Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)

My Lords, I will also oppose Clauses 18 and 19 standing part of the Bill, and I oppose Amendments 81, 82 and 83 in the names of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett of Maldon and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for reasons which I will allude to and develop later. As your Lordships’ Committee will know, the Sentencing Council exceeded its powers earlier this year when it issued the Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences guidelines, to come into effect on 1 April 2025, in respect of pre-sentence reports, which gave rise to complaints of two-tier justice. This was in respect of individuals from “ethnic, faith and cultural minority groups”. Of course, what we eventually had as a result of the dispute between the late chair of the Sentencing Council and the then Lord Chancellor was the Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Act 2025. I do not propose to relitigate the issues around that legislation because it was primary legislation and there were comprehensive debates in both Houses about it, but it is important to remember that that is context for the debate and discussion on the efficacy and long-term future of the Sentencing Council. Noble Lords will know that that Act got Royal Assent on 20 June this year. The background was that the Sentencing Council wilfully refused to amend its guidelines, despite being asked to do so by, effectively, this House and the other place, and the Executive and Parliament through the Lord Chancellor. As your Lordships will know, magistrates and the judiciary must follow such guidelines under Section 59 of the Sentencing Act 2020 and Section 120 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The then Lord Chancellor correctly argued that the newly imposed guidelines represented differential treatment and two-tier justice. The Sentencing Council is an independent non-departmental body sponsored by the Ministry of Justice, and it was created in 2009 and commenced its work in April 2010. As such, it is in the great scheme of things quite a new body—a successor respectively to the Sentencing Advisory Panel and the Sentencing Guidelines Council, both since abolished. The important point is that it is entirely the product of legislation, and that legislation could be repealed as easily as it was created. It was described by Professor Richard Bellamy in 2007 as an example of “political constitutionalism”, whereby the protection of minority rights undermines the protection of majority opinion, leading to its neglect. The imbroglio over pre-sentence reports illustrates the fundamental issues at the heart of my amendment: judicial independence, and the role of Ministers and Parliament in sentencing policy. While the ability of the judiciary to set, and its role in setting, individual sentences—certainly prior to 1998—has been wide and permissive, Parliament has always had, and should have, a pre-eminent role, the upper limits when sentencing offenders being set through statute, such as Section 1 of the Sentencing Act 2020. That is something Parliament has always been jealous of in terms of its role in the sentencing framework. Parliament should not involve itself in individual sentencing decisions—that is for trial judges, magistrates and appellate courts—but, quite rightly, it should and does, through Ministers, determine a broad sentencing policy framework. That is the delicate balance between democratic accountability and judicial independence, which the Sentencing Council upset and, frankly, transgressed. In supporting the new guidelines, the Sentencing Council violated the historic and fundamental principle at the heart of our judicial system: equality before the law. Commendably, and to her credit, the then Lord Chancellor—now the Home Secretary—made that point very strongly in the other place and throughout the passage of the legislation there. The dispute last year pointed to another broader and wider phenomenon leading to a democratic deficit: the decisions of non-departmental public bodies and arm’s-length bodies lack legitimacy and proper accountability to elected Ministers and their electors and taxpayers. To quote the Times leader, which was cited in the other place by my honourable friend Sir Christopher Chope in March 2010, “arm’s-length bodies … have often been favoured by ministers as a way of distancing themselves from contentious issues … Free of the need to answer to voters, ALBs can go rogue … in the face of public opposition”. My honourable friend added: “The Sentencing Council is not unique in being able to ignore the wishes of Ministers and Parliament”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/3/25; col. 1452.] I do not suppose that the Government will support this amendment, but they should certainly commit to ensuring that all further sentencing guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council be confirmed via order in Parliament prior to coming into effect. It should put beyond doubt that ethnicity, race, religion and membership of a “cultural minority” is no longer a factor in determining either a court sentence or pre-sentence reports. Finally, the amendment focuses on not just the concerns of two-tier justice but democratic accountability, judicial activism, and the proper constitutional balance between the legislative and judicial branches. Fundamentally, we do not need the Sentencing Council. The Court of Appeal, prior to 1998, created judgments and authorities that established a body of case law refining some of the principles of sentencing, to give sentencing judges the ability to make those decisions. There was little or no evidence of sentencing inconsistency or lack of uniformity, of judicial independence being compromised, or of a lack of public support for or understanding of how sentencing works. For those reasons, I beg to move.