Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

My Lords, in moving Amendment 65 I shall speak also to Amendments 65A and 67. Amendment 65 is necessary because it lies at the very heart of the nature of the work that is performed by these agencies. The Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Headquarters, collectively known as the intelligence agencies, are at the heart of the United Kingdom’s national security apparatus. Their roles involve highly sensitive operations, often conducted in real time and under exceptionally stringent conditions. They work to protect the nation from terrorism, espionage and cyberattacks, among other threats. The national security landscape is dynamic and fast-moving, and it requires the utmost flexibility, discretion and responsiveness from their employees. In this context, the introduction of provisions for flexible working could unintentionally create significant risks to national security. The need for immediate action, tight schedules and often secretive operations simply cannot be fully compatible with the predictability that flexible working arrangements might demand. We think it is essential that we avoid the unintended consequences of applying the Bill’s flexible working provisions to the intelligence services. Arguably, this list of services could be expanded, of course, to other operations that have implications for national security. As I said, these services operate in highly confidential environments and their work often involves time-sensitive operations that demand secrecy and agility. This is obviously a probing amendment: I want to ask the Minister what conversations the Government have had with the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Headquarters regarding the potential impact of the flexible working provisions on their operations. On Amendment 67, again I join in the broad support for flexible working that we have just heard in the last group, but this amendment presents an important opportunity to better understand the implications of introducing such a right. We think we ought to approach it with a slightly critical eye: specifically, we need to consider the Regulatory Policy Committee’s feedback on the clause, which has raised several concerns that cannot be overlooked. The RPC rating for this clause was red across all three core areas of rationale for intervention, identification of options, and justification of preferred way forward. The RPC has stated that there is a lack of sufficient evidence presented to justify the need for this intervention. In particular, it highlighted that there is little evidence to suggest that employers are rejecting flexible working requests unreasonably. This is a key point that must be addressed. The committee’s wider concerns suggest that, without strong evidence of a widespread issue with employers rejecting requests, the Government are introducing a policy that is based on assumptions rather than concrete data. What problem are the Government trying to solve by introducing the right to request flexible working if the case is as the committee has described? Do they in effect believe that the RPC’s assessment is incorrect? What data or evidence do they have to demonstrate that employers are systematically denying such requests in a way that harms workers? One of the most important questions that this clause raises is whether the intervention is justified. The RPC has pointed out that the rationale for introducing the right to request flexible working has not been sufficiently established, so the purpose of tabling this amendment is to find out what the Government have done in this area and to suggest that the overall environment around this debate would be enhanced by a broader understanding of the situation under consideration. Amendment 65A seeks to provide clarity and fairness regarding the refusal of flexible working applications in roles where such flexibility would fundamentally alter the nature of the job or undermine critical operational needs. Clause 9, as drafted, is obviously well intentioned but is ultimately a blunt instrument. New subsection (1ZA) sets out a list of what are deemed reasonable grounds to refuse a flexible working request, but they are largely subjective and difficult to quantify in practice. For example, how can an editor reasonably be expected to prove that a journalist’s writing has deteriorated because they are working from home? How does one assess the decline in creative spontaneity that often arises when collaboration in the newsroom is replaced by isolated remote working? This ambiguity could create a climate of uncertainty for employers. Rather than making legally risky judgments, many may simply acquiesce to requests even where remote work may compromise essential aspects of the role. I go back to the example of journalism: this could disrupt the delicate balance of the newsroom and undermine quality, editorial cohesion and the development of junior reporters through in-person mentoring, and so on. This is precisely why we think that sector-specific exemptions are needed. A one-size-fits-all approach, as is implied in the current drafting, is simply not adequate. This amendment provides a clearer and more realistic framework, recognising that in certain sectors and occupations physical presence is not optional but essential. To expect employers in some of these sectors to navigate the current subjective standards is both unfair and, we think, unworkable. This amendment seeks to offer a constructive alternative by allowing a reasonable refusal where the core nature of the role would be compromised, and by specifying sectors where that risk is most acute. As I have said, we support flexible working in principle, but flexibility must be implemented with common sense and a clear-eyed understanding of operational realities. We do not believe that the current drafting provides that assurance. We urge the Government to take serious note of these amendments, because we may have to return to them on Report. I beg to move.