Lord Sandhurst (Con)

My Lords, these amendments, many of which are in my name—Amendments 53, 54 and so on—address the Government’s proposal to transfer a significant element of sentencing discretion from the courts to probation practitioners: determining the number of rehabilitation activity days under community orders and suspended sentence orders. The amendments seek not to frustrate reform, although, as we made clear on our first day in Committee, we oppose the changes. They are intended to ensure that, if such powers are to be reallocated to the probation officer or practitioner from the judges, they are supported and buttressed by the same principled framework of accountability, transparency and procedural safeguards that have underpinned judicial discretion through the years. The constitutional architecture of this country has long rested on the independence and authority of our judiciary. Sentencing is a judicial function and the product of reasoned evaluation of seriousness, culpability, risk and proportionality. Judges exercise that responsibility transparently, in open court and subject to appellate review. These protections exist because sentencing is a public act in which legitimacy rests on visible fairness. Society, represented by the third limb of the constitution—the judiciary—is passing sentence on outlaws and criminal offenders. Clauses 11 and 12 would shift this discretion from judges to probation practitioners. Probation professionals are dedicated and skilled, of course, but they were never intended to assume quasi-judicial responsibilities. The Government may describe this as flexibility, but flexibility cannot become a veil for judicial discretion exercised behind closed doors without consistency or oversight. If probation offices are to take on direct decision-making powers that influence the substance of a sentence, proper safeguards must apply; the Bill, we submit, contains none. Amendment 53 would therefore require the Secretary of State to establish, by regulation, clear national criteria governing how rehabilitation activity days are to be determined. Decisions of such consequence must not depend on local practice, staffing pressures or administrative expediency; in these straitened financial times, I emphasise “staffing pressures or administrative expediency”. Judges operate within well-established frameworks. Probation practitioners should not be left to improvise. Amendment 54 would require written reasons for the determination of rehabilitation days. Giving reasons is a cornerstone of fairness. Offenders must personally understand what is required of them. Victims must be able to trust the process, and the courts must be able to review what is being done in their name.