Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)

My Lords, I strongly commend the report of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, which I have read. My purpose in speaking, very briefly, is to interrogate Amendment 369, in the light of what we already have. What we already have was very well put in a report by David Spencer of Policy Exchange, the director of which is my noble friend Lord Godson. David Spencer put the current balance very well, I think in his report A Long, Long Way to Go. He wrote: “The Human Rights Act 1998 does not refer to a ‘Right to Protest’ – the relevant rights are the ‘Right to freedom of expression’ (Article 10) and ‘Right to freedom of peaceful assembly’ (Article 11). However, the sense that many of the recent wave of protests have been ‘peaceful’ by any ordinary understanding of the word – particularly when filled with antisemitic chanting through mobile sound amplifiers, calls for ‘jihad’ on the streets of London, or the use of criminal damage as a tactic – is clearly false. Further, Articles 10 and 11 are qualified rights”— and this is the point about balance that other noble Lords have made— “in that they can be restricted where it is necessary and proportionate to protect public safety, prevent crime and protect the rights and freedoms of others”. I myself think that the balance in the Human Rights Act really puts the matter rather well when it refers to this right of peaceful assembly. Peaceful assembly surely does not mean that the protest must be meek and mild. One must expect protests to be noisy, turbulent, robust and, up to a point, disruptive. But the right of protests to be disruptive, as the noble Lord, Lord Walney, said a few moments ago, must be balanced against the right of others not to have their lives disrupted. That is the balance of the thing. Furthermore, just in closing, there is a very difficult issue here that David Spencer raises very profoundly about some of the language that has been used in demonstrations that is very close to—trembling on the verge of—incitement. In a country where we have seen what happened in the synagogue in Manchester, and where attacks are carried out on other institutions, we have to bear that in mind. In short, it seems to me this amendment is either reproducing what is already in the Human Rights Act, in which case it is unnecessary, or it is complicating it, in which case it should not really be there. My own sense is that it is complicating it, and that it makes no sense at all to scatter different rights willy-nilly in different pieces of legislation, rather than—if one is going to set positive rights out in statute—putting them in one place in the Human Rights Act, which is what has been done. So I think that the balance we have got is satisfactory and that the amendment does not really stand up to robust interrogation.