Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)

My Lords, I look forward to the Minister answering my question from yesterday, as referenced by the noble Lord. I wish to refer exclusively to the India agreement. We have debated in this House on a number of occasions UK-India trade, and on those occasions I have rehearsed the long-standing position on these Benches that free trade is part of our party’s DNA as a political movement. We believe fundamentally that free trade benefits consumers and businesses alike, and, combined with the means by which it is fair trade and inclusive, that it can be beneficial for wider policy ambitions on climate, sustainability, social justice and the reduction of poverty. These are the parameters by which we will judge any agreement that this Government sign with other Governments, as they were for the previous Administration, and specifically on the agreement with India. We start from the position that we wish this agreement and the Government well in ensuring that it is the basis upon which India trade can develop. This is a complex time in international trade, as it is buffeted by policies and chaotic uncertainty from the United States. The fact that India has now signed an agreement with the UK, and that on Monday the second round of negotiations on an FTA between India and the European Union began, shows those of us who believe in widening free trade around the world that we need to redouble our efforts to reinforce the global trading environment and the rules upon which it is based. The India agreement has been launched with a high degree of boosterism, last seen under the Boris Johnson Administration, and of course we would be a world leader in trade if press release assertion was a commodity. The Government say that we have a series of anticipated benefits as a result of this agreement. No doubt the Minister will rehearse some of those in her reply. However, looking carefully at the Government’s technical papers and not the press release, we can see that the cash figures of potential GDP growth, which she may quote in a moment, are purely a mathematical extrapolation of potential global trade in 2040, which the Government have then converted into pounds sterling, taking a starting point of 2023. This does not take into account the Trump Administration’s disruption of global trade. Therefore, all the cash figures that are presented are purely illustrative. The technical papers also helpfully suggest that the Government made a policy decision to round up to 0.1% for the growth figures. Rounding up to 0.1% highlights that there will probably be modest results. Furthermore, very deep in the Government’s papers is that, to get their very ambitious figures on UK trade growth, the Government have taken the starting point as the baseline of 2019, which does not take into consideration the pandemic, the Ukraine war and the Trump supply chain issues. So they start at a high point in order to get higher. We do not necessarily oppose the agreement in principle, but we look at it from perhaps a more realistic and sober perspective. The issue then becomes how we will support our businesses to take advantage of the new market access arrangements. According to the United Nations data figures, India has seen its exports rise over the last 10 years by 13.2%. This is an export market which the UK consumer wishes to benefit from. UK exports over the same time have expanded by only 5.1%. This is marginal growth over a decade, so it is right that we want to be part of a growing market. However, the European Union export growth has expanded by over 9.5% over the same period, nearly double the UK rate. We now have barriers erected, additional costs and more bureaucracy with the European Union, and we are trying to reduce them for India. So the fundamental issue is not that we have a tariff agreement but how British businesses will see the Indian market as barrier-free, open and accessible across all states, and reliable under the rule of law, with less corruption, more transparency—so that we trade more—and businesses supported more to access the market, which this agreement theoretically facilitates. What are the practical steps of actively supporting businesses that will take advantage of this agreement? Because there is little reference so far in what the Government have said, can the Minister confirm that the agreement will include a human rights chapter, with clearly articulated mechanisms to address human rights supply chain concerns that have been raised in this House on a number of occasions, including by myself—for example, on broadcasting and civil liberties. If there is to be market access on digital, media and broadcasting, are we ensuring that it is reciprocated and that the restrictions that have been put in place for media have been lifted? Can the Minister confirm that there will be a climate chapter in the agreement that demonstrates that this agreement reduces emissions rather than contributes? On Monday, India and the EU announced their intent for an agreement by the end of the fourth quarter this year. Whether this happens is out of the Government’s hands—I completely understand that—but any comparative advantage that we are likely to have as a result of this agreement is likely to be impacted if there is an agreement between India and the European Union. On rules of origin and other areas of standards, how will we triangulate between India and EU trade? Finally, I will ask the Minister about potential trade diversion and preference erosion as a result of this agreement. The House is well aware that I look for all the juicy details of these agreements in annexes, and typically on every page after page 200. In the previous Government’s scoping document, annex 9 of the technical paper showed that, with all the likely potential trade benefits for the UK of over £5 billion, which is very similar to this Government’s estimate, it is likely that there will be trade preference and trade erosion of over £3.25 billion. What does that mean? It means that we must discount all of the benefits from the India agreement with the diversion of trade and the preference erosion from other countries—primarily Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kenya, Senegal, Ghana, Indonesia, the Philippines and Jamaica. For Bangladesh alone, the previous Government estimated that the trade erosion would be £1.5 billion less trade with the UK. So I hope the Government will have an impact assessment clearly articulating the likely trade erosion and trade preference. Will there be primary legislation as a result of this, what will be the extent of it and when are we likely to see it?