Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)

Let me reassure the noble Lord that this is not personal. I would welcome any suggestions from across the Committee. If we reject the amendment in due course, as he is right to suspect we will, it will not be because it comes from him; if anyone else had moved it, it would still be rejected. The noble Lord knows better than anybody the challenges of the roles that we have in the Home Office. I am grateful for his suggestions and we are trying to examine them. The key point—maybe this will give the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, a chance to think again as well—is that the merits of the claim could attract an appeal right, removing the possibility provided under the current system for certifying the claim as clearly unfounded. We would end up with even more litigation, which may help lawyers but would not help the resolution of the challenge at home. Without the specific further provisions in the legislation, our decision would need to explain why we considered that this measure applied in an individual’s particular circumstances, addressing anything they raised alleging that their life and liberty were threatened in what we consider to be a safe third country. It is nothing personal to the noble Lord, but we cannot accept the amendment. Amendment 203E, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, had support from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and my noble friend Lord Cashman. It seeks to provide a definition of “exceptional circumstances” for the working of our inadmissibility provisions. It also seeks to remove Albania, Georgia and India from the list of generally safe countries to which inadmissibility provisions may apply in the future. I have explained how exceptional circumstances bear on the inadmissibility process. Section 80A already sets out examples of what constitutes exceptional circumstances, which relate to states derogating from obligations under the ECHR and actions taken by EU institutions. These examples are not exhaustive, and there may be case-by-case instances where exceptional circumstances are identified and where that inadmissibility should not be applied. At present, the question of whether a person’s evidence or other relevant matters constitute exceptional circumstances is determined according to case law. The amendment would replace this established approach.