Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his responses; I am also grateful for the debate we have had on this group of amendments. I am grateful to all noble Lords beyond me who have asked further questions, particularly in the latter stage of this short debate. It is fair to say—I am saying this against myself—that, with so many questions having been directed originally to the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, but applying to both Ministers, it would be extremely helpful to have a full letter with the answers. This has been an important debate; some clear issues have been spoken to, and answers are required. I will start by picking up some points made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. He gave the impression—indeed, he said this; I cannot remember his expression—that I was being negative about the Local Government Pension Scheme. I reiterate the point made by my noble friend Lord Fuller: the Local Government Pension Scheme is efficient and is very much a British success story. In addition to that, my noble friend Lord Fuller set out—very eloquently, I thought—the concerns around both the complexities in the Bill and the unintended consequences. There are two clear sides to this. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on the success aspect; I want to be quite clear that he knows my position on this. What unites the amendments in this group is not opposition to reform, nor hostility to pooling local investment or good governance. Rather, it is a concern about how far the Bill reaches into areas that have traditionally, and rightly, been the responsibility of trustees exercising fiduciary judgment. The noble Lord, Lord Katz, said that intervention by government is very much a last resort. I accept what he says but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, asked—very tellingly—are the Government best placed to direct? Further, she made an interesting point on whether the £400 billion should be part of a sovereign wealth fund. That just shows that it is worth having this sort of debate on this important area of the Bill. Across these clauses, the Bill moves from setting a framework to conferring powers of direction, compulsion and prescription; direction over participation in asset pools; compulsion towards a particular end state without a clear transition; duties to co-operate with strategic authorities without defined boundaries; and regulation-making powers that reach into advisory pathways and the content of investment strategies themselves. I feel from the debate that each of these elements raises the same underlying question: how will these powers be exercised in a way that is genuinely compatible with fiduciary duty, rather than merely being stated to be so? With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but I also acknowledge that there is much work to be done in this area.