Lord Sandhurst (Con)

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to introduce the second day of Committee on the Sentencing Bill. Amendment 51, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, proposes a targeted and necessary change to Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act, dealing with the Sentencing Code. Its purpose is straightforward: to ensure that, where a police or prison officer is murdered because of or in retaliation for their current or former duties, that murder automatically falls within the highest sentencing category—that is, one where a whole-life order is available and, ordinarily, appropriate. At present, Schedule 21 refers to murders committed “in the course of” the victim’s duty. Those words are too narrow. We suggest that the provision was intended to capture the most egregious attacks on those who serve the public in roles that inherently expose them to danger. However, the phrase “in the course of … duty” in the statute has, in practice, been interpreted by the courts in a restrictive manner, excluding cases where an officer is murdered because of, in retaliation for or in consequence of their earlier performance of their official duties—for example, when a murder takes place a while later, after service has ended. This amendment would correct that anomaly by inserting the essential clarification that, where the motivation for the murder is connected to the officer’s current or former duties, the case will fall within the highest sentencing category. That is legally coherent and morally necessary. Motive is already a well-recognised component of sentencing. It is taken into account in terrorism offences, hate crimes, witness intimidation and organised crime retaliation. It is therefore entirely consistent with the existing principle that the deliberate targeting of an officer because he or she carried out their duty should be regarded as an aggravating feature of the utmost severity. This amendment would not create a new offence. It would not broaden the law on homicide or interfere with the Law Commission’s wider review. With precision and exclusively, it would ensure that the statutory scheme reflects Parliament’s clear and settled understanding that to murder a police officer or prison officer simply for having done their job is among the gravest crimes known to our law. Let me speak plainly. We have seen the consequences of the existing drafting. The tragic case of former prison officer Lenny Scott revealed the gap starkly. Lenny Scott, whose widow and father I and others met last week, carried out his duties with integrity in HM Prison Altcourse, Liverpool. In March 2020, he discovered an illegal phone in the hands of a prisoner. He was offered but refused a bribe to turn a blind eye. He duly reported it, and, as a result, not only was the prisoner discovered to have had a phone but it was discovered that he had been having an affair with a woman prison officer—which was pretty serious, if you think about it. For that simple act of professionalism, Lenny received explicit threats at the time that he would be seen to. Those threats were graphic. They contained details about the appearance of his twin boys, who were no older than six years old. Some years later, on 8 February 2024, after Lenny had left the Prison Service, those threats were put into practice. He was hunted down and murdered—shot as he left a gym class, in a planned act of revenge. It was a murder directly and unequivocally connected to the past performance of his duties. This was a gangland execution intended to punish Lenny for doing his duty and not giving way to what had been asked of him, and to terrify and intimidate other prison officers into doing gangsters’ bidding in the future. Because this crime did not occur in the course of his duty but a couple of years later, the statutory framework failed to treat it as the kind of murder for which Parliament provides the highest penalty and the judge therefore did not pass a whole-life order. This is a clear loophole in the legislation, and I look to the Minister to put it right. How many more Lennies will there be? Serving officers in prisons and in the police force must know that there is the added protection of whole-life-order deterrence after they have left as well as when they are in active service. How many serving or former officers walk our streets knowing that they will remain potential targets long after they take off the uniform, and knowing that under the law as presently interpreted, their killers may not face the penalty that Parliament intended for those who attack innocent public servants? We cannot undo the tragedy that happened to Lenny Scott and his family, nor repair the pain, but we can ensure that the law is changed. We can ensure that the sentencing framework recognises that the risks to officers do not end when their shift finishes and certainly do not disappear when they have left the force. When a murder is motivated and driven by the officer’s service, the seriousness, risk and moral culpability are exactly the same. This is a plain gap in the legislation as currently drafted, and it must be closed immediately. It is very disappointing that this amendment was opposed by the Government on Report in the other place. The Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats together were in rare agreement on this amendment. I urge the Minister not to oppose it. This amendment is modest in drafting but deep in its importance. It transcends political fault lines. I suggest that there is no reason why any noble Lords should oppose it. It simply makes no sense that a whole-life order can be imposed for the murder of a prison officer while he is a serving prison officer and while he is at work, but not if he is killed on the weekend with his family. This amendment would restore coherence to the statutory scheme and protects those who seek to protect us. I commend it to the Committee.