Lord Clement-Jones (LD)

My Lords, this group addresses the extension of warrantless search powers for electronically tracked stolen goods to the service police, in Clause 129, alongside civilian police, in Clause 128. While we recognise the need for police to tackle high-tech crime, such sweeping powers, particularly warrantless searches, must be meticulously governed to avoid abuse and uphold civil liberties. I have tabled Amendments 386 to 389, which would ensure that robust governance and accountability mechanisms are embedded in these provisions. Amendment 386 would require the Secretary of State to produce a code of practice for the operation of Clause 129, specifically mandating consultation with civil liberties and human rights organisations and relevant service police bodies. This would ensure due process regarding the authorisation, seizure, retention and disposal of evidence. Amendment 388 would require the Secretary of State to provide appropriate training for service police personnel on how to exercise these powers proportionately and lawfully. Amendment 387 would mandate the establishment of an independent mechanism for handling, investigating and reviewing public complaints arising from the exercise of these powers, giving complainants similar statutory rights to victims reporting to the Independent Office for Police Conduct. Amendment 389 would mandate that the Secretary of State produces an annual report detailing the exercise of these warrantless search powers under Clause 128, ensuring transparency and accountability to Parliament. Further, these new obligations would require the affirmative procedure for their governing regulations, ensuring full parliamentary debate before they are enacted, as sought in Amendments 499 to 501. We on these Benches are opposed to Amendments 383 to 385 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, which seek to remove the requirement, as we have heard from the noble Lord, for an officer to even possess electronic tracking data before conducting a warrantless search. By stripping away this technologically justified threshold, these amendments would transform a specific investigative tool into an arbitrary power of entry, undermining the core principle that a person’s home is his castle. In contrast, Amendments 386 to 389 provide the necessary basis for these intrusive powers to be overseen. Specifically, Amendment 386 mandates a statutory code of practice for the Armed Forces to ensure that their exercise of these powers is necessary, proportionate and strictly compliant with the Human Rights Act. Furthermore, Amendment 387 would establish an independent mechanism for handling public complaints, ensuring that any misuse of power is investigated by a body demonstrably independent of the service police. Finally, my amendments would require post-implementation reporting to Parliament every 12 months. We must see the data on the demographic profile of those targeted and the subsequent criminal justice outcomes to guard against disproportionate application or mission creep. Without these safeguards, we risk creating a shortcut—as other provisions might do—to a surveillance state, where convenience is prioritised over constitutional protection. The safeguards that I have proposed in Amendments 386 to 389 regarding service police are only as strong as the parliamentary scrutiny that would underpin them. We must ensure that these powers are exercised with not just efficiency but a regular check of parliamentary accountability.