Contribution
My Lords, we unequivocally oppose the Government’s dangerous mandatory digital ID policy, both in principle and in practice. If it is allowed to become legislation, the electorate risks being subjected to an extraordinary expansion of state power, one that comes not only at the expense of personal freedom but at great cost to the taxpayer.
Before I outline our objections to this proposal, it is important to understand the wider context in which this policy has been announced. Over this Government’s year in power, an estimated 50,000 people have entered the country on small boats, the largest recorded number to date, but the Secretary of State has claimed that digital IDs will deter these illegal migrants. Where is the evidence for this claim? Criminal gangs and illegal workers already operate outside formal employment and taxation systems. They do not care about paperwork or credentials. They work illegally, beyond the reach of existing regulation. They subvert existing national insurance requirements. Why would we expect digital ID to be different? To suggest that digital ID would somehow deter these operations is untested, unfounded and too optimistic to be convincing.
We are concerned, too, about the vast scope of this programme. The Government have claimed that digital IDs will result in “more joined-up” public services, saving people time from having to restate personal details to multiple departments. Here the Government seem to me to conflate separate issues: more effective public services and curbing illegal migration. They promise an end to bureaucracy while simultaneously constructing one of the most intrusive systems of state surveillance in our nation’s history. This is vast in its objectives, slight in its detail and, frankly, creepy in its reach into our privacy. Better online services do not require a centralised identity regime. We already have mechanisms such as right-to-work checks and DBS verification. These have all been designed with consent and privacy in mind, with nobody forced to pursue the digital route. The Government’s policy would herald an end to that freedom.
This policy was not even in the Government’s manifesto. There is no democratic mandate for digital ID, nor is there any appetite for it. In fact, over 2.8 million people have already signed a petition opposing it.
If, all of that said, the Government go ahead with this policy, we urge them to mitigate the risks and the costs in three ways. First, can they please ensure that the system is designed as a decentralised tool, using the blockchain to give citizens privacy and security? Secondly, to ensure some adherence to their stated goals, we urge the Government to adopt an agile approach of test and iterate rather than a build-once model. Thirdly, can the Government clarify and limit the stated goals? The current scope is simply too broad to be realistic.
Digital IDs fundamentally shift the burden of proof from government to citizens. In a free democracy, it is the state, not citizens, that must justify its actions. Under this scheme, one’s ability to rent, open a bank account or even order a drink would be conditional on the possession of government-issued digital ID. When the ability to work is conditioned on digital, state-approved credentials, meaningful consent ceases to exist. The choice between non-participation and never being able to work again is no choice at all. Last week, the Foreign Secretary proposed issuing digital IDs for those as young as 13. Once implemented, this policy will further infringe on people’s lives. Today, it is to determine the right to work; tomorrow, it could be to determine the right to vote or to travel.
Digital IDs are accompanied by a litany of practical problems and challenges, not least the enormous and real cybersecurity risk. The UK’s own sign-on system was breached only months ago during testing. The National Cyber Security Centre is yet to endorse the scheme. Further, 8.5 million adults lack the requisite digital skills to make use of these IDs, and many do not own a smartphone or have reliable internet access. Labour’s digital inclusion action plan is currently inadequate for the need and does not account for the structural barriers that vulnerable individuals face.
Finally, this presumably comes at a considerable cost to the taxpayer. Perhaps when he speaks, the Minister could give us some estimate of the likely costs for hardware, software, development and the operation of the system. The Government’s proposal for digital IDs is costly, controlling and risky. We do not think it will stop the boats and we do not think it will streamline services without very significant, and as yet unknowable, investment and programme delivery. Instead, we are concerned that it represents an illegitimate state encroachment on people’s privacy that they themselves are forced to fund. We are deeply alarmed.