Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)

My Lords, I will start by thanking noble Lords for their rigorous and detailed representations on the mayoral commissioners model that the Bill introduces. I think it is fair to say that there is a plurality of views on this important area, evidenced by the substance of the amendments tabled and the hours of considered debate in both Houses. The government amendments that I am introducing today follow considerable deliberation on those contributions. They focus on ensuring that we balance the operational flexibility of the commissioner model with appropriate accountability and scrutiny—issues that have been raised repeatedly in this House. I will take these amendments in five groupings. First, government Amendments 42 and 46 increase the maximum number of commissioners the mayor may appoint from seven to 10. Secondly, government Amendments 50, 53, 55, 59, 62 and 64 allow multiple commissioners to operate in a single area of competence. Thirdly, government Amendments 51 and 60 ensure that commissioners can operate in one or more aspects of an area, rather than only the area as a whole. Fourthly, government Amendments 54 and 63 clarify that a commissioner must not carry out work in cases where a mayor ceases to hold office early, with the exception of winding down their office. Finally, government Amendments 56 and 65 clarify that an appointment can end in accordance with contract law if not otherwise provided for in the terms and conditions of their appointments. These changes will increase the overall flexibility of the model, enabling mayors to appoint commissioners with local cross-cutting briefs related to an area of competence, and allowing them to enlist additional support within a given area. This could mean, for instance, two commissioners operating within the transport and local infrastructure area of competence, with one focused on rural connectivity and the other on active travel. I emphasise that the ability to appoint up to 10 commissioners recognises that we expect the devolution framework to grow over time, thereby providing a contingency as mayoral duties and powers expand. It does not mean mayors frivolously appointing people based on patronage. We know that mayors want high-calibre individuals whom they can trust to help them deliver for their regions. Therefore, to bring in people with a track record of success, these appointments should be on merit. While combined authorities and combined county authorities will have the ability to remunerate commissioners, that does not give mayors carte blanche to pay them what they want. Commissioners may only be remunerated in line with the recommendations and maximum amount specified in a report from an independent remuneration panel. To be clear, no additional funding is being provided for these appointments. We expect combined authorities and combined county authorities to make appointments prudently on the basis of where they determine that a commissioner will add value to achieving public outcomes. Part of that success relies on commissioners being accountable and their performance being open to scrutiny. That is why, alongside the mayor being able to terminate appointments, the overview and scrutiny committee may also recommend a termination. The decision on whether to accept that recommendation must then be put to a vote of the authority’s board. Commissioners will also be subject to the strengthened accountability measures being introduced through local scrutiny committees. This includes removal from post for failing to attend six consecutive meetings of a local scrutiny committee, and financial penalties for failing to answer questions or provide information, or for misleading a local scrutiny committee. I beg to move government Amendment 42, and I commend government Amendments 46, 50, 51, 53 to 56, 59, 60 and 62 to 65. I reserve my right to speak later in response to other noble Lords’ amendments.