Sir Mel Stride

I will in a moment. It should be pointed out, of course, that that is a fiddled fiscal target. It is not the fiscal target that we were working to—the same definition of debt. It is not net public sector debt at all; it is something different. In fact, if we were to apply the targets that we were running to, which were much more stringent, to the figures in the forecast that we see from the recent Budget, those targets would be underwater in every single year of that forecast. We should acknowledge that there is now real risk to the stability of our economy, even with an apparently doubled fiscal headroom. The first risk is in defence spending. Although within the numbers, there is the ambition to reach 2.7% of GDP by 2027, there is nothing beyond that. Of course, the Government know that they will have to spend more on defence, and that every increase of 1% of GDP in defence spending is about £25 billion—more than the entire fiscal headroom that the Chancellor has set aside. The Chancellor knows that part of the problem she had with the forecast—although other things moved strongly and positively in her direction—was the productivity growth downgrade by the OBR from 1.3% to 1%. The trend for productivity over the past 15 years has been just 0.5%. If the OBR decides in a couple of years’ time to return to an assumption of trend growth in productivity, that will wipe out £28 billion of headroom. It will destroy all the headroom and more. Similarly, on the path of interest rates, a 1% increase in interest rates across the forecast would cost £16 billion. In relation to particular spending pressures, such as special educational needs and disabilities, there is of course a £6 billion cost pressure, because that spending will be taken from local authorities and put on to the Government’s books in 2028. How that additional cost will be met is not in any way accounted for. Similarly, apparent efficiency savings of £4 billion in 2029-30—the target year—are very handy if one is trying to hit a fiscal target, but there is no explanation whatsoever of where or how those efficiency savings will be found. My final point is that the tax increases set out by the Chancellor are all back-ended. That is when the frozen thresholds kick in. We are expected to believe that, in the run-up to a general election, a party that has shown no resolve, backbone or capacity to take difficult decisions will suddenly find some backbone, stick to its guns and deliver those tax increases. That simply will not happen.