Contribution
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for this group of amendments. Amendments 1 and 6 would require the Secretary of State to enter into at least one revenue certainty contract with a SAF producer that is using power-to-liquid technology. The Government recognise the potential that power-to-liquid fuel may have. These fuels will have high greenhouse gas emissions reduction potential, with a low risk of environmental issues such as land use change.
However, adopting these amendments would limit the Government’s allocation flexibility by setting criteria in advance, which could ultimately reduce value for money in the contracts agreed. It is important that the allocation strategy is able to reflect different technologies as they develop. The Government will establish a fair and transparent process to assess each project’s key costs, benefits and risks. This process will be developed over the coming months and will involve consultation with stakeholders.
The decisions on contract allocation will be determined during the contract allocation process. The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, is right that we do not want perpetual subsidy, but we have to establish over time the opportunity for different technologies to develop.
The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, is right in his remarks about contract lengths; there is no humiliation there at all. The length of contracts is not set out in the Bill, and the amendments other than his Amendment 2 would extend the time in which the contracts could be entered into, not the length of the contracts themselves. We are engaging a range of stakeholders on contract length because it obviously makes sense to talk to the market about that. No final decisions have yet been made.
Contracts issued under similar schemes are generally for a period of 10 to 15 years, which reflects a standard debt repayment period. Limiting the contract to 10 years may not be sufficient to attract the investment necessary to construct these plants, and I contend that it is premature to decide the contract length until the market has advised what it would need to construct the plants that would make the fuel.
The Bill allows the Secretary of State crucial flexibility to adjust any standard contract length in between allocation rounds in the light of emerging market evidence. It also preserves optionality for the potential needs of emerging pathways—for example, nuclear-derived SAF. The addition of a no-fault break clause would, of course, undermine the certainty provided by the contract and seriously risks losing the investor confidence that the Bill aims to increase.
In respect of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, the learning from the energy market is that the contracts need to be long enough to secure the investment that we are talking about. The noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, asked what the right contract length is. I think we have to establish that by talking to the market, so it is premature to determine it now.
On the contrary, Amendment 3 seeks to extend the time in which revenue certainty contracts can be allocated from 10 years to 20 years. The purpose of the Bill is to kick-start the industry in this country. The revenue certainty mechanism is intended to be a time-limited measure and to stimulate the early market. Once investors have confidence in the market price and the first-of-a-kind technology has proved itself at commercial scale—to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan—the mechanism should no longer be needed.
The Government contend that Amendment 3 is not the right way to go. However, if the Government find in due course that it is necessary to extend the provision, Clause 1(8) will allow the Secretary of State to extend the period by which contracts can be allocated in five-year increments by making regulations by the affirmative resolution, so that Parliament can take a view about the applicability of that extension at the time that it is proposed.
Amendment 5 from the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, seeks to include a contract allocation framework in the Bill. The Government will need to carefully consider and work with industry on the specifics of contract allocation. This will ensure that there will be a fair and transparent allocation process that evaluates the key costs, benefits and risks of each project. This will be developed over the coming months and will be rightly subject to consultation with stakeholders. The amendment as it stands would reduce the Government’s leverage in negotiations by setting criteria in advance and limit the ability to secure the best value for money in the contract signed.
The noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, referred to the Energy Act 2023. The allocation framework was included in the Energy Act 2013 and the Energy Act 2023 to ensure that the Secretary of State could effectively regulate the activities of an allocation body where one is appointed under that legislation. In this Bill, the Secretary of State will carry out the allocation process, so it is not necessary to set out an allocation framework to govern the activities of an allocation body.
I hope that my explanations have answered the concerns and that noble Lords feel able not to press their amendments.