James Cartlidge

The hon. Gentleman will be aware that we have been training Ukrainian soldiers since 2014—over 60,000, I think, under Operation Interflex. I think there is a very strong consensus in the House on support for Ukraine. Obviously, there were limitations on what we could do. We have done everything possible. We were the first country in Europe to stand by Ukraine. We sent weapons before the invasion started. We did not wait for Putin to invade so that we could comply perfectly with international law. Boris Johnson and Ben Wallace had the guts to ignore the Foreign Office and send those weapons, despite that—premeditated. If Kyiv had fallen and the column of tanks heading to Kyiv had not been intercepted, we would have been in an extremely serious situation. I am making a point about procurement. This is important. By April 2024, we were providing Ukraine with drone and counter-drone capabilities that were proving decisive on a real battlefield, against the peer military threat in Europe. They were not being produced through the old system, full of delays and overspend, but by British SMEs, producing them cheaply, swiftly and with constant feedback from the frontline. We were therefore incredibly well placed to deliver the vision of the MOD defence drone strategy—which I published in February 2024 and is meant to be current Government policy—whereby we would be a leading nation in uncrewed warfare. Most importantly, we would have achieved that by providing in parallel for our armed forces the drone technology that we were giving to Ukraine. By now, our Army should have been training across the board in drone warfare, the Navy should have been fielding the beginnings of an autonomous drone fleet, learning the lessons from Ukraine’s extraordinary victory in the Black sea, and the RAF should have been maximising investment in loyal wingmen—drones that would fly alongside and enhance the lethality of our current Typhoons. But there was one big problem.