L

Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 22 October 2026

Debate

Written Constitution

Contribution

My Lords, it is an extraordinary honour to open this debate, and I am grateful to all the clever people, from the Bingham Centre to the Constitution Unit, who have helped me prepare for it. But a written constitution is not a subject only for initiates. This debate is on the syllabus of every student of law and of politics, at university and at school. It concerns every citizen, including the 12 and 13 year-olds whom many of us have met during this Parliament through Learn with the Lords, and who, as things stand, will have a vote at the next general election. Those who will speak after me have unrivalled experience in how our constitution works in England and in the devolved nations—not only as parliamentarians but as judges, Ministers, party leaders, civil servants, constitutional watchdogs, an intelligence chief, and behind the door of Number 10. I suspect we are in for a treat. The constitutional arrangements of this country are unusual in two respects. Almost uniquely in the world, they are not codified, although many of them are written down, and they are founded on a particularly strong version of parliamentary sovereignty—the principle that, as Chief Justice Holt put it in 1701, “an Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd”. People who support a written constitution tend to do so for one or more of three reasons, which I shall describe in ascending order of ambition as clarification, entrenchment and the driving of change. To start with clarification, a written constitution would demystify what the journalist Gavin Esler has described as the “smoke, mirrors and glorious verbiage” of our constitutional arrangements. It would set out principles, powers and conventions for all to see. Arrived at by an inclusive process of public debate, led by a constitutional convention, prefaced by an inspiring statement of values and eventually endorsed by Parliament or by popular vote, it would aspire to foster trust and encourage a sense of involvement, cohesion and pride in country. Entrenchment would involve taking vital protections that currently exist only in precedent, in convention or in statute, and placing them beyond the reach of day-to-day politics by including them in a written constitution that could be changed only with a higher-than-usual degree of political or popular consensus. A desire for greater certainty was expressed in evidence given last month to your Lordships’ Constitution Committee on relations between Cabinet Secretaries and Prime Ministers. The noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, seems to have found such meetings occasionally frustrating, commenting that: “A precedent is a precedent until someone decides to do something else … I would love to have been able to say, ‘Well, Prime Minister, that is not such a good idea because it is illegal’. Perhaps greater clarity could assist Ministers, too. Darren Jones MP, until recently Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, recalled this week in evidence to another committee: “I would be told all the time that there were things I could not do because of the constitution”. The noble Lord, Lord Case, who served as Cabinet Secretary to four Prime Ministers, took things a step further in his evidence to the Constitution Committee. He pointed to the waning persuasive force of precedents and conventions against unconstitutional behaviour. A backstop, he said, was needed. After what he described as “a rather long journey”, he had eventually concluded that “probably the best backstop is a written constitution”. Most ambitiously of all, some proponents of a written constitution see it as a vehicle for whatever major change they may favour: removal of the royal prerogative, electoral reform, a new second Chamber, the remaking of the United Kingdom on federal lines, or the abolition of the monarchy. Andy Burnham argued last year in his book Head North for a written constitution that would echo the German Basic Law by providing for “equivalent living standards” between the different nations and regions of the United Kingdom. He has repeated that call since becoming Prime Minister, perhaps uniquely. I look forward to hearing from the Minister what he meant by that and what government policy is on a written constitution. On the other side of the debate, it is common to hear reasons why a written constitution could never happen or would be pointless if it did. Some of those reasons are to my mind not wholly convincing. It is sometimes said that a written constitution is against the traditions of this country or the common law. But the Government of Ireland Act functioned as a written constitution for Northern Ireland for over 50 years, and the current devolution statutes operate as written constitutions for the devolved institutions of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Our Westminster model of parliamentary democracy has been codified, with multiple variations, in nearly all our former colonies. Indeed, I learned the other day that the drafting of new constitutions for Commonwealth states is still one of our legal exports, although rather a niche one. We even have state-of-the-art judicial expertise in interpreting constitutions through the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and through a Supreme Court which performs constitutional review when it deals with challenges to the validity of delegated legislation. Another frequently heard objection to a written constitution is that it would be bound to empower the judges to set aside Acts of Parliament, placing our elected representatives at the mercy of the lawyers. Well, courts are the most dispassionate arbiters we have, and it would certainly make sense for them to interpret any constitution, but we would not need to go down the path taken by our American cousins, of whom Alexis de Tocqueville so appositely said, almost 200 years ago, that “there is scarcely any political question that does not, sooner or later, turn into a judicial one”. Any part of any constitution could be placed expressly off limits to the courts—a course taken in Part IX of the Constitutional Consolidation Act that was drafted for the Public Administration and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of Commons in 2014. The higher courts, or the Supreme Court only, could be empowered to issue a declaration of unconstitutionality, serving as an invitation to government rather than a binding instruction—a solution not without precedent and fully consistent with parliamentary sovereignty. Or inspiration could be taken from countries such as Sweden and Finland, whose written constitutions are enforced primarily by parliamentary committees rather than the courts. We could even, if we wished, choose to emulate the Netherlands, whose constitution by its Article 120 simply prohibits constitutional review by the courts. Another frequently heard objection to a written constitution, generally accompanied these days by an injunction to look across the Atlantic, is that, however fine its words, such a document can do nothing in practice to prevent a slide towards authoritarianism. That point is overstated. It is true that careful balances of power can fall out of kilter. No written constitution could be a complete defence against leaders who seek persistently to undermine it, or a population which has stopped caring for the values of pluralist democracy. But recent experience in America and in Europe shows that, while the tide may attack the foundations of any constitution, that constitution may still educate us to recognise the attack, measure the extent of the damage, and slow its advance while we wait for the tide to turn. So I suggest that some of the supposed barriers to a written constitution are illusory. But this does not mean we will be writing one any time soon. History shows that new constitutional settlements come only at constitutional moments, times of national convulsion. We have certainly had our moments over the past decade, not least Brexit and the election of nationalist-led Governments in each of the devolved nations. But the constitution putters on, with “expensive noises coming from the engine”, in the phrase of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, but with only muted calls for fundamental change. For this, something still more dramatic would be required—a civil war or a revolution, perhaps—and one would need to be a very keen proponent of a written constitution to welcome that. There is another point, too. We are living through a period of rapid constitutional change. In just a few years, EU membership, fixed-term Parliaments, English votes for English laws and hereditary Peers have gone. New mayoral authorities have been created and the structure for relations between Westminster and the devolved Governments has been refreshed. Changes to English devolution and the Westminster voting system may soon be in contemplation. The information revolution poses urgent questions to ancient institutions and procedures. Looking back, the ease with which it has been possible to change our uncodified constitution has surely been an asset. If we can hold on to that while preserving the values that really matter, we will not have done badly. So I suggest that this is not the time to divert our energies into the process of attempting a codified written constitution. However, the flexible nature of our constitutional framework, its unusual reliance on parliamentary sovereignty and the relatively limited powers of our courts place a heavy burden on Parliament to protect and promote constitutional values. Here are four suggestions for building on what we have. First, we could clarify our current arrangements. The House of Commons Library launched in 2024, and updates monthly, a lengthy summary entitled The United Kingdom Constitution—A Mapping Exercise. This could evolve with academic help into an authoritative but non-binding restatement of the constitution, and there could be a miniature version focusing on principles rather than detail, perhaps endorsed by the constitutional committees of each House for use as a teaching aid in schools and a public point of reference. We should also build on the Government’s recent decision to update the Cabinet Manual, the document inspired by the New Zealand equivalent and first published in 2011, which sets out the main laws, rules and conventions affecting the operation of government. It is excellent news that PACAC in the Commons and our own Constitution Committee are to be consulted on the revisions. The Cabinet Manual should be a document acceptable to Parliament, not just the Civil Service. Heeding the calls for certainty in the recent evidence of the noble Lords, Lord O’Donnell and Lord Case, we might also consider the case for giving statutory force to some of its elements. Thirdly, a clear distinction should be made between common-or-garden quangos, of which there may well be too many, and those of real constitutional significance. I think of the Judicial Appointments Commission, our guarantor of judicial independence and everything that flows from judicial independence, which it is disturbing to see major political parties proposing to abolish in favour of a more political appointments system. Other watchdogs, such as HOLAC, the independent Commissioner for Public Appointments and the Independent Adviser on Ministerial Standards, might also be candidates for a statutory lock. These are important bulwarks against favouritism and corruption, and a future Government should not be able to throw them on the next bonfire without at the very least having to justify that decision to Parliament. Fourthly, the Constitution Committee published last May a codified summary of the legislative standards that it applies in its scrutiny of pending Bills. I declare an interest as a member of the committee at that time. It would be good to see that referred to in the reports of the committee and the debates of this House and, better still, if it could be integrated into the guidance supplied by parliamentary counsel and, within government, by the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee. The quality of legislation is a vital component of the constitutional principle of the rule of law, and these vital standards need to be given both greater weight and more consistency in their application. I finish with a word on human rights. Whether these are derived from the ECHR or from a domestic Bill of Rights, any imaginable constitution for the United Kingdom must surely have at its centre a catalogue of individual rights against public authorities. Courts must be able not only to defend the fundamental liberties of the individual against the excesses of official power but also, as a minimum, to register their formal concern should those rights be infringed by the operation of statute. The genius of the Human Rights Act is that it achieves those outcomes by means of the declaration of incompatibility without in any way affecting the sovereignty of Parliament. If we ever lose the right of recourse to the European Court of Human Rights, we will be still more reliant on the continued power of our own courts to pronounce on violations of our liberties, including when those violations result from the application of statute. A codified constitution may be no more than a pipe dream for now, but let us ensure that the liberties of the individual remain front and centre of our constitutional settlement, whatever that settlement may look like. I beg to move.

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