Contribution
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has done the Committee a service in tabling this amendment. It has enabled us to think in advance of the debate that we will have when we get to Clause 3 on the existing wording in the Bill about the Mental Capacity Act. Some of those issues came out in the debate that we have just had. It has been helpful to cue that up.
I want to comment on a couple of issues following on from the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben. Two different things are being talked about with capacity and ability. I listened carefully to the comments of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Scriven. There is a clear mental capacity test. But as others have said—I will not repeat the quote—experts in assessing capacity from the Royal College of Psychiatrists think that this decision was not thought about when the test was designed and that it is not an adequate test. I will not labour the point now, but we should think about whether we need a new test or, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, an additive process where we take the Mental Capacity Act test and add something to it. There are amendments on both of those—a new test or adding things to it.
That comes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, made. Of course, it is true that people make life and death decisions about medical treatment and about whether to refuse medical treatment. But there is a qualitative difference between refusing medical treatment, even if the consequence of refusing that medical treatment will be to hasten the end of your life, and to make a decision for active steps to be taken to administer substances to you which will end your life. They are very different things, and they are treated differently in the law. Perhaps that is the reason why we have had that slight cross-purpose. We need to be very precise about our language when we come to have that debate on capacity. I think that that would be helpful. That is all I will say about that at this point. I suspect that we will have a very extensive debate on Clause 3.
I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was getting at something a little wider, which was not just about the capability of the individual to make a decision—that is the capacity piece. It was also about both the information they are furnished with and whether they have all the information at their disposal to be able to exercise their capacity to make a decision. It is not just about whether the information is available but whether the services are available that make that a truly proper, informed decision. Clearly, she has enormous expertise in palliative care.
Whether that palliative care is available in practice is incredibly important. Somebody could have capacity, and we could judge that they do. I listened very carefully to what the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, said, with her expertise on the Mental Capacity Act, and I listened carefully to my noble friend Lady Browning about the importance of recognising how it works in practice, but it is also about whether those services are available. You could have the capacity and a lot of information provided to you, but if the palliative care services are not available to you, you do not have the ability to make a meaningful choice about whether you wish to end your life. I think that is what the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was getting at in that wider use of the word “ability” on top of capacity.
When we get to Clause 3 and the amendments to it, one of the things we should think about is whether we accept that the Mental Capacity Act is a good basis. As people on both sides of the argument have said, it is a tried and tested situation. As we heard earlier, it has been tested in court, up to and including the Supreme Court. We should think about whether we want to replace that with a completely new test or whether we actually stick with the Mental Capacity Act and perhaps have some additions to it, which recognise that it is a qualitatively different decision from whether you are having medical treatment or not. That is the essence of it.
In the place it is in the Bill, just accepting the word “ability” probably is not the right thing to do. We want that wider debate. But the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has done us a service in flagging up some of the issues that we can now think about in advance of the debate on Clause 3.