Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for their points and questions on this matter, which rightly concerns us all. To reiterate, this was a quasi-judicial decision taken independently by the Secretary of State for Housing. I also remind noble Lords of the premise of the Statement made by the Security Minister in the other place, which focused on the national security considerations of China’s proposal to build a new embassy at the Royal Mint Court. This concludes a process that began in 2018, when the then Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson—who I believe may have been a Conservative—gave formal diplomatic consent for China to use the Royal Mint site for its new embassy, subject to planning permission, and welcomed it as China’s largest overseas investment. I think we have seen how much has changed in a few short years on the Opposition Benches. Nevertheless, I am aware of the significant interest that this issue has provoked in your Lordships’ House, and as such I am grateful for the opportunity to provide an assurance of the work that the Government have undertaken to ensure that UK national security is protected. I am very fond of the noble Baroness, but her comments about the Government’s prioritisation of national security were outrageous. National security is our number one priority. The Home Office and the Foreign Office both provided views during the planning process on potential security issues around the build and confirmed in writing when these were resolved. We have engaged with key allies throughout, and our security and intelligence agencies have been integral to the process. As the director of GCHQ and the director-general of MI5 wrote in their letter, “as with any foreign embassy on UK soil, it is not realistic to expect to be able wholly to eliminate each and every potential risk … However, the collective work across UK intelligence agencies and HMG departments to formulate a package of national security mitigations for the site has been, in our view, expert, professional and proportionate”. They also judged that “the package of mitigations deals acceptably with a wide range of sensitive national security issues, including cabling”. Indeed, they noted that there were “clear security advantages” from consolidating China’s diplomatic estates in London. I am also grateful for the close consideration and scrutiny that my noble friend Lord Beamish and the Intelligence and Security Committee have given this matter. His committee concluded: “On the basis of the evidence we have received, and having carefully reviewed the nuanced national security considerations, the Committee has concluded that, taken as a whole, the national security concerns that arise can be satisfactorily mitigated”. National security concerns that have been raised in media reports again in recent days are not new to the Government or the intelligence community, and an extensive range of measures has been developed to protect national security. We have acted to increase the resilience of cables in the area through an extensive series of measures to protect sensitive data. The Government have seen unredacted plans for the embassy and have agreed with China that the publicly accessible forecourt on the embassy grounds will not have diplomatic immunity, thereby managing the risk to the public. Based on all that and our extensive work on this matter, we are content that any risks are being appropriately managed. On our approach to China, I note that it is a fundamental and normal part of international relations that countries agree to establish embassies in each other’s capitals. The Government are engaging with China confidently and pragmatically, recognising the complexity of the world as it is and challenging China where we need to. Of course, we recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyber attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our diplomatic institutions, to transnational repression of Hong Kongers and China’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Government have responded and will continue to respond to these challenges. However, taking a robust approach to our national security also includes engaging with China. Indeed, it is only through engagement that we can directly challenge China on its malicious activity. By taking tough steps to keep us secure, we enable ourselves to co-operate in other areas, including in pursuit of safe economic opportunities that are in the UK’s national interest and in areas such as organised immigration crime, narcotics trafficking and serious organised crime. That is what allies do and what we are doing: delivering for the public, putting more money in their pockets and keeping them safe through hard-headed, risk-based engagement with the world’s most consequential power. I would like to clarify some specific points raised by the noble Baroness and the noble Lord. The noble Baroness asked what this is for. She knows what this is for: as a result of a quasi-judicial process and a planning application, this is the consolidation of seven different sites into one. There are significant security benefits that come from that. On the planning and building processes, I reiterate that this is a British planning application that has gone through a quasi-judicial process. The normal building inspections will apply as the building is developed. As I said, national security is the first responsibility of any Government, and especially this Government. Any other suggestion is frankly appalling. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, I say that we will see the results of the PM’s visit when he returns and I look forward to discussing it in your Lordships’ House at that point. On FIRS, we are looking carefully at whether other countries should be added to the enhanced tier. Any decision will be brought before Parliament in the usual way. Countries are considered separately for specification, and decisions are made on the evidence. The Government have a range of capabilities to manage and mitigate threats emanating from foreign states. FIRS is one of many tools that we use. I will touch on the number of diplomats who will be present at the embassy. Under the Vienna convention, having an embassy is not a reward for like-minded partners but a necessity for any country with which we have diplomatic relations. On the issue of pragmatism, I say that we are talking about a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the second-largest economy in the world and our third-largest trading partner, so a level of diplomatic relations would be wise. It is also a fundamental and normal part of international relations that countries mutually consent to other nations having embassy premises. However, as the Vienna convention states, the UK has control over the number of diplomats in the UK on diplomatic relations. Any diplomatic position at the Chinese embassy must be approved on a case-by-case basis by the FCDO’s protocol department. The FCDO will work with allies on any additional extensions of that. As I have said, the Government have seen the unredacted plans. It is based on this and our extensive work on this topic that I am content that any risks are being appropriately managed. The noble Lord raised a very important point about transnational repression. Noble Lords may be aware that I ran Index on Censorship until the general election and spent a great deal of time campaigning on these specific issues. The Government condemn the Hong Kong police’s efforts to coerce, intimidate, harass and harm those living in the UK and overseas; these acts of repression will never be tolerated in this country. We have raised these concerns directly with Chinese authorities, reaffirming that the extraterritorial application of Hong Kong’s national security law is unacceptable and will not be tolerated in the UK. The safety and security of Hong Kongers in the UK, including those on the British National Overseas visa, is of the utmost importance. The UK will always stand up for the rights of the people of Hong Kong. This is demonstrated through the bespoke immigration route for BNO status holders and their eligible family members. The UK’s response to tackling state-directed threats is world leading. Appropriate tools and system-wide safeguards are in place to robustly counter transnational aggression. Following the Defending Democracy Taskforce’s TNR review, we have strengthened our response by implementing the National Security Act 2023, which provides a comprehensive suite of powers to counter the threat of TNR. We have rolled out training across 45 territorial police forces, including the upskilling of 999 call handlers to improve front-line identification of and responses to state-directed threats. We have published practical guidance on GOV.UK for individuals who believe they may be at risk, with advice to help them protect themselves physically and online. We have deployed tailored support and security assistance for individual victims, where we have become aware of them, that are proportionate to the threat and varied in scope and approach. This Government will always welcome the knowledge and experience of noble Lords and Baronesses in your Lordships’ House, particularly when they pertain to matters of national security. So let me again reassure your Lordships that upholding national security is the first duty of government and we will continue to take all measures necessary to disrupt these threats. Based on the extensive work on this topic, the Government are content that any risks to the UK’s national security are being appropriately managed.