Rebecca Paul

I apologise, but I do want to get through my speech. It is important to make the point that someone suffering with anorexia, or indeed any mental condition, is not intended to be eligible for an assisted death. However, in the case of anorexia there are physical manifestations of the illness, such as malnutrition and diabetes, that might mean the patient meets the definition of being terminally ill, and that is the nub of the problem: the Bill does not adequately rule out physical manifestations caused by mental illness. That is why amendment 14, tabled by the hon. Member for Bradford West (Naz Shah), is so important, because it would ensure that anyone who voluntarily stops eating or drinking is ineligible for assisted dying. I support the amendment strongly as it addresses a big risk. Lastly, on eligibility specifically, I want to talk about capacity. There are such problems with the current approach to determining capacity that I barely know where to start. When it comes to ending one’s own life, a higher standard should be applied. The current definition of capacity was not created with such a monumental decision in mind, and if it were being drafted from scratch today, it would look very different. That is one of the reasons why the Royal College of Psychiatrists does not support the Bill. Under the Bill, a person is assumed to have capacity in the first instance. A clinician only needs to be over 50% sure that a person has capacity. If the person is making unwise decisions, that is not taken into account, and a person can be “helped” to make a decision—for example, when a patient has learning disabilities. I ask all Members today whether they are happy with that. Does that sound like a robust approach to assessing whether someone has capacity to make the decision to end their own life? Let us begin with the starting presumption of capacity. That, too, lacks the standard for assisted death decisions. I therefore support amendment 24, tabled by the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford (Daniel Francis), which would disapply section 1(2) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 for the purposes of assisted dying. One of the biggest issues for me is the fact that the current approach requires an impairment or disturbance of the brain in order for someone to be considered not to have capacity, irrespective of whether they can make a decision. In the real world, that would mean a doctor could assess a patient who gives the impression of being confused, illogical, erratic, inconsistent—everything about them could scream that they are not in a good place to make this decision at that point in time—but they would still be considered to have capacity if there is no identifiable impairment or disturbance of their mind or brain. That could potentially put those with depression, anxiety, learning disabilities or eating disorders, or even those just experiencing physical pain that is driving them to distraction, in danger of being considered to have capacity when they do not. So far I have focused on eligibility. I will now talk about hospices.