Contribution
I shall speak to Amendments 372 and 380 and various other amendments in this group. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, for his kind remarks at the end of the previous group, but I fear that, after this speech, normal service might be resumed. There are many issues to cover in this group, and I will try to be as brief as possible.
Government Amendment 372 amends the Public Order Act 1986 to impose a duty on the police to consider so-called “cumulative disruption” caused by repeated protests in a given area. The amendment gives the police unprecedented powers to restrict or prohibit protests that are expected to be too disruptive. This amendment represents a grievous attack on the right to protest, which is vital to our democracy, and has many unintended consequences, as I shall outline. The overly broad framework would empower the police routinely to curb freedom of expression and assembly as exercised through peaceful protest. It would significantly expand the definition of serious disruption to include so-called cumulative disruption caused by repeated protests in an area. This would allow the police pre-emptively to prohibit peaceful demonstrations if, in their opinion, an area has been the site of too many protests, which is an extremely broad discretion.
Until this debate started, I had no idea that this provision is aimed at frequent protests outside synagogues. The amendment says nothing to that effect, and it has very broad application to all protests, so I shall carry on on that basis.
Presumably it would apply if the protests in question were organised by different groups who advocate for different causes. This could create a first-come, first-served version of free speech, where areas are given what could be described as a protest allowance at the whim of the local constabulary. The police would be within their rights to prohibit peaceful assemblies once that allowance had been used up. This opens up the concerning opportunity for groups of citizens to censor their political opponents by using up an area’s protest allowance before their opponents have had a chance to protest themselves.
Furthermore, as has already been said this evening, the amendment is silent on what constitutes an area. We do not know whether this power would permit the police to move a demonstration to a different part of a square, to another part of town or even to a difficult-to-reach rural area, resulting in decreased attendance and visibility. Perhaps the Minister could enlighten the Committee on that.
Similarly, Amendment 372 does not specify within what timeframe disruption would have to be repeated to be considered cumulative. This is another question for the Minister. The suggestion that so-called cumulative disruption should be taken into account in considering conditions for restrictions or prohibitions of protests is also disproportionate. Will the Minister please explain why one person’s right to protest should be extinguished simply because somebody else has already protested in the same location about the same cause, or about a different cause?
What about causes that evolve or develop over time, legitimately calling for further protests to coincide with the next stage of public debate? The courts have also repeatedly concluded that a relevant consideration regarding the proportionality of Article 10 and Article 11 rights is whether the views giving rise to the protest relate to “very important issues”. That would de facto be more likely to apply to causes that have led to repeated protests than it would to causes that have given rise to a single protest. This provision, if enacted, would give the police an additional power to ban or curtail protests on the most important causes: the ones most worthy of protest and the ones most protected by the courts. Will the Minister please explain if that is the intention?
Amendment 372 is poorly drafted. It is far too broad to prevent the problems that I have described, and it gives the police far too much power to curtail or prevent peaceful protest on the most important matters. Government Amendments 372 and 380 should both be withdrawn or, if necessary, voted down.
Government Amendment 381 would create a new offence about protesting outside the homes of public officeholders. This may be sensible but should it not have a reasonable conduct defence, as appears in other harassment-type offences, to cover, for example, situations where a neighbour speaks amicably to a politician about a local issue as they are leaving home? Would it be proportionate to criminalise that perfectly normal interaction? That is another question for the Minister.
On Clause 124, which caused so much heat rather than light earlier, it goes without saying that worshipers must be free to access their places of worship, be they synagogues, mosques, churches, or whatever, and worshippers must be able to do so without intimidation or threats or fear of the same. But those rights are already fully protected by the Public Order Act 1986. Under the Act, conditions may be imposed on protests by senior police officers if they believe that the procession may result in serious public disorder or where the purpose of the organisers is the intimidation of others. Section 12(2)(a) of the Act specifically includes places of worship, so Clause 124 may be completely unnecessary.
The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain, seek to clarify what is meant by “in the vicinity”. They are all well and good, but just about every place where people demonstrate is close to a church or another place of worship. For example, Parliament Square and Trafalgar Square would fail the test. Clause 124 could enable the police to ban or restrict just about any protest on that basis. That is probably not the intention, but it would be the result.
Amendment 378A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, would allow restrictions to be placed on protest or assembly if they take place in the vicinity of places used for “democratic decision-making”. Given the high standing of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, in this House, I find this idea rather strange. It would restrict protest close to Parliament, which is where the people who make the decisions, the people the protesters most want to influence, are to be found. The whole point of protest is to engage in a democratic process and seek to persuade decision-makers to a particular point of view. If anything, protest is more proportionate where it takes place in the vicinity of decision-makers. There is no sensible argument for Amendment 378A; it should be rejected.
Turning briefly to Amendment 370A, I understand that the idea of designating as an “extreme criminal protest group” is something that the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has been advocating for a long time. I oppose it because it is an oppressive and draconian restriction on the right to protest, in essence banning specific protest organisations. It is, of course, right that the law steps in to criminalise unlawful protest activity, but this is already done frequently on an individual basis. Criminalising association with others who share the same cause is wholly disproportionate; not everyone associated with a group shares any criminal intent. Designation or restriction of ECPGs will serve only to criminalise other law-abiding citizens because of their shared, but reasonably held, political views about a particular cause.
Taken as a whole, this group of amendments extends the regressive and anti-democratic tendencies of the previous Government—and now this one—to suppress or ban legitimate and peaceful protests in whatever way they can. Substantial pruning is required to get the Bill into a state where it no longer threatens our cherished democratic processes. Peaceful protest educates the public. It sparks debate. It creates the pressure needed for reform. In a healthy democracy, disagreement is not a threat but a sign that citizens care deeply about their society.