Contribution
My Lords, I will make two points. The first relates to Motion B and the removal of the arbitrary statutory limit on compensation. My noble friend the Minister mentioned the tribunal statistics for 2023-24, published by the Government, and the fact that the median award for unfair dismissal was £6,746. That is the median award, not, as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, mentioned, the average award. It means that 50% of all awards for unfair dismissal are less than £6,746.
But those statistics reveal something that I found even more startling: in that year, 2023-24, the tribunals disposed of 31,000 single-claim cases and 2,000 multiple-claim cases; of those, only 646 awards were made in respect of compensation for unfair dismissal. Of course, one accepts that many cases were settled through ACAS or between the parties and then approved by the tribunal, and that would count as a disposal. But 646 cases out of 33,000 means that this jurisdiction of unfair dismissal is little used.
Of those awarded compensation, the latest government survey, which dates from 2013 and has never been updated, found that only 49% of claimants had been paid in full, a further 16% had been paid in part and 35% of successful claimants receiving a tribunal award had never received a penny of their awards. In 2016, the then Government sought to address this lamentable state of affairs by establishing the employment tribunal penalty enforcement and naming scheme to penalise companies that do not pay within 28 days of the tribunal order and, since 2018, by publicly naming them.
However, the BBC and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism published research two months ago showing that of the 7,000 unpaid claimants using the scheme, no less than 5,000 had failed to obtain any recovery. Some 4,800 penalty notices had been issued, with a combined value of £9 million of unpaid awards, but government records show that only 109 of those notices were actually paid, and none of the employers in question was named, despite nearly 4,000 requests for naming as well as compensation. These are the issues that the Government need to confront, not whether highly paid executives and others who are found to have been unfairly dismissed are entitled to the full measure of compensation for their losses.
My second and final point relates to Motion D, the amendment to it from the noble Lord, Lord Burns, and the discussion there has been, on this occasion and on the previous one, which my noble friend Lord Barber was involved in, about the compromise that was reached in 2016. I will go back a little further in the history of trade union political funds. In 1871, the Trade Union Act gave unions, for the first time in British history, legitimacy under the law. A trade union was materially defined as
“such combination, whether temporary or permanent, for regulating the relations between workmen and masters”.
The Act protected such organisations from illegality, in particular for restraint of trade, what is now called anti-competitive activities, of which collective bargaining as the means of regulating relations was the paradigm example. With various tweaks, the essential element of regulating relations between workers and employers remains the essential element in the current legislation for the definition of trade unions.
The point I want to make is that before the 1871 Act and for 40 years afterwards, trade unions continued to spend money promoting parliamentary Bills for the benefit of working people, such as on health and safety, national insurance, restoration of the right to strike after the Taff Vale judgment of 1901, and so on. At the end of the century, they came to the conclusion that they needed representation in Parliament. The Labour Representation Committee was founded by the TUC in 1900 and became the Labour Party in 1906. All this was largely financed by the unions from their general funds, just as employers financed the Tories and the Liberals. But in December 1909—