Member

That approach is problematic for several reasons. First, the Mansion House Accord itself does not exclude listed investment companies. On the contrary, it explicitly looks through to the underlying asset rather than the wrapper. Secondly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said, this exclusion appears to have emerged without consultation, transparency or any clear public interest justification. Thirdly, by legislating a preference for one structure, the Government are no longer guiding the market but actively shaping it. This creates coercive pressures, reputational risks for schemes and incentives for forced migration away from existing and well-understood investment vehicles. Fourthly, given that many of the signatories to the accord also manufacture long-term asset funds, this approach risks entrenching conflicts of interest and behaviour that begin to resemble market co-ordination rather than healthy competition, a point that I think was made in this debate. The effect is one of structural foreclosure, reducing the range of viable long-term investment vehicles. Even if the reserved powers are never formally exercised, their mere presence already distorts behaviour through signalling effects.