Contribution
My Lords, it is a pleasure to open this first day of Committee. I will speak also to my Amendments 2, 26 and 27 in this first group. At Second Reading, a number of noble Lords raised the issue that the commander will essentially be a civil servant with co-ordination functions: a commander with nothing to command. I have tabled these amendments and a number of others to seek to rectify the situation and probe the Government’s full intentions for the new role.
Amendment 1 seeks to replace the words
“designate a civil servant as the”
with “appoint a”, thereby specifying that the commander does not have to be a civil servant. Nothing here serves as a critique of the current border security commander, Martin Hewitt, coming as he does from a law enforcement background; rather, it is a critique of the Government’s limited ambition for this new role.
That is not just my view but that of Tony Smith, the former director-general of UK Border Force. He said in evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place that
“the first thing that struck me is that the Border Security Commander will be another civil servant. I think it will be a director general post in the Home Office. I was a director general, and we already have quite a lot of them. I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 27/2/25; col. 40.]
Those were the words of the person whose job it was to lead the agency that polices our borders. As he stated, there are already enough civil servants co-ordinating activities within the Home Office. The Small Boats Operational Command already exists, so can the Minister tell the House how it will work with the commander? How will their roles differ, and what degree of interoperability will exist?
As Tony Smith made very clear to the committee in the other place, if the Government wish to achieve their stated goals, Border Security Command needs to have expanded powers, for example to arrest and detain in the same manner as Border Force, the NCA and Immigration Enforcement. If the powers of the commander and his team remain as they are instituted in this Bill, they will be essentially toothless in their ability to tackle illegal migration. This is a role that, by the Government’s own admission, is meant to help secure our borders, disrupt criminal networks and co-ordinate multiple agencies in the face of complex cross-border threats. Surely, we can all agree that this is not a job for a generalist administrator or a nameless Whitehall official; it demands specialist knowledge, strategic leadership and operational credibility.
Amendments 26 and 27 are essentially consequential. They amend Clause 7, which relates to delegation of the commander’s functions, and Clause 8, which permits the designation of an interim commander. Just as I am concerned by the first clause, I am potentially even more concerned about the possibility of delegation. This commander might be well qualified for the task, but who will he delegate to? As the Bill stands, this will be a civil servant. We must ask whether this is appropriate for the task at hand. My amendment would ensure that only a person of appropriate rank—a similar rank to the commander—would be able to undertake any of the functions bestowed on the commander under the Bill. These amendments would therefore introduce a vital safeguard: that the commander may appoint only a person of appropriate rank and qualifications to fulfil delegated functions, not just anyone who happens to be on the departmental payroll. They would help ensure that we do not fall into the trap of creating yet another abstract, symbolic post—another title without substance, which I am afraid is what the Bill proposes.
I had the pleasure of meeting and spending an evening with the honourable Scott Morrison a few weeks ago. He explained that, when Australia began Operation Sovereign Borders, it instituted a structure that, on the surface at least, appears somewhat similar to this Government’s Border Security Command. Its job was to co-ordinate and lead the 16 agencies that had border security functions. However, there are two crucial differences: first, the Australian system came with far more robust powers than are in this Government’s plan; and, secondly—this is the crucial difference—the Australians appointed a senior military commander, Deputy Chief of Army Major General Angus Campbell, to lead their border security efforts.
This leads on to my Amendment 2, a probing amendment which seeks to gauge the type of background that the Government think most appropriate for the role of commander. I have specified that the commander should be only a former or current officer of the National Police Chiefs’ Council—meaning assistant chief constable or above—commander or above in the Metropolitan Police, a senior officer in Border Force or Immigration Enforcement or a senior military officer of at least brigadier-general, commodore or air commodore rank in the Royal Air Force. This amendment would therefore specify that the commander should be a senior police, immigration or military officer, which I believe would put the office on a stronger footing.
If we are serious about this role having teeth and want it to be a powerful, directive position that can genuinely drive change, then the least we can do is to require that the person filling it has the experience to do so effectively. We cannot afford to build this office on vague criteria and wishful thinking. The public deserve confidence that this position is not just another bureaucratic appointment but one that is fit for purpose from day one. I urge the Committee to support this, and I beg to move.