Contribution
I add my commendation to the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) for securing this important debate. Hearing the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) speak reminded me of our trip to Ukraine earlier in the year. Thinking of surreal moments, it cannot be more surreal than being on a road outside Kharkiv watching him try to fix a car that was not working properly.
In recent weeks, it has become painfully clear that many of us underestimated the sophistication and intent behind the Trump Administration’s manoeuvres regarding Ukraine, Europe and Russia. What at first seemed like a genuine pivot towards supporting Ukraine now appears, in retrospect, to have been a carefully orchestrated performance designed to protect Russian assets, pave the way for future business dealings and shape a narrative in which Ukraine’s defeat was treated as inevitable.
At the heart of that strategy lies the $300 billion in frozen Russian sovereign assets that hon. Members have mentioned repeatedly this afternoon. For many years, including in this place, we have debated whether those assets should be used to help Ukraine defend itself and rebuild. But we now know from reports that US officials have been placing intense pressure on European Governments to leave those assets untouched, and indeed insisting it is their view that they be returned to Russia after any peace deal, while feigning, for months, a willingness to ramp up support for Ukraine.
That illusion was crucial, because the more Europeans believed that Washington might still back Ukraine, the less likely European Governments were to take unilateral steps, including seizing or repurposing those Russian assets. It was a calculated sleight of hand, and it succeeded. Even now, European leaders remain hesitant, while Washington has now made its position unmistakably clear that Ukraine is expected to accept a settlement that has been shaped by Russian interests—because, I believe, it is Trump’s assessment that Russia will ultimately prevail.
We have to face the facts: the September-October pivot, when Trump and Vance claimed that Russia was losing and Ukraine could win, was most likely theatre. Trump has always accepted the Russian narrative of inevitable Ukrainian defeat, and once the pretence ended, US officials made their message clear to the Ukrainians: “Accept a deal now or face a worse one later. Russia can fight indefinitely; Ukraine cannot.” In my view, this is not diplomacy; it is coercive pressure on Ukraine, and it carries an unmistakable message that the United States Administration are now structuring their policy around the assumption of a Russian victory in the long term. Many of us will be incredibly worried that Trump will pressure Ukraine into giving up territory and ultimately fail to give any meaningful security guarantees. It is for Ukrainians who have paid a price in blood to decide for themselves what price they are prepared to pay for peace.
What does this mean for Europe and for Britain? First, it means that we must accept the truth that if Ukraine is to resist Russian maximalist aims, we must step up now, not in six months or in two years. Secondly, it means that the fate of Russian sovereign assets is not a technical financial matter but a strategic one, and every delay, hesitation and concession on this issue weakens Ukraine and emboldens the Kremlin. Thirdly, it means we must recognise that 2026 will likely be the decisive year in this war. Yes, Russia faces mounting economic difficulties, fuel shortages and internal discontent, and the Kremlin still insists on its war aims, but its capacity to sustain the war is not limitless, and a sense of futility in Moscow is a necessary condition for peace. Ukraine’s ability to hold the line, supported through European unity, is central to bringing that moment closer.
I do not think that we have touched this afternoon on the fact that Ukrainian resilience is not endless either. There are hundreds of thousands of cases of desertion—a stark measure of exhaustion and eroding morale among frontline soldiers. Many units are under-strength and increasingly reliant on poorly trained conscripts rather than experienced volunteers. Some brigades operate without adequate rest, rotation or munitions. Commanders describe troops who are physically depleted, mentally exhausted and losing confidence in the strategic direction of the war. The result is a brittle front, with units stretched to breaking point, lacking resilience and vulnerable to sudden local collapses. Without substantial support, I really worry that the Ukrainian military could face a cascading breakdown as Russia continues to pile on the pressure.
The strain on Ukraine’s civilian population is equally acute. After three years of missile and drone attacks, millions of Ukrainians endure repeated power outages, damaged infrastructure, deep psychological trauma and limited access to heating, electricity and clean water. Mental health support has deteriorated sharply, especially as winter approaches. Displaced families have exhausted their savings, livelihoods have vanished, and the cumulative stress of air raids, mourning for the dead and uncertainty has driven a marked rise in depression, anxiety and long-term trauma. Communities live in a cycle of destruction and partial recovery, eroding resilience with each passing month.
We should be clear-eyed about our own position. We had warning after warning, but we never did enough—the invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the full-scale invasion several years ago, yet still we did not ramp up defence spending. The British armed forces have experienced years of hollowing out, cuts to troop numbers and chronic under-investment. Only now are we finally beginning to reverse some of that decline, but can we honestly say that the pace is adequate to the threat we face?