Contribution
I thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for bringing forward this important debate on the effectiveness of Magnitsky-style sanctions for serious human rights abuses. They are tools that reflect our values as a country that is meant to defend human rights and the rule of law.
Under the UK’s autonomous sanctions framework, which is built on the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 and reinforced by subsequent legislation, the global human rights sanction regime allows us to target individuals and entities responsible for gross violations of human rights, including with asset freezes and travel bans. Magnitsky sanctions have been used against perpetrators of egregious abuses in multiple contexts, from Russian officials linked to the death of Sergei Magnitsky to those implicated in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and military leaders in Myanmar. However, today’s debate also requires us to consider the broader effectiveness and consistency of these tools in the face of major crises.
Multiple authoritative assessments, particularly from REDRESS and UK parliamentary evidence submissions, highlight several areas where the UK Magnitsky sanctions regime has failed to act effectively. Evidence shows that the UK has not replicated the majority of Magnitsky sanctions imposed by partner jurisdictions across the US, Canada and the EU. Only 14% of global Magnitsky designations are listed under the UK Magnitsky regime and another 17% appear under other UK regimes, meaning that 69% of perpetrators sanctioned abroad are not sanctioned by the UK at all. Of the unsanctioned cases, 71% were designated by the US, 27% by Canada and 2% by the EU, yet the UK has not followed suit.
The gap means that the UK is failing to act against individuals already identified as human rights abusers or corrupt actors by close allies. The UK has received at least 15 detailed evidence packages from NGOs such as REDRESS documenting alleged human rights abuses or corruption in many of the countries that were referenced by previous speakers, including China, Sudan, Uganda, Bangladesh, Venezuela and others. In many of those cases, the US has already sanctioned the perpetrators, but the UK has failed to act in almost all of them.
On the use of the legal powers available, according to parliamentary evidence, since September 2021 the UK has sanctioned only three individuals under its Magnitsky human rights regime, compared with 105 designations in the preceding period under the previous Foreign Secretary. That reflects a significant slowdown and a lack of strategic direction. There is also poor co-ordination with our allies in the US, the EU and other sanctioning partners. The recommendations from the all-party parliamentary group on Magnitsky sanctions and reparation stressed that the UK’s unilateral approach weakens the effectiveness of sanctions. The UK has failed to systematically sanction individuals already targeted by partners, co-ordinate multilateral actions to target corrupt networks instead of isolated individuals, or match the scale and frequency of designation by allies.
Magnitsky sanctions have been used against the egregious abuses that I have mentioned. However, today’s debate requires us to reflect on the broader effectiveness and consistency of these tools. In recent months, the United Kingdom has taken steps to sanction two Israeli Government Ministers over their repeated incitement of violence against Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Those designations, made alongside partners including Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Norway, include travel bans and asset freezes and were justified by the Foreign Office as necessary responses to genocide and serious abuses of human rights. Moreover, the UK has suspended trade negotiations with Israel in response to its ongoing military offensive in Gaza and related violence in the west bank and has applied sanctions against settlers and settler organisations linked to violence against the Palestinian communities.
The scale and scope of action by the UK Government has not been sufficient, and we have failed to reflect our obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law to ensure that civilians do not suffer, particularly in the light of provisional measures from the International Court of Justice ordering the protection of civilians in Gaza and actions directed at ending grave human rights violations in Gaza and the west bank. The sheer scale of suffering in Gaza, including from the blockade’s effect on civilians and the risk of mass starvation, must prompt far stronger measures, ranging from broader sanctions and trade restrictions to the enforcement of legal obligations to prevent atrocities.
Instead, we see 37 NGOs, including Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Rescue Committee, ousted and banned from providing aid across the west bank and Gaza with impunity. That is despite nearly 1.9 million displaced Gazans being vulnerable to shortages of tents, shelter materials, medical assistance, clean water and sanitation support during winter, and we still refuse to go further on sanctions and punishment for Israel’s actions. At the same time, the UK Government have stressed their continued support for Israel’s security while the Israeli Government expand illegal settlements deeper and deeper into Palestinian territory. We have recognised the state of Palestine, which is a welcome step, but we must follow that up by fulfilling our obligations under that recognition to the Palestinian people.
All that illustrates an essential point: Magnitsky-style sanctions are neither symbolic nor irrelevant, but their effectiveness depends on consistent, principled application, rigorous enforcement and alignment with broader obligations and foreign policy goals. Targeted sanctions are most effective when they clearly align with international law, with evidence and with credible human rights concerns, when they are co-ordinated with international partners to avoid loopholes and politicisation, and when they are part of a broader strategy that includes diplomacy, humanitarian advocacy and engagement with multilateral justice mechanisms. Used in isolation, sanctions risk being dismissed as gestures rather than being seen as instruments of accountability. Used in co-ordination with wider action, they can contribute meaningfully to deterrence, pressure for change and justice for victims.
The United Kingdom should make principal use of Magnitsky sanctions wherever there is credible evidence of human rights abuses—be it in Russia, the middle east, Sudan, Myanmar or elsewhere—but they must also be prepared to act boldly and consistently, in line with international law when confronted with mass civilian suffering anywhere on the globe. Our inconsistent approach to human rights, and the protection of so-called allies, condemns us all to an unsafe world in which might is right and wrongdoing is never corrected. In the same stroke of a pen, we shame our enemies and sign away the human rights that we like to proclaim are sacrosanct. We must ensure that our sanctions regime is not just a statement of values but a tool that genuinely contributes to accountability, justice and the prevention of atrocities. I commend the motion to the House.