Contribution
My Lords, this group consists of three amendments that are sufficiently related to merit being included in one group but are each distinct from each other, and each requires a degree of explanation that, given the hour, I shall try to keep as short as possible, and I hope I will do a sufficiently good job at explaining what their purpose is.
Amendment 9 carries forward the notion of accountability that was contained in Amendment 1 relating to the purpose of the Bill. Amendment 1 related to the Secretary of State. Amendment 9 would place upon a duty upon a local transport authority that was considering embarking on a franchising proposal to make a statement as to what their objectives were in doing so. The franchising process itself is set out in some detail as a result of the amendments here to the Transport Act. I have no quarrel with the process, which is quite elaborate and involves half a dozen steps, including an external audit. It starts when a local transport authority, singly or jointly, decides to start it, and it concludes when that local transport authority decides whether or not to make the scheme. It is perfectly lawful for the local transport authority, having gone through all its process, to reach the conclusion that it should not make the scheme and not therefore proceed with franchising. But at no point does the local transport authority have to say to the public, although it may do as a matter of politics and local communications, what its objective is in doing this, what success is going to look like or what it is trying to achieve. Amendment 9 requires that. I think that is very sensible, and should be welcomed by the Minister, so the public know exactly what their local authority is embarking on and with what purpose.
Amendment 12 relates to the effect of the franchising scheme on incumbent private bus operators, which are companies that have staff and that have to make investment decisions and so forth. It says that, if having gone through that franchising process a local transport authority quite legitimately decides that it will not make a scheme, then it is not allowed to re-embark on the process for another five years. I would be open to persuasion if the Minister were to say that the period should be three years or even two years, but there must be a period of respite for the incumbent private transport operators during which they and their employees know that they can get on with a future, with a prospect, with reasons for investment and know that they are not necessarily going to be taken into a franchise arrangement. Otherwise, they could live in a state of perpetual uncertainty, with all the effects that would have on investment, business planning and staff morale. Amendment 12 intends to prevent that happening. It involves no criticism of anybody and would be the result of a perfectly legitimate outcome of the process as it stands. But it would be an adverse effect if through change of control, which of course does not have to follow an election in a local authority—change of control happens quite often without elections taking place, because councillors defect or change to one side and coalitions change in local authorities—the bus company does not have that period of respite.
Finally, we come to Amendment 13, on which I will listen very carefully to what the Minister has to say. The Bill does not contemplate giving the Secretary of State any power to step in if everything goes horribly wrong. What I mean by horribly wrong is something equivalent to bankruptcy of a local authority. In that case, the Government have the power to send in commissioners to rescue the situation. A situation of perpetual drift and financial incoherence will not be allowed to persist because that would not be good for the local people served by that local authority. Commissioners are sent in, and everything is somehow brought back into order so that services and so forth can continue. What is contemplated in this amendment—and it is carefully worded—is that
“If, due to poor operational or financial management by the franchising authority or franchisees, there is a persistent failure”—
not a bad weekend—
“to deliver a service specified by the contract, the Secretary of State may”—
it is permissive—
“take over the management of the service”.
In exercising this power, he may become the counterparty to the contract and continue to do this until
“a new contract is let, or … another permanent solution is found”.
The Secretary of State should welcome having this power because it is possible for things to go horribly wrong. You can imagine a situation where bus services in a particular area simply collapse and stop running. What is to happen if that was to occur? This gives an answer to that question and gives the Secretary of State the power to step in.
I want to listen very carefully to what the Minister will say because it is just conceivable that he has this power or an appropriate power he can use. I have had the advantage of a brief discussion with him about this beforehand. The Transport Act, which this Bill amends, is a very large document and I do not have the resources of the Government Legal Service at my hand ploughing through it, looking for the necessary power. If the Minister replies that he has such a power and can point it out, my amendment would fall away. If not, it is something that I would want to press and something he, I hope, would welcome. With that, I beg to move.