Contribution
My Lords, I will speak to the four amendments in this group, with thanks to the noble Baronesses, Lady Suttie and Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who have variously signed them. I thank also the Minister, not only for being generous with his time but for his indication in Committee on Wednesday that he had some sympathy with these amendments. What form that sympathy will take we look forward to finding out.
Standing back, the Bill has two principal elements: it stipulates the capacity of events and premises that are subject to its provisions, and it stipulates the types of procedures and measures which must be followed by those responsible for such premises and events. Those things are not matters of detail—they define the policy that underlies Martyn’s law. We are asked, quite properly, to sign off on those provisions by giving our approval to Clauses 2 and 3 on capacity, and to Clauses 5 and 6 on procedures and measures.
The amendments in this group all relate to Henry VIII clauses: provisions in the Bill that allow the Minister, by the affirmative procedure, to amend provisions of statute. It is not just any statute: this statute, the one we are being asked to pass into law; and not just any provisions—the provisions in Clauses 2, 3, 5 and 6 that lie right at its heart.
Delegated powers are a fact of life and, although some of us may regret it, we are even seeing the normalisation of Henry VIII powers, which allow statutes to be amended in points of detail by regulation. But I suggest that these Henry VIII clauses simply go too far in giving Ministers the power to retake policy decisions that have been taken after much debate by Parliament.
The first pair of amendments in my name, Amendments 21 and 23, would remove the Henry VIII clauses in Clauses 5 and 6. These were singled out for concern by the Constitution Committee in the letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, to the Minister of 14 January. As a member of that committee, fortunate to serve under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, I will briefly explain why.
The lists at Clauses 5(3) and 6(3) dictate what may lawfully be required of those responsible for premises falling within scope. Clause 5(3) specifies the “Public protection procedures” to be followed if there is reason to suspect that an act of terrorism is occurring or about to occur. They are of limited scope: little more than procedures for evacuation and invacuation, barring entrances and providing information.
Clause 6(3) lists the public protection measures that must additionally be in place in enhanced duty premises or in qualifying events. These are potentially much more extensive: measures relating to monitoring, movement, the physical safety and security of the premises, and security of information. Unlike the public protection procedures that are the subject of Clause 5, they must be in place at all times and may have as their objective to reduce the vulnerability of the premises as well as risk to individuals.
Clauses 5(4) to (6), and 6(4) to (6), which these amendments would remove, allow both lists—the list of procedures and the list of measures—to be amended, not only by regulation but without meaningful precondition and without even the safeguard of consultation. What could that mean in practice? Take Clause 6, where the range of public protection measures is already almost limitlessly broad: anything relating to monitoring of a premises or event; anything relating to the physical safety or security of the premises; anything relating to the movement of individuals or the security of information. Clause 6(4) would allow yet further measures, not relating to the safety and security of the premises, monitoring, movement, and so on, to be introduced by regulations. What regulations could the Government have in mind? They sound as though they are well outside the normal range of protections that we might think useful and acceptable. If any such categories can be thought of, why can they not be brought forward and debated in the Bill? If they cannot be thought of, how can this power be justified?
The range of procedures in Clause 5 is much more limited, and understandably so, because these procedures are to be activated only once a terrorist attack is immediately anticipated or already under way, and because some of the venues to which they apply are relatively small. But, because the range is so limited, the potential for its expansion is commensurately large. What new and more onerous categories of procedure might be in prospect, what will be their additional cost and why are they not already in the Bill so that we can debate and decide on them now?