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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 10 November 2026

Debate

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Contribution

My Lords, in this group I have Amendments 17, 21 and 25. All these amendments are against the background that “judge alone” trials in the Crown Court are intended by the Bill as drawn, subject to a later debate, to be as per the list of offences in part 1 of the new schedule in Schedule 1. This is restricted to cases of financial crime that are genuinely of real complexity or inordinate length. I say at the outset that there are many cases of serious and complex trials, some of substantial length, which in the end turn out to involve what I would characterise as jury issues. These are cases where the shape of the fraud or the scheme involved, usually to get substantial sums of money, may be difficult but not so difficult that a competent prosecution team could not present and explain it using sensible presentational aids and technology—not Claude, I hasten to add—to a jury. It is dangerous of us to underestimate the collective understanding of juries. Certainly, 12 heads, which I said are better than one, involve a collective decision-making and mutual information-giving exercise. They discuss the case in the jury room as it is going along. In the end, I do not believe that they miss much. My point is that, once the nature of the fraud is understood, questions of the guilt or innocence of individual defendants, on individual counts on the indictment, even usually boil down to very human questions of fact. These are essentially jury questions: did he sign that document? Did she tell him that she knew what he was doing? Did she know what he was doing? What did he know or believe? Was he or she dishonest in what they did? At Second Reading, I heard those who said that dishonesty is essentially a matter for a judge, but I believe that questions of dishonesty in serious cases are generally better tried by juries. Then there is the weighing-up exercise: what is it in the evidence that drives the conclusion on any given point? Frankly, I do not believe that there are many cases that cannot fairly and comprehensively be presented to a jury. If any are to be tried by judge alone, they should be genuinely of such complexity and length that they are unlikely to be comprehensible to a jury. I say that those cases are rare; it is indeed possible that they exist. We believe that the decision to try a case with a judge alone should be appealable. Although there seems to have been some antipathy to appeals from magistrates’ allocation decisions, this is a decision of a different quality altogether. It is a decision on whether a trial of huge complexity and length should be tried by a jury or a judge alone. That ought to be reviewable. It is of the essence of our system that wrong decisions in serious cases, on serious questions of substance, should be reversible on appeal. Whatever the criteria for “judge alone” trials—if they happen—are ultimately to be, these are serious decisions of substance. A wrong decision should not, in justice, be allowed to stand. I support the noble Viscount on the basis that decisions should be appealable. That is my Amendment 21. Furthermore, if a defendant is convicted, and then if, following that conviction, when the judgment is available—let us remember that there is bound to be a written judgment in “judge alone” trials—it is apparent that the decision on the trial being by a judge alone is found to be wrong, then that decision on the mode of trial should be appealable at that stage. That is the aim of my Amendment 25. Those amendments are sensible and certainly necessary in the interests of justice.

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