Contribution
My Lords, since the noble Lords, Lord Black and Lord Blencathra, have said that this is not an easy subject, I remind the Committee of what happened when Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 on sex with animals was debated in this House in Committee on 1 April 2003. I draw attention to what the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, said on that occasion:
“I hope that this matter is not something that most noble Lords come across. As we rarely have the opportunity to talk about such subjects, it seems right to ensure that any possible imperfections in the wording are covered, however difficult it may be to talk about them”.—[Official Report, 1/4/03; col. 1186.]
That wise advice applies today.
The prohibition of sex with animals has a long history. It was proscribed in Leviticus, chapter 18, verse 23. Coke’s 17th-century Institutes of the Lawes of England, volume 3, page 59, refer to the criminal offence by a “great Lady” who
“committed Buggery with a Baboon, and conceived by it”.
As the noble Lord, Lord Black, has explained, the limits of Section 69 of the Sexual Offences Act, like its predecessors, are that it covers only some sexual activity—penile penetration of the vagina or anus of the animal or of a human being by an animal—and does not apply to sexual activity with a dead animal. The exclusion of sex with a dead animal is particularly odd, as the next section of the 2003 Act, Section 70, does make it a criminal offence to engage in penetrative sex with a human corpse. The amendment would extend the scope of the offence to cover all “sexual activity” with an animal or using an animal for sexual gratification.
The noble Lord, Lord Black, has sought to define sexual activity in this context with a degree of precision in proposed new subsection (2), but has also left room for debate by stating that sexual activity “includes” what is specified. Of course, sexual activity is as broad as the human imagination. I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Black, that it would be preferable for an amendment to the law not to attempt a legislative Kama Sutra of possibilities but rather to adopt the approach seen in other sections of the 2003 Act.
The 2003 Act already uses the concept of “sexual activity”, for example in Section 4, and Section 78 provides a general definition of sexual activity. Sexual activity, says Section 78, means what a reasonable person would regard as sexual in nature, irrespective of the defendant’s purpose in relation to it. There is a slightly different definition in Section 71 relating to sexual activity in a lavatory, and I confess that I have not fully understood why Parliament in 2003 used a slightly different definition in that context. However, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Black, that it would be better to have a portmanteau phrase, “sexual activity”, so defined, which is already the approach that the 2003 Act takes in Sections 4 and 78.
I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will not pursue his original wish to substitute the term “bestiality”. My understanding is that, as a matter of law, bestiality is confined to penile penetration of the vagina or anus, which is contrary to the admirable intention of the noble Lord, Lord Black, to broaden the scope of the legislation.
It may also be helpful to include a definition of an “animal” in the new clause by cross-reference to other statutory definitions. As the Committee will know, the Animal Welfare Act 2006 provides by Section 1 that it applies to vertebrates other than man, but there is a power by regulations to extend the protection to cover classes of invertebrates. The Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022 covers, in addition to non-human vertebrates, molluscs and crustaceans. I doubt—the noble Lord, Lord Black, may have broader knowledge than me —whether sexual activity with a mollusc or a crustacean is a mischief which the Bill needs to address.
I have one final point. As was mentioned, this amendment would increase the maximum sentence of imprisonment for the Section 69 offence from two years to five years. I am doubtful about that. I would expect that defendants who are found guilty of the sexual abuse of animals nowadays are, as they always were, sad, pathetic individuals who need help rather than a lengthy prison sentence of more than two years. I would be very interested to hear from the Minister whether in any of the cases under the current Section 69 in the last few years any defendant has received a sentence of two years, or whether any judge has complained that the current sentencing powers of a maximum of two years are inadequate.