John Glen

I beg to move, That this House has considered pension investment in UK equities. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stringer. I think all hon. Members would agree that UK pension funds are hugely important, primarily to the millions of future pensioners, but also to the many scale-up businesses that are seeking additional investment and need extra capital for growth. They are also an important part of the UK’s capital markets more broadly. The UK has the second largest pool of pension capital in the world, but only 4% of it is allocated to UK assets. UK defined contribution pension scheme assets are set to grow from around £500 billion in 2021 to £1 trillion by 2030, an increase of 100% over nine years, and that growth will accelerate faster beyond that date. The key issue I wish to focus on is how we are to regulate, manage and enable the future form of that pool of capital, and the appropriate oversight of regulators or Government—if any—of the way it is managed. As I think all Members want, the Government have stressed the growth imperative and its prioritisation, but under-investment in the UK economy will be a significant dampener on growth. Over the past 25 years, allocation to UK equities by UK pension funds has fallen from more than 50% to 4.4%. Since the global financial crisis, the UK has under-invested, both in absolute terms and compared with our G7 peers. Our investment-to-GDP ratio is around 17% to 18%, compared with our peers’ 20% to 25%. That investment gap accounts for around £100 billion. The Government have introduced meaningful reforms. The closure of defined benefit schemes has resulted in large amounts of capital being moved from equities to bonds. Although that was a rational response to match the profile of obligations of those schemes, it is questionable whether it is optimal for the wider economy. That eagerness to match payouts to known obligations of a defined population has perhaps encouraged a lack of ambition in investment in the wider economy. What has happened progressively with DC scheme regulation is passive tracking rather than active investment. We have prioritised the minimisation of costs over returns. That has incentivised more and more funds to invest in cheap asset classes, almost alternating their investments, with fixed income, property and indexed funds being used. That is very frustrating, because over the past decade we reached consensus on auto-enrolment, and there was an emphasis on saying, “Oh, we mustn’t have any fat-cat fund managers taking too-big fees”. There was an anxiety about that, which drove an oversimplification of automated fund management. It allowed everyone to say, “The fees are very low”, but we did not have the right focus on performance and whether we were investing in the right things in the economy. It is obviously cheapest for a fund to go to passive, as it does not require active management and the skills that come with it. There have been previous fundamental reforms, such as the removal of dividend tax credits. Before 1997, when a UK company paid a dividend, it was accompanied by a tax credit, and pension funds could reclaim that credit in cash from His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. That meant that pension funds effectively received dividends gross of tax, boosting their investment returns. That reduced the effective yield on UK equities held by pension funds by around 20%, which was then the tax credit rate. There have been changes, with ISAs introduced in 1999 and self-invested personal pensions being widened in 2006, but this has removed the focus on UK investment.