Contribution
My Lords, this group of amendments touches on how the police should deal with modern threats and how we balance civil liberties with the clear duty of the state to protect the public.
I listened very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, when she introduced her Amendment 379, which, as she said, would prevent the police using live facial recognition when imposing conditions on public processions or assemblies under the relevant provisions of the Public Order Act, unless and until a new statutory code of practice had been approved. If we accept—as we on these Benches and, I think, others in your Lordships’ House do—that live facial recognition can be a legitimate and valuable policing tool in preventing crime, identifying suspects and protecting the public, it is difficult to justify singling out its use in this specific context for an additional and likely onerous layer of bureaucracy. The police already operate within an extensive framework of legal safeguards, such as data protection law. To require a further code of practice, subject to affirmative approval by both Houses of Parliament, risks delaying or deterring the deployment of technology precisely where it may be most needed. So, regretfully, we cannot support the amendment.
Amendment 471, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, goes further in seeking to affect the Government’s ability to use live facial recognition technology. It would restrict the circumstances in which live facial recognition could be used; it would require prior judicial authorisation in the specific circumstances of its use; and it would create an extensive new enforcement and oversight architecture. Public order situations are often fast-moving and unpredictable. Senior officers must be able to make operational decisions quickly, based on risk and intelligence on the ground. Introducing additional procedural hurdles at the point of use risks undermining that agility. We should focus on rolling out effective technology at pace to combat crime and disorder, while ensuring robust safeguards and scrutiny.
In particular, the requirement for prior judicial authorisation is, in our view, particularly problematic. One of the principal advantages of live facial recognition is its speed and flexibility. It can be deployed rapidly in response to emerging intelligence, acute threats or serious risks to public safety, and requiring prior judicial approval risks rendering the technology ineffective in precisely the circumstances where it could prevent serious harm. In dynamic operational scenarios, such as events of violent disorder, knife crime hot spots or rapidly evolving threats, delay can mean failure.
I was particularly taken by the speech of my noble friend Lord Moynihan, who spoke about the position in New York, where, because of there being fewer police on the streets, the technology had to take over. He was right to say that.
We on these Benches are concerned by the attempt to narrow the scope of live facial recognition to a tightly defined set of purposes, because, if Parliament accepts the use of this technology in principle, it makes little sense to confine it to only a small number of scenarios. Crime does not present itself neatly within statutory categories. Policing requires judgment and discretion. Artificially restricting the use of a tool that has demonstrated value risks depriving the police of one of the most effective capabilities available to them.
We of course recognise the need for appropriate safeguards to be implemented in the use of this technology. This new and expanded use of people’s data, even if to facilitate an objective that we support, must be enacted with transparency and proportionality. But these amendments would constrain the police’s operations and weaken our ability to respond to modern threats. At a time when criminals are increasingly sophisticated and technologically adept, Parliament should be empowering the police to use lawful, proportionate and effective tools rather than tying their hands.