Lord Clement-Jones (LD)

If the noble Lord accepts the fact that controls are required, which he did not in his earlier comments, I think he would be greatly reassured if you had to have judicial oversight of the use of live facial recognition, which is useful in circumstances other than purely policing. What we are talking about is a greater level of control over the deployment of live facial recognition. We can argue perfectly satisfactorily about whether or not it should be extended beyond the police, but we are suggesting that, alongside that greater deployment, or possible greater deployment, there should be a much greater degree of oversight. I think that effectively answers the noble Lord. The Metropolitan Police’s own data from recent LFR operations shows a false alert rate requiring officers to make numerous stops of innocent people. Even with claimed accuracy improvements, when a system processes thousands of faces, even a small error translates to significant numbers of misidentifications affecting law-abiding citizens. More concerning is the evidence on differential performance, and that is where I fundamentally agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The National Physical Laboratory’s 2020 testing of facial recognition systems found significant variation in performance across demographic groups. While contemporary LFR systems used by UK police show better performance than earlier algorithms, independent research continues to identify measurable differences in accuracy rates across ethnicity and gender. The Court of Appeal in Bridges ruled that South Wales Police breached the public sector equality duty by failing to satisfy itself that the software was free from racial or gender bias, yet current deployment practices suggest insufficient progress in addressing these equality obligations. We should also address the secrecy surrounding police watch-lists. The Justice and Home Affairs Committee of this House recommended that these lists be subject to compulsory statutory criteria and standardised training. There is no independent review of watch-list inclusion, no notification to those placed on lists and no clear route for challenge or removal. I also very much appreciated what the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, had to say about the problems with software. But the chilling sentence he delivered was “Technology has to take over”. That is precisely the problem that we are living with. If technology is to take over, we need a legal framework to govern it. The current patchwork of overlapping laws addressing human rights, data protection and criminal justice is not fit for purpose. These amendments provide the democratic and judicial guard-rails needed to contain this technology, and we cannot allow the convenience of new tools to erode our established civil liberties. Only Parliament should determine the framework for how LFR is used in our society, and only the courts should authorise its deployment in individual cases.