Contribution
My Lords, I am grateful for the explanation given by the Minister, but the issues at stake here are not theoretical; they are practical questions about how these conditions will actually work. Will they be real, meaningful and enforceable? The Government have repeatedly asserted confidence in suspended sentences and the expanded use of community-based requirements. If that confidence is well placed, these amendments should be entirely uncontroversial; they do nothing more than ensure that what is ordered by a judge can be delivered in reality.
We are not seeking to impose obligations to enforce on the licensee of a public house, for example, but they should know so that they are then free to pass the information on to the police or the Probation Service, because they will not want someone there who is the subject of an order. It will be a public house order, for example, because the offender has a particular issue with behaviour in such places—so too with football grounds or other specified events. The host, if that is the right word, should be informed and should know that a particular individual, if recognised, should not be on his premises and can be turned away.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, with her usual acuity, pointed to the civil liberty aspects of this as well. I will not embark on those, but she also identified practical and policy issues underlying these provisions in Clauses 13 to 16. We on these Benches suggest that these amendments insert a simple and reasonable test. They do not impose a condition unless compliance can realistically be monitored in practice by the Probation Service, and the Probation Service will need help from the hosts. It is not radical to say that orders issued by a court should carry weight. A prohibition that in practice cannot and will not be checked is not a deterrent. A restriction that cannot and will not be enforced is not a restriction. Without these safeguards, we will create orders that are performative rather than protective. They will offer only the illusion of safety to communities and to victims.
The Government themselves use this precise standard when justifying reforms elsewhere in the Bill—for example, removing rehabilitative activity days because the system “did not operate effectively in practice”. The provisions in Clauses 13 to 16, if they are to be enforced, must be enforceable in practice and must be effective. If a condition is imposed but nobody has a duty to enforce it, it is not a condition at all. The Probation Service is not going to have time to run around the pubs, football grounds and so on; it is going to have to rely on information from other people.
These amendments would simply ensure that the supervising authority has responsibility for enforcement and is given the means to do so, rather than the vague hope that somebody may intervene if they happen to notice a breach. Without this duty, we repeat here that the failures seen with criminal behaviour orders and football banning orders, where thousands of breaches each year go unpursued and offenders learn that compliance is optional, will be repeated. Public confidence will not be restored by rhetoric; in fact, it will be damaged. It will be damaged by visible consequences, namely failures to enforce.
The Government propose to release more offenders into the community under suspended and community-based regimes. That is a political choice. Having chosen that path, they must choose the responsibility to ensure that it works and that it is safe. We should not be asking the British Government to accept greater risk while refusing the safeguards that would mitigate that risk. Ministers who believe that this strategy will reduce reoffending should have no objection to tests of practicability, enforcement duties and notification requirements. To oppose these amendments, they must be justified as to why they will be unenforceable, unmonitored, unaccountable conditions. That is a hard case to make to the victims, to police officers on the street or to the public whose safety is being traded away.
The amendments we put forward are not obstructive but supportive. They would help, indeed allow, the Government’s policy to function in the real world, not just on the printed page. If we are to put offenders back in the community who might not otherwise have been there—indeed, probably would not have been—the very least we owe the public is confidence that these conditions will be monitored and enforced, so I urge the Government to look again at these amendments and to reflect. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.