adequate to sentence the defendant for the offence? What would the criteria be? How far would they be confined to the nature and seriousness of the offence before the court? To come back to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would factors relating to character be considered? Would factors relating to the defendant’s circumstances—for example, family ties, housing, children, employment, mental health, addiction and treatment needs, the effect of delaying a trial on sentencing, and the effect of delaying sentence—be permissible subjects for such representations? Would there be a judgment, giving reasons as to why the magistrate’s sentencing powers would be adequate—or why not, as the case may be?
These are important issues as to how this new provision might work. All I seek on Clause 2 is clarity as to what the Government propose and how they envisage that the allocation might work.