Lord Polak (Con)

My Lords, I am pleased to support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, to which I have added my name. As I understand it, the purpose of the amendment is pretty straightforward: it seeks to remove the current requirement in Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 that, for a statement glorifying terrorism to be criminal, prosecutors must prove that the speaker intended to encourage others to emulate the act. In practice, this current requirement creates a significant evidential barrier. Under the current law, it is not enough that someone praises terrorist violence, celebrates terrorist attacks or glorifies terrorist organisations; prosecutors must go further and demonstrate that the individual intended their words to encourage others to copy those acts. As a result, individuals can glorify terrorism while carefully avoiding an explicit call for imitation, and so remain technically within the law. We know that extremist propagandists are acutely aware of these legal boundaries. They deliberately operate at the margins of the law. Rather than issuing explicit instructions, they rely on suggestion, admiration and narrative. They glorify past attacks, elevate perpetrators as heroes or martyrs, and celebrate organisations that Parliament has already determined must be proscribed because of the threat that they pose. Such messaging may not always contain an explicit instruction to copy the act, but it none the less plays a powerful role in the radicalisation process. It legitimises terrorism, fuels extremist ideology and contributes to an environment in which violent extremism becomes normalised. In many cases, Parliament has already taken steps to proscribe certain organisations as terror groups. The decision reflects a clear judgment that those organisations pose such a grave threat that supporting them must be prohibited. It therefore follows that publicly praising or glorifying the acts of such organisations should also fall into the scope of criminal law, even where, as I said, the speaker avoids explicit calls for imitation. This amendment would simply align the legislation with that principle. It is important to be clear on what the amendment would not do. It would not criminalise legitimate debate, historical discussion or academic analysis of terrorism, nor would it undermine the fundamental protections of freedom of expression that are central to our democratic society. Instead, it would target the deliberate glorification of terrorist organisations and their acts of violence, which extremist actors use to spread propaganda and to influence vulnerable audiences. Extremist propaganda has evolved significantly since the original legislation was drafted. Today, radicalisation often occurs through narratives that glorify past attacks and portray terrorists as heroes, rather than through direct instructions to commit violence. If the law is to remain effective, it must reflect that reality. Removing the emulation requirement would close a loophole in the law, align our legislation with the realities of modern extremist propaganda and strengthen the ability of prosecutors to act against those who glorify terrorism while hiding behind technicalities. It would send an unequivocal message that the celebration of terrorist violence has no place in our society. This amendment represents a sensible, proportionate and necessary improvement to the existing legislation, and I hope that colleagues will support it.