Contribution
My Lords, the history of the HS2 project is not a happy one. It was initially proposed in its current form by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, and endorsed by Gordon Brown in the wake of the global financial crisis, then taken up enthusiastically by the coalition Government, in which all major decisions were made by a quad that included Nick Clegg and Danny Alexander, and, indeed, in which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, sadly not in her place, was a Minister, as was Norman Baker. It was then taken forward further by the Conservative Government following 2015. Failure often has many parents, and there is no doubt that HS2 has been a mess. The letter from Mark Wild and the report from James Stewart leave us in no doubt of that at all.
I thank the Minister for the Statement. I welcome the appointment of Mike Brown as chairman of HS2 and the appointment last year by the Conservatives of Mark Wild as chief executive. Both are people with whom I have worked in the past, as has the Minister.
My first question to the Minister is whether there has been equally significant change in senior personnel at the Department for Transport. I ask that because the James Stewart report leaves one in no doubt that the Department for Transport failed sufficiently to distinguish its various roles in this project, including as sponsor, as funder, as policymaker and as shareholder.
This brings me to questions of governance model. The settled orthodoxy in recent years has been that, for government-supported projects to succeed, there must be a clear structural division between a sponsor body and a delivery body. On paper this is logical. The sponsor sets the strategic direction and prevents outside parties changing the objectives by gold-plating and adding further requirements as time goes by. It holds the delivery body to account, and the delivery body focuses on the execution.
In the case of HS2, this model has not functioned as intended: it has broken down. Rather than providing a framework for responsibility and efficient delivery, it has resulted in a culture of what might be called “deferral”. The dominance of the Department for Transport—well known anecdotally by those familiar with the project—over the board of HS2 has resulted, as James Stewart identifies in his report, in the board not carrying out its functions but deferring important questions it should have taken to the department. As a result, decisions were delayed, accountability was blurred, and independence of delivery was undermined.
At the same time, the department itself did not fully separate its own strategic oversight role as sponsor from its various operational entanglements. There was no clear split within the department between those who were supposed to hold the project to account and those who were working with it in other regards. We are therefore left with very serious questions that go way beyond HS2. They affect, for example, the restoration and renewal project of the Palace of Westminster. Something we relied on as a dependable structure—which appeared to prove itself largely in the case of Crossrail, for example—has broken down. My second question to the Minister, then, is, what thinking are the Government giving to a new model that is going to work well for future projects, or are we now steering blind?
My final point relates to Euston station. Euston is, strictly speaking, no longer part of HS2 Ltd’s responsibilities, as I understand it. It was a decision of the last Government to put it into a separate company, but I am not aware of the existence of that separate company; perhaps it exists on paper. I am not aware of the board of that company, or the chairman of that company. I am not aware of what that company is actually doing, because, while the Government have committed to taking the tunnels forward from Old Oak Common to Euston station, there is as yet no plan for the delivery of platforms at Euston station, which would allow passengers to make use of those tunnels.
I am not speaking for my party now, so much as for myself, when I say that I have always felt that a terminal-station solution for Euston was somewhat old-fashioned. We should perhaps take as an example Thameslink at St Pancras, which simply has two platforms underneath the station, and the trains come in and they go through. Perhaps we should be thinking now—it would cost money, but then, the plan for Euston station is going to cost a great deal of money—about alternative solutions that might take the lines through to a depot to the east of London. Can the Minister say something about the plans for Euston and how open the department now is to alternative solutions?