Hansard·Lords Chamber·Vol. 860

Written Constitution

Thursday, 22 October 2026

25 contributions19 members

Contributions

  1. Motion to Take Note

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  2. Moved by

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  3. Lord Anderson of Ipswich

    That this House takes note of proposals for a written constitution.

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  4. Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)

    My Lords, it is an extraordinary honour to open this debate, and I am grateful to all the clever people, from the Bingham Centre to the Constitution Unit, who have helped me prepare for it. But a written constitution is not a subject only for initiates. This debate is on the syllabus of every student of law and of politics, at university and at school. It concerns every citizen, including the 12 and 13 year-olds whom many of us have met during this Parliament through Learn with the Lords, and who, as things stand, will have a vote at the next general election. Those who will speak after me have unrivalled experience in how our constitution works in England and in the devolved nations—not only as parliamentarians but as judges, Ministers, party leaders, civil servants, constitutional watchdogs, an intelligence chief, and behind the door of Number 10. I suspect we are in for a treat. The constitutional arrangements of this country are unusual in two respects. Almost uniquely in the world, they are not codified, although many of them are written down, and they are founded on a particularly strong version of parliamentary sovereignty—the principle that, as Chief Justice Holt put it in 1701, “an Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd”. People who support a written constitution tend to do so for one or more of three reasons, which I shall describe in ascending order of ambition as clarification, entrenchment and the driving of change. To start with clarification, a written constitution would demystify what the journalist Gavin Esler has described as the “smoke, mirrors and glorious verbiage” of our constitutional arrangements. It would set out principles, powers and conventions for all to see. Arrived at by an inclusive process of public debate, led by a constitutional convention, prefaced by an inspiring statement of values and eventually endorsed by Parliament or by popular vote, it would aspire to foster trust and encourage a sense of involvement, cohesion and pride in country. Entrenchment would involve taking vital protections that currently exist only in precedent, in convention or in statute, and placing them beyond the reach of day-to-day politics by including them in a written constitution that could be changed only with a higher-than-usual degree of political or popular consensus. A desire for greater certainty was expressed in evidence given last month to your Lordships’ Constitution Committee on relations between Cabinet Secretaries and Prime Ministers. The noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, seems to have found such meetings occasionally frustrating, commenting that: “A precedent is a precedent until someone decides to do something else … I would love to have been able to say, ‘Well, Prime Minister, that is not such a good idea because it is illegal’. Perhaps greater clarity could assist Ministers, too. Darren Jones MP, until recently Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, recalled this week in evidence to another committee: “I would be told all the time that there were things I could not do because of the constitution”. The noble Lord, Lord Case, who served as Cabinet Secretary to four Prime Ministers, took things a step further in his evidence to the Constitution Committee. He pointed to the waning persuasive force of precedents and conventions against unconstitutional behaviour. A backstop, he said, was needed. After what he described as “a rather long journey”, he had eventually concluded that “probably the best backstop is a written constitution”. Most ambitiously of all, some proponents of a written constitution see it as a vehicle for whatever major change they may favour: removal of the royal prerogative, electoral reform, a new second Chamber, the remaking of the United Kingdom on federal lines, or the abolition of the monarchy. Andy Burnham argued last year in his book Head North for a written constitution that would echo the German Basic Law by providing for “equivalent living standards” between the different nations and regions of the United Kingdom. He has repeated that call since becoming Prime Minister, perhaps uniquely. I look forward to hearing from the Minister what he meant by that and what government policy is on a written constitution. On the other side of the debate, it is common to hear reasons why a written constitution could never happen or would be pointless if it did. Some of those reasons are to my mind not wholly convincing. It is sometimes said that a written constitution is against the traditions of this country or the common law. But the Government of Ireland Act functioned as a written constitution for Northern Ireland for over 50 years, and the current devolution statutes operate as written constitutions for the devolved institutions of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Our Westminster model of parliamentary democracy has been codified, with multiple variations, in nearly all our former colonies. Indeed, I learned the other day that the drafting of new constitutions for Commonwealth states is still one of our legal exports, although rather a niche one. We even have state-of-the-art judicial expertise in interpreting constitutions through the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and through a Supreme Court which performs constitutional review when it deals with challenges to the validity of delegated legislation. Another frequently heard objection to a written constitution is that it would be bound to empower the judges to set aside Acts of Parliament, placing our elected representatives at the mercy of the lawyers. Well, courts are the most dispassionate arbiters we have, and it would certainly make sense for them to interpret any constitution, but we would not need to go down the path taken by our American cousins, of whom Alexis de Tocqueville so appositely said, almost 200 years ago, that “there is scarcely any political question that does not, sooner or later, turn into a judicial one”. Any part of any constitution could be placed expressly off limits to the courts—a course taken in Part IX of the Constitutional Consolidation Act that was drafted for the Public Administration and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of Commons in 2014. The higher courts, or the Supreme Court only, could be empowered to issue a declaration of unconstitutionality, serving as an invitation to government rather than a binding instruction—a solution not without precedent and fully consistent with parliamentary sovereignty. Or inspiration could be taken from countries such as Sweden and Finland, whose written constitutions are enforced primarily by parliamentary committees rather than the courts. We could even, if we wished, choose to emulate the Netherlands, whose constitution by its Article 120 simply prohibits constitutional review by the courts. Another frequently heard objection to a written constitution, generally accompanied these days by an injunction to look across the Atlantic, is that, however fine its words, such a document can do nothing in practice to prevent a slide towards authoritarianism. That point is overstated. It is true that careful balances of power can fall out of kilter. No written constitution could be a complete defence against leaders who seek persistently to undermine it, or a population which has stopped caring for the values of pluralist democracy. But recent experience in America and in Europe shows that, while the tide may attack the foundations of any constitution, that constitution may still educate us to recognise the attack, measure the extent of the damage, and slow its advance while we wait for the tide to turn. So I suggest that some of the supposed barriers to a written constitution are illusory. But this does not mean we will be writing one any time soon. History shows that new constitutional settlements come only at constitutional moments, times of national convulsion. We have certainly had our moments over the past decade, not least Brexit and the election of nationalist-led Governments in each of the devolved nations. But the constitution putters on, with “expensive noises coming from the engine”, in the phrase of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, but with only muted calls for fundamental change. For this, something still more dramatic would be required—a civil war or a revolution, perhaps—and one would need to be a very keen proponent of a written constitution to welcome that. There is another point, too. We are living through a period of rapid constitutional change. In just a few years, EU membership, fixed-term Parliaments, English votes for English laws and hereditary Peers have gone. New mayoral authorities have been created and the structure for relations between Westminster and the devolved Governments has been refreshed. Changes to English devolution and the Westminster voting system may soon be in contemplation. The information revolution poses urgent questions to ancient institutions and procedures. Looking back, the ease with which it has been possible to change our uncodified constitution has surely been an asset. If we can hold on to that while preserving the values that really matter, we will not have done badly. So I suggest that this is not the time to divert our energies into the process of attempting a codified written constitution. However, the flexible nature of our constitutional framework, its unusual reliance on parliamentary sovereignty and the relatively limited powers of our courts place a heavy burden on Parliament to protect and promote constitutional values. Here are four suggestions for building on what we have. First, we could clarify our current arrangements. The House of Commons Library launched in 2024, and updates monthly, a lengthy summary entitled The United Kingdom Constitution—A Mapping Exercise . This could evolve with academic help into an authoritative but non-binding restatement of the constitution, and there could be a miniature version focusing on principles rather than detail, perhaps endorsed by the constitutional committees of each House for use as a teaching aid in schools and a public point of reference. We should also build on the Government’s recent decision to update the Cabinet Manual , the document inspired by the New Zealand equivalent and first published in 2011, which sets out the main laws, rules and conventions affecting the operation of government. It is excellent news that PACAC in the Commons and our own Constitution Committee are to be consulted on the revisions. The Cabinet Manual should be a document acceptable to Parliament, not just the Civil Service. Heeding the calls for certainty in the recent evidence of the noble Lords, Lord O’Donnell and Lord Case, we might also consider the case for giving statutory force to some of its elements. Thirdly, a clear distinction should be made between common-or-garden quangos, of which there may well be too many, and those of real constitutional significance. I think of the Judicial Appointments Commission, our guarantor of judicial independence and everything that flows from judicial independence, which it is disturbing to see major political parties proposing to abolish in favour of a more political appointments system. Other watchdogs, such as HOLAC, the independent Commissioner for Public Appointments and the Independent Adviser on Ministerial Standards, might also be candidates for a statutory lock. These are important bulwarks against favouritism and corruption, and a future Government should not be able to throw them on the next bonfire without at the very least having to justify that decision to Parliament. Fourthly, the Constitution Committee published last May a codified summary of the legislative standards that it applies in its scrutiny of pending Bills. I declare an interest as a member of the committee at that time. It would be good to see that referred to in the reports of the committee and the debates of this House and, better still, if it could be integrated into the guidance supplied by parliamentary counsel and, within government, by the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee. The quality of legislation is a vital component of the constitutional principle of the rule of law, and these vital standards need to be given both greater weight and more consistency in their application. I finish with a word on human rights. Whether these are derived from the ECHR or from a domestic Bill of Rights, any imaginable constitution for the United Kingdom must surely have at its centre a catalogue of individual rights against public authorities. Courts must be able not only to defend the fundamental liberties of the individual against the excesses of official power but also, as a minimum, to register their formal concern should those rights be infringed by the operation of statute. The genius of the Human Rights Act is that it achieves those outcomes by means of the declaration of incompatibility without in any way affecting the sovereignty of Parliament. If we ever lose the right of recourse to the European Court of Human Rights, we will be still more reliant on the continued power of our own courts to pronounce on violations of our liberties, including when those violations result from the application of statute. A codified constitution may be no more than a pipe dream for now, but let us ensure that the liberties of the individual remain front and centre of our constitutional settlement, whatever that settlement may look like. I beg to move.

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  5. Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)

    I am very privileged to follow the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. When he started his speech, I thought I would disagree with him, but by the time he finished I agreed with every word he said. He mentioned the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, as it stands, and it is now dealing with vulnerabilities and threats to our constitution. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, talked about how students were once taught about the British constitution. I taught just that in the 1970s and early 1980s. In the first lecture the students were completely bewildered when I said that there was no constitution to teach them. They thought there was. Over the following 18 months to two years—as we went through everything from the monarch to the judiciary to Parliament, and everything else that constitutes a Government and Parliament in this country—they began to realise that we did indeed have a constitution. Some of it was written; some of it was convention; some of it was historical; some of it was good; and some of it was bad. But what it was not was a written constitution. Over recent years, as the Constitution Committee will undoubtedly report, there have been threats and vulnerabilities to our constitution, not least of which is the rise of populism. Who knows what might happen if a hard-right Government took over? The Reform Party has already said what it would do, and it is not on its own. Would a written constitution stop it? I am not sure it would—that the constitution as we see it is strong enough to withstand those threats. It is very important that we try to change it where it needs to be changed, in the way we have done for many years. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has touched on the ways in which we can strengthen our constitution without going to the extent of writing it all down as a complete written constitution. The noble Lord rightly mentioned the Cabinet Manual . At the moment, it is relatively worthless because it is entirely based on the whim of a Prime Minister. The only way it could be made absolutely perfect would be to codify it in law, through statute. The Constitution Committee will probably look at that in further detail. Look at the way in which Members of our House are appointed. The committee which appoints them is not statutory in the sense that it can do what it wants; it is still at the whim of a Prime Minister. Perhaps that could be codified and put into law to improve our constitution. What I am particularly interested in, as a Welsh Member of this House and someone who spent his entire ministerial career in the territorial departments, is how devolution has changed the nature of our constitution over the last 30 years. The constitutional and political landscape has completely changed. All three of the Governments and Parliaments in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were set up by statute and then confirmed by referenda. Indeed, I took the Northern Ireland Act 1998 through the House of Commons, and that Act is effectively a constitution for the running of Northern Ireland. There have been other Acts since which have clarified different things, but that Act and the similar Acts for Wales and Scotland—incidentally, they said that sovereignty was vested in the people, which is something quite different from what we have heard in the past—formed the basis of the constitution of those countries. However, they are in a sense themselves under threat. In Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, the Governments of those countries are now effectively in the hands of nationalists. Of course, they are perfectly legitimate political parties. In Northern Ireland it is not as simple, as it is half and half, but the First Minister is Sinn Féin. In Edinburgh, the First Minister is SNP and in Cardiff the First Minister is Plaid Cymru. All parties are committed to independence. What happens if they have a referendum in each of those countries? In Northern Ireland, it would be the border poll, and it would be a referendum in Scotland and in Wales. If that happens, we will not be talking about a British constitution but an English constitution. That is a severe threat to the constitution of our country of the United Kingdom which needs to be taken very much into account. Soviet Russia under Joseph Stalin had a constitution. It guaranteed all the rights of freedom of the press, freedom of association and the rest of it. It was entirely fiction—worthless. It does not mean to say, if you have a written constitution, that it protects anything if someone is going to overthrow it by coup or some other method. In the United States, the President, as mercurial as he is, has almost complete control of the separation of powers which de Tocqueville talked about. He has a Supreme Court which is compliant, Republican majorities in both houses, and he uses Executive orders on a whim. That is a written constitution, which was meant to protect the liberties of the subject, so take care. We might see a change in a few months; we can only hope.

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  6. Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)

    My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen. Unfortunately, I am no more able to agree with him today than I was during the many years we served together in the other place. I have only one point to make. The one certain effect of the adoption of a written constitution would be the transfer of power from elected parliamentarians to unelected judges. This is because under a written constitution, the final word on our laws would rest with the judges. Under our present arrangements, if the courts interpret the law in a way Parliament considers undesirable, Parliament can legislate to put matters right if it so chooses. Under a written constitution, it would have to amend the constitution—a process which, by design, would be made very difficult. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, in his opening sought to circumvent this by suggesting that you could have a watered down written constitution which would not quite have the effect I have just described. But the whole point of a written constitution is, to a greater or lesser extent, to hamstring the sovereignty of Parliament and that is what I consider undesirable. Of course, democracy is not perfect, and of course, it does not always deliver the verdict that any of us might want, but if those who are elected fail to deliver what they were elected to do, they can be ejected from power and replaced by others. Democracy is, in a real, literal sense, power to the people. If an extreme totalitarian Government were elected—which I believe would never happen in this country—does anyone think they would be deterred from pursuing their agenda by the niceties of a written constitution, any more than the Russian Government, just mentioned, are deterred by the provisions of Russia’s written constitution? Of course, there are some, not least some judges themselves, who regard judges as the ultimate personification of all that is noble, wise and good—in contrast to mere politicians, who have to pander to the demands of the electorate, or, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, put it, with the faintest hint of disparagement, day-to-day politics. They may well be right in their characterisation of judges that I have just described, but judges are not elected, nor should they be. That is why they should not be granted the ultimate power, which a written constitution would confer upon them. The transfer of power from elected parliamentarians to unelected judges has been happening under our current arrangements. It has happened as a result of the extension—by the judges, not by Parliament—of the scope of judicial review. Most of all, it has happened via the coming into force of the Human Rights Act—a transfer of power for which Parliament itself was, most unwisely, responsible. However, that transfer of power would be considerably extended by the adoption of a written constitution. In due course, it would inevitably lead to demands for political oversight of the appointment of judges, so candidates for judicial office could expect to be closely questioned on their political views. I do not think most people would welcome the importation to our shores of the practice whereby judges of the US Supreme Court decide on the date of their retirement by reference to the political make-up of those who would select their successor. What mischief is this proposal designed to remedy? Our current arrangements have, by and large, served us well. With a few modest adjustments, returning to Parliament the power that has recently been transferred to the judiciary can, and will, serve us well in the future. A written constitution is something we do not need; it would do us harm and should not be introduced.

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  7. Lord Burnett of Maldon (CB)

    My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Howard. I start by assuring him that I am not one of those judges who would seek to accrete further power to the judiciary. As the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, reminded us, he is a member of the Constitution Committee, as am I, but I speak in a personal capacity this afternoon. I have also been asked to convey the regrets of our chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, that he is unable to be here this afternoon. The merits of a written constitution over an unwritten one such as ours are the stuff of endless discussion. However, before any profound change is proposed, there must be a hard-hearted look at what is wrong with the existing system, whether a written constitution would solve the problems identified, and whether it is feasible to produce one. All constitutions are vulnerable to bad actors. Examples abound around the world of Governments abusing their constitutions. As the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, reminded us, many of the most authoritarian countries have constitutions that look beautiful on paper but are worthless. A written constitution is generally only as good as the ability of a constitutional court independently to interpret it and declare conduct or legislation unconstitutional and that of the Government to comply with the court’s rulings. Alexander Hamilton, a founding father of the United States and a draftsman of its constitution, observed that the judiciary is the weakest of the three arms of the state because it requires the executive to enforce its orders. This explains why so many Governments, including some in Europe in recent years, have sought to pack the judiciary with their placemen and remove others. A written constitution, in the end, provides only limited protection from bad actors. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, reminded us, written constitutions usually arise in circumstances of political upheaval and change—sometimes peaceful, such as when new states are created, but often not. The United Kingdom is simply not in that position. Our constitutional settlement followed the Civil War, the restoration of the Stuarts and the Glorious Revolution, and it has constantly evolved since. Aspects of it are contained in legislation, but much of it is not. It is hedged around with conventions. As has already been noted, at its heart is parliamentary sovereignty. That is a key aspect of our constitutional settlement, and it necessarily includes the proposition that Parliament cannot bind its successors. Any legislation can be repealed or amended—including constitutional legislation. I have not seen any convincing explanation of how Parliament today could pass legislation that is entrenched in the sense that it can be repealed or amended, for example, only with a supermajority in Parliament or by a referendum, which are mechanisms adopted in constitutions around the world. Moreover, proposals for a written constitution generally require widespread political support, and I wonder what the prospects are, realistically, of the House of Commons approving legislation, if a mechanism could be found, that restricted its own freedom of action in the future and very likely transferred final decisions of great political moment to the judiciary. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, there might be advantage in placing on a statutory footing some of the constitutional guardrails that currently could be swept away at the stroke of a prime ministerial pen. Sir Peter Riddell, Professor Robert Hazell and the UCL Constitution Unit have done invaluable work on that. Such a move would at least require a Government to confront what they were planning to do through legislation. However, there is an aspect of our constitution which provides constraints and protections against extravagant executive action of the sort that the proponents of a written constitution fear. That is the existence of conventions, which operate to give the Executive freedom of action but are not immutable. They include the conventions that operate in this House, itself an important constitutional guardian, and that govern the relationship between the Crown, the Executive and Parliament. Conventions work when all who are subject to them respect their boundaries, but, if one player does not do so, the others can be expected to modify their responses. It is probably fruitless to hypothesise on the circumstances in which that might happen because they are unpredictable, but it should not be supposed that the current arrangements are toothless. I return to where I started. There is little doubt that our unwritten constitution is vulnerable to bad actors, but so too are all constitutions. However, I am unpersuaded that a written constitution is the answer. Ours continues to work well and can adapt. A written constitution would be unlikely to solve whatever problems have been identified, and it is not likely to be feasible.

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  8. Baroness Manningham-Buller (CB)

    My Lords, I speak with some hesitancy, given the expertise of many speakers in this debate. I will not talk for long; I want to say just a few things. I always believed that our constitution was flexible and adaptable, and preserved the sovereignty of Parliament. I can remember a conversation with the President of the Supreme Court many years ago about whether we need a written constitution. He said that in 1930, if you looked at constitutions of Europe, you would have said that Germany had the best one. We have seen other examples and other speakers have shown the fallacy of relying on a beautiful constitution. Of course, the events with the Prorogation of Parliament and others worried us; they certainly worried me. I note, in particular, the Daily Mail story on “enemies of the people”. My father filled all the major law roles of the Crown: Solicitor-General, Attorney-General and Lord Chancellor. He always told me that he tried to do those jobs in a quasi-judicial way, not a party-political way. For example, he objected to Suez on the grounds of its illegality. He also told me that he took an oath to defend the judges if they were attacked. That has not recently happened, and the person in the role of Lord Chancellor or the Minister of Justice should defend the judges. We do not have to agree with all the judgments or all their decisions, but if we do not resist any imputation of the independence of the judiciary, we are in real trouble. A recent Attorney-General had a spad; this is completely wrong in my view. I have twice chaired committees to appoint the chair of the Judicial Appointments Commission, which was established by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. In each case, I came under some pressure from politicians to reach a certain outcome, which the panel resisted. In MI5, which is slightly different, there were occasions under both Labour and Conservative Governments when we were asked why we were not looking at a particular subject, to which the answer was that, constitutionally, the Government can stop MI5 doing anything—they can sack it, abolish it, sack the leader or refuse to authorise anything—but they cannot tell it what to do any more than they can tell the police who to arrest or investigate. In each case, both for the appointment of the chair of the JAC and in my MI5 experience, when this was explained, Ministers backed off and the constitutional niceties were preserved. My feeling is that all noble Lords need to be sure to resist inroads into, in particular, the independence of the judiciary, which I have focused on, and the other aspects of the constitution which we all recognise; they should not necessarily go into a formal document.

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  9. Lord Boyd of Duncansby (CB)

    My Lords, this is the first substantive contribution I have made to the work of this House since 2012, when I was disqualified from sitting here by virtue of the Constitutional Reform Act—one of a slew of recent judicial constitutional measures that demonstrate the evolving nature of the constitution. Reference has already been made to the work of the devolved Governments and Parliaments. These are important changes that have been made to the constitutional order through the present arrangements. In principle, a written constitution is not necessarily a bad idea. It may have a number of advantages. In practice, however, those who propose such a document rather underestimate the time and energy that would be entailed by such an exercise, to say nothing of the political controversy that would surround it. To take one example, do the nations of the United Kingdom have the power to secede? If so, on what terms and by what means? In my submission, the issue is not whether we should have a written constitution but whether we have and maintain the conventions, norms and shared values that support our democracy. The noble Lord, Lord Murphy, referred to the constitution of the USSR. Article 112 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union states: “Judges are independent and subject only to the law”. If one looked at that and knew nothing about the Soviet Union, one might think that it had an independent judiciary and was committed to the rule of law. Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth. I submit that the conventions, norms and shared values, the respect for those whose opinions differ from ours, and the respect for human rights and human dignity are of more significance than whether we have a written document. If we look across the Atlantic to the United States—a nation whose commitment to a written constitution is, in effect, forged into its very soul—we can see what happens when these values are challenged. There are too many examples, I suggest, that question its commitment, at least under this Administration, to the values I just outlined. The most egregious example was on 6 January 2021, when there was an assault on the Capitol building. The President’s false allegations of voter fraud and the pressure on the Vice-President, effectively, to overturn the result of the general election challenged the norm that, barring any legal challenge, the result of free and fair elections would be accepted and that thereafter there would be a peaceful transition from one Administration to another. Under this President, we have seen the politicisation of federal prosecutions to go after perceived political enemies, the flagrant misuse of presidential powers of pardon, and threats to journalists and the freedom of the media. While federal judges would no doubt bristle at the suggestion that they allow political leanings and considerations to colour their judgments, it is perhaps remarkable that, in order to understand some of the judgments made, it is thought relevant to question who was the President who made the appointment. This gives rise to cynicism and undermines the authority of the courts. In April 2026 just 43% of Americans supported the work of the Supreme Court, down by 11 points from a year before. These are serious matters, but I am not one of those who believes that America is about to slip into a further authoritarian abyss. However, I suggest that what is happening in the United States is both a warning and a wake-up call. In this country, we face challenges which should be now addressed. Respect for the opinions of others has declined. Public discourse in this country has become coarser, more divided and more challenging. The debate over Gaza and Palestine has at times descended into an ugly form of antisemitism. The language used to describe illegal migrants and asylum seekers is often degrading and dehumanising; every human is entitled to be treated with dignity. Threats to the safety and well-being of politicians and public figures have increased. These will only serve to push good people out of public life. Social media, of course, has played its part. We have also seen assaults on the independence of the judiciary, which were referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. These challenges to the unwritten parts of our constitution, particularly the values that bind us together, will, I fear, only increase. I have no great views on whether we should have a written constitution, but I rather suspect that the energy and time that would be involved in that process would be better expressed by addressing these fundamental issues.

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  10. Lord Griffiths of Burry Port (Lab)

    My Lords, I begin with two quick points. First, to share my noble friend Lord Murphy’s point, we came to the fray expecting to hear solid advocacy for a written constitution and had prepared the finest speeches imaginable against such a proposition, whereas it has not turned out that way at all. Secondly, I had not imagined that I would be speaking at this point in the debate, with all those extraordinarily learned people with huge experience of law immediately ahead of me. Your Lordships must therefore regard my remarks as an entreacte, a little bit of entertainment, between now and when the great heavyweights come on again later. I want to make a point about written constitutions, whether of the kind that is in the head of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, as he brought the debate before us, or otherwise. I come from a theological angle—I can see your eyes glazing—with a consideration of, for example, the 500 years it took the Christian church, after the death of Christ, to formulate the Nicene Creed. It celebrated its 1,700th anniversary just last year. To get a form of words that satisfied everybody—it was an attempt to bring an experience out of a Semitic world into a Hellenic world—was itself a challenge, but with the Hellenic, there were a variety of ways of speaking Greek in Alexandria, Jerusalem, Ephesus and other places that demanded only the best intellects, put together to take out of all that something that they could all live with. It went on year after year, decade after decade and century after century. In the end, the great force that brought it into being was a contingent of troops from the Pope in Rome, who put a shotgun—or its equivalent in the fifth century—to the heads of all those gathered for the formulation of the creed. Those were all the elements going into the attempts to make a written constitution which would bind the Roman Empire, or what remained of it, together. There were more people excluded from Christendom by the creed than included. However, let me move on 500 years, because at that particular time, in the 11th century, there was a proposal to add one word in Latin to the Nicene Creed: filioque. That itself proved so divisive with this written constitution that it divided the whole of Christendom between east and west, Orthodox and Latin. Written constitutions are for the birds. I admire the Nicene Creed, its intellectual process that gave us that form of words and satisfied people for a long time, but it is a historic document. I have never used it—I can say that now only because the Bishops are not here—but, for all that, that is my experience of a written constitution. I am a Methodist minister. Every year, I get a directory telling me about “who’s who” in my church, together with a second volume that is called The Constitutional Practice and Discipline of the Methodist Church —it is fat. It is the accumulation of all the bits and pieces over 250 years that have allowed us to feel this is our constitutional position—it is fixed. In my early years as a minister, when the manses we lived in were furnished, my wife and I had a bed which had one short leg on it. The Constitutional Practice and Discipline of the Methodist Church fitted perfectly under the fourth leg, and we slept happily ever after. The trouble with that document is that when it was taken overseas to Methodist churches in Africa, Asia and all over the world, that constitution became a substitute for the gospel. The people coming to meetings would be armed with it, and they would say, “But on page 230, it says X and you are doing Y”. At the end of the day, written constitutions lend themselves to nitpicking, oppositionists and uselessness. I have just half a minute left, so I will do my best. I preached a sermon at Gray’s Inn, the Mulligan Sermon, which was all about the judgment of a man called Richard Atkin, who took all those precedents that constitute our common law and made a kind of overarching statement for it. It boiled down, in the end, to a consideration of the Donoghue v Stevenson case—which all learned Lords know about—which, at the end of the day, allowed him to say that a duty of care and doing unto others what you would have them do unto you will undergird all our attempts, legally and constitutionally, to find the right way forward. So, there you are. Let the lawyers get on with it now; I will be here to listen.

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  11. Lord Mance (CB)

    My Lords, our uncodified constitution has four legs—short or long: common law, statutes, conventions and practice. Our modern system of administrative law, elicited from our well-respected Government Legal Service, has a measured guide, The Judge Over Your Shoulder , now in its sixth edition. Its witty acronym is JOYS, but I take this in the sense that it is a real joy, and a huge privilege, to live in a country which adheres to the rule of law. An important aspect of the courts’ role is to determine the legal limits of the powers conferred upon each branch of government. In the two Miller cases, in the first of which I sat, the Supreme Court acted to preserve the position of Parliament, not the Executive, as our ultimate democratic institution. Where our uncodified constitution stands out is in a certain lack of transparency, possibly accompanied with a degree of complacency, in its inability to act as a salient feature of national identity—it mystifies—and in its foundational principles of parliamentary sovereignty and privilege, the relationship of which with the other Diceyan principle of rule of law we are discussing this evening. As for transparency, there has been reference to the Cabinet Manual . In 2008-09, when I had the privilege of chairing the House’s sub-committee on European law and institutions, on which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, also served, we were interested to know the bases on which the Government chose to consult the House in respect of European legislative initiatives in Brussels. Our information was that in at least one Nordic country, its parliament was not merely consulted but dictated the Executive’s line on such initiatives, which are of course a form of primary legislation in many cases. The response to our inquiry was that the Cabinet Office guidelines were confidential. Only on 5 May 2009 were we able to thank the then Minister for Europe, Caroline Flint, for a letter putting several of the guidelines for the first time into the public domain. Now, of course, we have the Cabinet Manual of December 2010, but it has not even been updated to reflect our leaving the EU—although it is about to be, apparently, reformulated. As to the core constitutional principles of parliamentary supremacy and privilege, they operate well if exercised with restraint and respect. But can we, in modern conditions, still feel quite the same complacency as Mr Podsnap in Our Mutual Friend , when he declared that “We Englishmen are Very Proud of our Constitution, Sir. It Was Bestowed Upon Us By Providence. No Other Country is so Favoured as This Country”? Mr Podsnap did not see beyond Hadrian’s Wall or foresee devolution. He gloried in English exceptionalism without acknowledging any possible advantages in written constitutions. Today, we do not have to look abroad to see that our uncodified constitution has potential vulnerabilities. The supremacy of Parliament makes primary legislation immune to judicial review. Most written constitutions entrench fundamental individual rights, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has said, a model upon which UK Supreme Court Justices regularly adjudicate sitting in the Privy Council. The UK’s nearest equivalent, cleverly constructed to respect parliamentary supremacy, is the unentrenched Human Rights Act. But a Government commanding a parliamentary majority can simply repeal that at any time. With one exception, Parliament can do anything. The teasing exception already mentioned is that Parliament cannot bind itself. Nothing can be entrenched—although perhaps a way in the form of some sort of constitutional people’s convention, or even a referendum, would lead courts to recognise entrenchment. The privileges of Parliament, combined with Article IX of the Bill of Rights, make the appropriateness of parliamentary procedures forbidden territory for UK courts. However, this does not mean that nothing needs doing to improve or change them. The problems are well known. The Institute for Government has described the Government’s iron grip over the Commons timetable as “unusual in international terms” and needing modification. The insufficiency of parliamentary scrutiny and the prevalence, breadth and vagueness of delegated legislation have been robustly criticised in and outside Parliament by very strongly worded reports, with one entitled Government by Diktat: A C all to R eturn P ower to Parliament and another entitled Democracy Denied? . A written constitution would probably address Parliament’s supremacy, although, with respect to what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said about the Netherlands, there is a law going through there to give ex post facto jurisdictional power to strike down to the Raad van State on similar lines to the Conseil constitutionnel in France. The Prime Minister co-authored Head North , as has been mentioned, looking with favour on the German Basic Law, which features scrutiny of both the supremacy and the internal procedural privileges of the German Parliament. The German constitution and its court were part of an essential new start, but both have won continuing acceptance as core elements of Germany’s legal and cultural identity. The court’s involvement with parliamentary procedures has been in the interests of democracy. It has prescribed general principles to prevent the misuse of majoritarian power: to ensure that Parliament is given sufficient time to debate proposed legislation; to ensure that minority parties have proper information and a proper say; to ensure the precision of legislation; and to avoid excessive or vague delegation of legislative powers to the Executive. At the same time, the German constitutional court has remained very sensitive to the greater democratic legitimacy of the German Parliament, and Germany is not governed by judges. The elective dictatorship of this country clearly needs to improve itself in less dramatic ways than a written constitution. There should be a new self-denying concordat by the Executive, with the Government identifying and agreeing to observe certain basic principles governing Parliament and its procedures. The German model is an interesting parallel and precedent. Such changes would revivify Parliament as the place where the nation’s concerns are debated and true political compromise occurs.

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  12. Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)

    My Lords, it is a privilege to follow so many distinguished speakers. The primary purpose of a constitution is to establish the fundamental legal framework for governing a state. In the United Kingdom, two key facets of this are protecting and strengthening our democracy and providing a framework for effective government in accordance with the rule of law. I would measure the arguments for a written constitution against these two benchmarks. So, would a written constitution be more or less democratic? Jonathan Sumption pointed out in his Telegraph article of 9 August this year that a written constitution would “hand enormous political powers to the courts”, which would have the power to interpret it and overturn Acts of Parliament if they did not measure up to the courts’ interpretations. That point was echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, just now. Extending the role of our unelected judges in this way would distort our finely balanced separation of powers, weakening parliamentary sovereignty and thereby our democracy. Parliamentary sovereignty provides the flexibility to reform and strengthen our democracy. One can point to many of our statutes, such as the European Communities Act, the Human Rights Act, the Constitutional Reform Act and the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, when Parliament has legislated in a constitutional way. The same is true of devolution in the United Kingdom, which the Prime Minister thinks should be extended throughout the country by a written constitution. The beauty of our current system is that parliamentary sovereignty has enabled these constitutional statutes to be enacted and then to be repealed or amended subsequently through a normal legislative process, as has happened in the case of every single one of them. A written constitution could not so easily have achieved this, since the whole point, as has been said, would be to entrench it and give it a higher status than primary legislation, deliberately making it harder to amend or repeal and transferring power from elected politicians to the judiciary in the process. There has, of course, been social and political angst in the debates leading to the enactments and repeals I have mentioned, but take a moment to imagine the discord which the nation would endure in trying to decide what a written constitution should contain. There would certainly be calls for it to go wider than the Cabinet Manual . One has only to consider the recent heated debates on economic and social issues, such as whether a person is a man or a woman, which migrants should be allowed to stay in the United Kingdom, or the duties of the state to provide welfare and social care. The list goes on, and one could see some people arguing passionately for their inclusion in a written constitution, leading to fresh divisions in society. Far better, in my view, to rely on Parliament to decide such issues as and when necessary, in line with manifesto and other policy commitments, and to override unintended judicial interpretations by fresh legislation. I turn to the second purpose of our constitution—to provide a framework for effective government. Advocates of a written constitution might point to the ineffectiveness of our current system to get anything done. One is spoilt for choice, but just look at the seeming inability to deliver infrastructure projects such as Hammersmith Bridge, which has so far been closed for seven years and will not fully reopen until 2035. The Chinese replaced their multilane Sanyuan Bridge in 43 hours. Look at the massive cost overruns and delays of HS2, the broken prison system and the procurement failures and lack of investment in UK defence. Tempting as it is in the face of these failures to seize on anything which might make things better, it is not the fault of our constitution that some Governments over the past 15 to 20 years have failed to govern effectively or responsibly. A written constitution would make no difference. Ministerial accountability is already part of our unwritten constitution, for which the Prime Minister holds ultimate responsibility, and it can be enforced by means of the Ministerial Code and parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms such as Select Committees. The Public Office (Accountability) Bill, once implemented, may help to add statutory weight to the principle of ministerial accountability. In addition, there is political pressure, which, at an election, punishes ministerial incompetence or irresponsibility—or earlier, if our leaders are forced to quit. Seven Prime Ministers in 10 years speaks for itself. This and other political dramas in recent years show how our constitution can weather the fiercest storms. Some would say that a written constitution would be more transparent than our current convoluted statute book. They have a point. AI states that there are around 6,000 statutes in force, many totally incomprehensible because of extensive amendments to previous Acts. The Representation of the People Bill is a case in point. However, the answer is not a written constitution but a programme of legislative consolidation, which would vastly improve everyone’s understanding of what the law actually is. There is little hope of that. In conclusion, let us cherish the jewels in the crown of our unwritten constitution: parliamentary sovereignty, the separation of powers and ministerial accountability, which have protected our democracy for so long and which are the envy of written constitutions around the world.

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  13. Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)

    My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for securing this debate, and so clearly and entertainingly introducing it, even though I profoundly disagree with his conclusions. It will probably not surprise your Lordships’ House when I say that I am going to bring a very different perspective to any heard thus far in this debate. I thank the noble Lord also for giving me the opportunity to explain a discussion I was forced to truncate back in 2020, when the respected commentator, David Allen Green, took a letter I had written to the Financial Times in a manner that I had not intended. I was in fact agreeing with Mr Green and an article he had written headlined: “The UK’s constitution is not working”. He responded on the social media site then called Twitter, feeling incorrectly that I had meant to slight him. The internet rule of not feeding the fire meant I did not have a chance to fully explain then, but I can now. The newspaper had put the headline on my letter: “It’s time the UK had a written constitution”, which was an accurate, although not complete, description of the letter’s contents. What I called for was a modern, functional, democratic and written constitution. I described what we have now as “a tangle of historical accident held together by a gloss of tourist-friendly ceremony”. The constitution is not democratic. We still have a massive Labour majority—if with a different leader—that was won in 2024 with the support of 33% of the people who voted: about 25% of eligible voters. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, referred to the extreme position we have of parliamentary sovereignty, and this is a Parliament that does not reflect the views of two-thirds of the British people. The constitution is not functional. There are so many examples, but one I will point to is the wide agreement around the House on the abject failure of scrutiny of legislation in the Commons. The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, has taken to highlighting this, to general House approval. The constitution is not modern. Visit the FCDO offices and they are like a time machine; you return in a flash to the Victorian empire, as the report The World in 2040 : Renewing the UK’s Approach to International Affairs , highlighted in 2024. Going back to 2020, my focus then—and now—was not primarily on the written aspect of the constitution, although there is an argument going back to the law of the 12 tables in ancient Rome, when the plebeians demanded, and finally secured, written laws against which the actions of patrician judges and officials could be tested. If that basic safeguard of being written down is not there, insiders will always have the advantage. What I would have said to Mr Green is that the existence of a written constitution of course does not ensure constitutional behaviour—something I am all too concerned, as are the majority of Americans, that we are about to see close up and serious in the US midterms and the next presidential election there. However, it would be an important democratic step forward, taken in Rome in about 450 BCE, that the UK has yet to secure. However, of course it is not a panacea. No single step will solve all our problems, and anyone who tells you they have a cure-all patent medicine should immediately be discounted as a serious thinker. What would be crucial now is the process of creating a written constitution, to debate and consider. Here I respectfully disagree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Carter. I believe we need to have that debate. Currently, we have toxically buried a huge amount of disagreement in our society. If we do not have that debate, the agreement will continue to fester. In that process, what might we consider? What is the UK and what is its place in the world? Should there still be a UK? That is now very seriously in question, and I note that it is challenged by the Green parties of both Scotland and Wales. Should we have such a massive dominance by Westminster over the rest of these islands? Should we get the big money out of politics, not all of us getting the politics the few pay for? Should we still have the last rotten borough: the City of London? After all, the position of the City of London as a global centre of financial corruption is a failure not just of governance but of government. What does the constitutional monarchy mean? What about the Crown Estate? Should who anyone’s parents are determine their place in our constitution? Should we have an elected upper House? The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, will give us a chance to talk about that tomorrow, so I will leave that there. These and many more are the questions that I suggest should be considered by a people’s constitutional convention that would be at the heart of a broad national debate. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, the constitution is a matter for every citizen; I would say it is a matter for every resident of the UK. The status quo benefits the status quo. That is not a stable and sustainable situation; it cannot continue. I have to respectfully disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, that written constitutions arrive in a time of political upheaval and change, but that does not apply to the UK—this after we have had seven Prime Ministers in 10 years and are now known internationally as “Westminster on the Tiber”.

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  14. Baroness D’Souza (CB)

    My Lords, I too thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for providing the opportunity for this debate and for his far-reaching introduction. This is a huge issue. We have heard various views expressed on the pros and cons of a codified constitution. I am not entirely sure that I have much to add to what has been expressed, but I would like to touch on the role that Parliament could play in ensuring scrutiny and monitoring of constitutional Bills to ensure that they receive the attention that they deserve and need. My premise in so doing is that it is the experience of this House over many years that incremental reform is more likely to succeed than sweeping changes. In the last decade or so, constitutional issues have come into sharper focus, whether it be the Brexit process and Prorogation, the successful rulings by the Supreme Court in 2017 and 2019 on the Gina Miller challenges, or on aspects of devolution. There have been repeated questions about the integrity and ethics of the Government of the day. What emerges is the lack of clarity on where exactly power lies in our uncodified constitution. The centuries-old chivvying between the Government, the courts and Parliament was eventually resolved by the adoption of supreme parliamentary sovereignty as the basis of the English settlement. Parliament can make or break any law and, in theory at least, this power is constrained by a set of checks and balances. The problem is that these checks and balances have proved weak, resulting in, among many other developments, public distrust of the Government of the day and of our political institutions. There are now new elements to contend with, notably the impact of external forces—forces outside government—which, by their wealth and influence, are creating a new global order. There is an urgent need for action to reassert the UK’s fundamental constitutional principles. However, a serious attempt to rewrite our uncodified constitution would be a huge undertaking, lasting possibly several years, with an uncertain outcome. Furthermore, it would require widespread consultation and efforts to educate the public on complex aspects of law. That said, no one denies that there is a case for action. What kind of action would serve to educate and allay the concerns of the wider public, including the media? One of the main recommendations of the 2023 Review of the UK Constitution , published by the Institute for Government and the Bennett School of Public Policy, was the establishment of a new and possibly joint parliamentary committee on the constitution. The committee would have several functions, including scrutinising constitutional policy and monitoring adherence to norms and conventions. The review points out some of the weaknesses in the present arrangements, such as the tendency for the Government to pass devolved legislation often without the consent of the respective devolved nations, or the reliance on a simple parliamentary majority for changes such as fixed-term Parliaments, only to have them abandoned by a similar simple majority. There is also the reversion to referendums—for example, on Scottish independence and Brexit—by a public who may not take into account the unintended consequences. This committee could usefully begin by listing existing constitutional Acts and principles and new categories of constitutional Acts, thereby formally recognising the importance of key legislation that underpins our system. The present constitutional arrangements are relatively unclear. A single independent and authoritative source of constitutional knowledge would be of great help in clarifying the legitimacy of different party-political views which have no mechanism for resolving disagreements. In due course, this committee could perhaps take on greater powers, such as the power to delay legislation until the constitutional aspects are formally agreed following pre-legislative scrutiny. The rationale in focusing on the constitution is that we can no longer ignore the contradictions of the political instability that is emerging. The public need reassurance, and the Government need to be prepared to deal with new challenges so as to underpin protections that we already have but do not adequately adhere to. The recommendations in the IfG review suggest a way forward that would significantly improve parliamentary oversight, promote public understanding and trust, and serve to clarify our constitutional laws.

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  15. Lord Kakkar (CB)

    My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady D’Souza. In so doing, I join other noble Lords in thanking my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich for having secured this important debate and introduced it in such a thoughtful manner. I am one who is opposed to the idea of a written constitution, because I am deeply attached to the orthodox interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty: the ability for a Parliament to make and unmake laws, for an Act of Parliament to be recognised as the supreme legal authority, and for the clear convention that no Parliament can bind its successor. To that I would add the simple principle that, ultimately, the other place enjoys primacy. As a result, because the other place is composed of the representatives of the people, not their delegates, we have a situation where the people are ultimately sovereign. However, there are circumstances under which we might need to consider a written constitution in the future: those identified in the preamble of the Parliament Act 1911, where if Parliament decided to compose a second Chamber not on a hereditary basis, as at that time, but on a popular basis then the interim arrangements of the 1911 Act, which governed, effectively, the relationship and powers between the two Houses, would need to be reconsidered. In defining the powers of, effectively, a second elected Chamber, there would need to be some kind of constitutional document. That ultimately would require interpretation, potentially by a different authority from one or two of the Chambers of Parliament—potentially a constitutional court. That is why, in principle, I have been opposed to an elected second Chamber. I have had the privilege of serving in two positions on two bodies mentioned by other noble Lords: for some years, I chaired the House of Lords Appointments Commission and, thereafter, the Judicial Appointments Commission. They are two very different bodies. The House of Lords Appointments Commission was composed as a result of a Written Ministerial Statement by the then Prime Minister in April 2000, which laid out the basis for appointment of the first commission and indicated that, in addition to making nominations for appointment to the Cross Benches, it would adopt the responsibilities of the then political honours vetting committee. The Judicial Appointments Commission, on the other hand, was established as a result of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and came into being in April 2006, and many of the regulations under which it makes appointments were brought into force in 2013. It is interesting that both bodies are subjected to parliamentary scrutiny: the chairman of the House of Lords Appointments Commission appears before the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in the other place and the chairman of the Judicial Appointments Commission appears before the Justice Committee in the other place. Both bodies appear before your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, so there is an important degree of parliamentary scrutiny. It is suggested that the House of Lords Appointments Commission should be put on to a statutory basis; it is merely advisory at the moment. There may well be some arguments for that. I was always quite anxious about that proposition because, in putting the body on to a statutory basis, one would then establish criteria for appointment in statute. I always wondered, therefore, whether appointments could be challenged or subjected to judicial review. That would put your Lordships’ House—indeed, this Parliament—in a difficult place where the judiciary might ultimately object to the appointment of somebody who had already taken their seat in your Lordships’ House, creating something of a crisis. On the other hand, in the Judicial Appointments Commission there are two clear statutory duties: to appoint on merit and to appoint individuals of good character. The work of the JAC was often challenged because it failed to achieve quickly enough substantial and sufficient diversity of the different jurisdictions and Benches. When those challenges were made, the statutory position was clear and the Lord Chancellor of the day was able to resist those calls and ensure that the JAC continued to be supported to make appointments on the basis of merit only. I make these observations because so many of the settlements that we enjoy and that have been broadly discussed in this interesting debate by other noble Lords are dependent on those who have the responsibility and privilege to act within our constitution to understand that envelope of responsibility and to act within it. If we are to consider a change and move away from these current constitutional arrangements, we will need to consider both positive and unintended consequences. For those reasons, I believe that it is appropriate for the flexible, pragmatic approach that we have enjoyed to date to continue. However, the point has been made that for certain bodies that play a role in our constitution, such as the House of Lords Appointments Commission and the Judicial Appointments Commission, further thought may be given to strengthening the way that Parliament itself can protect their work from excessive interference or becoming subjective to a particular mood not properly enjoyed by broad democratic consent. I believe that is something that should be considered. Ultimately, we have to continue to believe that our constitutional settlement as currently constructed provides protection. Certainly, the experience I had with regard to those two bodies confirms that the arrangements are appropriate as long as we continue to understand that it is Parliament that has the ultimate responsibility for scrutiny. Therefore, both the other place and your Lordships’ House must be able to effect their responsibilities with efficiency, determination and absolute confidence.

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  16. Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)

    “Up to a point, Lord Kakkar”, as Evelyn Waugh might have very nearly said. I agree with the general thesis, but I think HOLAC needs to be on a statutory basis and with a wider remit. I once tried to write a constitution for the European Union. It was a constitutional treaty. Mine was merely the pen; the ideas came from representatives of 28 legislatures and 28 Governments, including four active present Members of this House. My treaty was a total failure. It was accepted by 18 countries, but it was vetoed by two and I think it would have been vetoed in this country if it had come that far. Are there any lessons that I can bring to the House from my sad experience of having failed to write a constitution, or having written a constitution that failed? I am prepared to try, if noble Lords insist. We failed principally because the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, was not involved. He could have warned us not to be so ambitious, as he warned three years ago in his famous lecture and as he has warned again tonight. In his lecture, he distinguished three kinds of constitution writing. He warned against a revolutionary approach, starting from scratch—a Grundgesetz. He recommended for this country an authoritative restatement of current constitutional arrangements, making them easier to grasp. As again today, he spoke of a programme of modest renewal, dealing with problems that are thrown up by recent history. I think HOLAC is a case in point. Excessive use of framework laws worries me greatly, and the Independent Adviser on Ministerial Standards and the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, which seems to be a revolving-door committee, could both be looked at. All these defects are ones which most of us in this House hope Mr Burnham will address. The Anderson prescription is evolution, not revolution. I concur with my noble friend: I am uneasy about the suggestion, though I do not know how valid it is, that Mr Burnham is still attracted to something like the German basic law. The EU constitutional treaty that failed was actually not far from the Anderson prescription. It was mainly restatement, but the provisions in it that attracted most opposition were in fact provisions it was restating. They were already operative when they attracted enormous opprobrium in France, and a certain amount in this country, and they remained operative after the treaty was rejected. The elements that were new—the new parts of the European Parliament, the European Council’s enhanced status and presidency, and the bulwarks against competence creep—were not in themselves revolutionary, and 95% of them were subsequently adopted and are operative now. It was putting them all together in a single new compendium text that killed them in 2005. It looked an intimidatingly big package, and a vanishingly small proportion of those who rejected it in France, in the Netherlands and, I suspect, in this country had actually read it. I draw two conclusions from that sad history. First, restatement and renewal, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, prescribed, should be entirely separate exercises. Secondly, renewal should be tackled seriatim in a rolling programme over time. Every innovation will have an opponent, and the opposition to a compendium will amount to more than the sum of individual criticisms—so no German basic law, please. It would need countrywide acceptance, presumably by referendum. It could easily suffer the same fate as my EU masterpiece, and a failure would do lasting damage because it would be very hard to distinguish and disentangle the acceptable from the unaccepted. In my view, we should not just think about the relationship between Executive and legislature. We also need to think about the relationship between this legislature and those in Belfast, Cardiff and Edinburgh, and the relationship between central and devolved governments, as the noble Lord, Lord Murphy did. I hope that Mr Burnham, when he preaches devolution, looks beyond England. As a Scottish unionist, I strongly resented the way that recent union Governments patronised and insulted Edinburgh. I was and remain uneasy that consultative intergovernmental mechanisms were so little used and interparliamentary consultation so vestigial. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, commended conventions, but our elastic interpretation of the Sewel convention seems to me to be dangerous and dishonourable. That convention, written into the Scotland Act 2016, says we will not normally legislate in devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament. However, we never should, and the inclusion of the promise that we will not normally cheat is an open invitation to cheat, which has all too often been exercised. Devolved means devolved, and we should bind ourselves never to claw back competencies when it suits us. We Scots are great at grievances, so let us not create real ones. Let us honour the constitutional settlement we have and go in for some cautious reform and renewal, along the lines of the Anderson prescription.

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  17. Viscount Stansgate (Lab)

    My Lords, I am very pleased to contribute to this debate, not least because I welcome any opportunity to debate the constitution. Being so low down in the list at least gives me the opportunity to say what a wonderful debate it has been so far. I commend the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for securing the debate and for his speech. I find myself rather missing my noble friend Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, who would be making a contribution if he were here. I am very grateful to the Library for the briefing it has given, setting out the arguments for and against a written constitution. As we heard the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, pay tribute to the distinguished career of her father, I would like to thank the Library for including in its briefing a reference to the 1991 Commonwealth of Britain Bill, introduced by the then right honourable Member for Chesterfield. We know that we do not have a single document that contains our constitution; we have a variety of laws and judicial decisions, customs, conventions and precedents. However, we do not just have written documents, we also have pictorial ones. Earlier this year I went to the British Museum to see the Bayeux Tapestry, and I recommend that all Members do the same. In a way, that tapestry is a foundational document of our constitution, because the events that followed the Battle of Hastings have laid the foundation for the system of government we have today. The Prime Minister has set out his case for greater devolution. No 10 North is a symbol of his commitment and, in due course, it may well be that this will lead to new developments in our constitutional arrangements, but they will be evolutionary. That is not quite the same thing as saying that it will inevitably lead to a brand new written constitution for this country in a single document. Apart from anything else, it would be remarkably difficult to create and agree a written constitutional document setting out the relationship between the various branches of government, the individual rights and sovereignty of the people and so on. That is not to mention the need to consider the way in which it might be ratified. There may be Members of this House, people present now, who have studied the founding of the United States, as I have. The Federalist Papers and the debates in Philadelphia culminating in the document written in 1787 represented a great achievement at that time. It remains one of the most robust and successful in modern political history, though I am bound to say that it is currently under strain, to say the least. We have yet to see how stretched that constitution can be by current events. Ask me some more after 3 November, but that is a debate for another day. I do not think it feasible or practicable for us to create a single written constitutional document today; frankly, we have had too much history to make that possible. If I may gently say so to the noble and learned Lords here present, nor would it be right or desirable to create a constitution that would inevitably confer on the judiciary a major responsibility for its interpretation. Call me old-fashioned, but I am a believer in parliamentary sovereignty, and I may as well add that I was brought up to be so. For those who argue that a written constitution is a vital bulwark against the abuse of power, I would argue that written constitutions are not immune to bad actors, a point made by many people so far. Of course, there are weaknesses in unwritten constitutions. A recent example was the attempt to prorogue Parliament for a long time in 2019, though that did not eventually succeed. Some have raised other weaknesses. I recently saw the evidence given by the noble Lord, Lord Case, to the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House. His argument for a written constitution was that it was remarkable for a G7 country, a P5 member of the United Nations and a nuclear power not to have a clear line of succession—a not unreasonable point. What would happen if our Prime Minister was run over by a bus today? The only thing I know for certain is that the passengers on that bus would have not paid more than £2 each for the journey. Seriously, though, what would the line of succession be? I do not claim to know. We do not at the moment have a designated Deputy Prime Minister, though we have had at various times in the recent past. Some might claim that this is a fatal weakness. I think the situation would be resolved. I am sure we would probably have an interim leader, then an election of the Labour Party and events would unfold in a familiar way. The underlying point I am trying to make is that our unwritten constitution would, in effect, cope with such a situation, as it has with others, because ultimately it rests on the consent and the confidence of the people. This concept of confidence is a central part of our unwritten constitution. After all, we have a system in which the very definition of a Prime Minister is that she or he has the confidence of the House, and the political system has the confidence of the people. This year has seen a pretty classic example of what happens when a Prime Minister loses their confidence. Where there have been attempts made to import a rigidity into our constitution, such as the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, they have failed because it did not work and it was realised that we need to retain the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances—even if it means, as the country knows well enough, that this adaptation has meant six Prime Ministers in seven years. There is one thing I want to raise. Others have mentioned it, but that is a disadvantage of being down the list. It is the issue of the Cabinet Manual . If there is one point on which I hope my noble friend the Minister will reply, it is to update the House on progress on the next edition. The origins of the manual go back to the document Questions o f Procedure f or Ministers in the 1970s. It was updated by the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, who I am glad to see in his place, and Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, with the direct support and encouragement of the then Prime Minister, whose interest in the architecture of British politics is well known and to be respected. I am one of those who have long campaigned for a new edition of the manual. My time is up, so I urge my noble friend to tell us how progress is going, what the process for approval might be, what consultations there will be in both Houses and when it will be published. Following that, I hope this House will have a debate on it, because it would make a fitting sequel to our debate today.

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  18. Baroness Prashar (CB)

    My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for securing this debate and for his masterly introduction of it with a light touch. Andrew Blick and Peter Hennessy, in their book The Bonfire of Decencies: Repairing and Restoring the British Constitution , written following the Boris premiership, highlighted how the experience of the Johnson premiership demonstrated the fragility of our uncodified constitution. They argued that muddling through is no longer feasible. They said that, although the system self-corrected, these excesses are a warning. More recently we heard that Prime Minister Burnham has said that the greater devolution of powers within the UK strengthens the case for a written constitution, and he made reference to the German model. In recent years, the UK constitution has been under pressure for reasons such as Brexit and Covid. Calls for a written constitution are not new. Arguments for and against are well rehearsed. However, in my view what is clear is that our uncodified constitution needs attention. A full-blown constitution through which we move from parliamentary supremacy to judicial supremacy is not the answer to the concerns expressed. We need evolution, not revolution. The flexibility and merits of our current arrangements were very well articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere. I agree with what he said, so I will not repeat it. However, the current constitutional arrangements need enhancement in areas such as violation of conventions, unlawful activities of a challenging nature, violation of criminal law by Ministers, breaking treaty obligations and international law, compromising public institutions and associated values, and eroding any mechanism that exists to police or limit overriding rules, conventions and limitations—for example, Parliament, courts and oversight bodies, particularly those of a constitutional nature. Our current arrangements depend on these structures, and their robustness and respect for them. The underlying changes faced in the recent years necessitate a look at the problem as a whole and not piecemeal tinkering. There have been a number of inquiries, with recommendations and suggestions which need to be brought together and considered as a whole. There have been several Select Committee inquiries and recommendations. I was involved in one two years ago: the governance commission, which was chaired by Dominic Grieve. We need a cross-party commission which considers the recommendations already made and examines where the weaknesses are in our current arrangements—what needs to be strengthened and where we need harder enforcement. Such an exercise would address the problems as a whole and their combined effect. This process could be used to encourage public awareness and show why respect for rules and conventions matters. The “hidden wiring” of our constitution, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, needs to be made more explicit in a document that is accessible. That can then be underpinned by the recommendations made by the Institute for Government, to which the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, referred. Those arrangements would work well. While such an exercise is necessary, it is not sufficient, because the environment within which it operates also needs attention. No constitution can function satisfactorily without a strong political realm that addresses the lack of trust and confidence in government and democratic institutions, that tackles the decline of and lack of participation in political processes, and that creates initiatives to restore confidence in democracy, the lack of which has given rise to populism, authoritarianism and consequent social divisions. That is equally, if not more, important. We need to strengthen and enhance our current constitutional arrangements and foster values that bolster democratic behaviours and encourage the engagement of citizens. This is where devolution can help. Properly implemented, it can bring decisions closer to communities, strengthen local leadership and enable a greater public voice; through deliberative engagement, it can foster social cohesion. True participation rests on the capacity to come together, build trust and have shared spaces for dialogue and collective problem solving. It is these that need to be woven into devolution, not just a constitutional change. Devolution is not just an administrative task or a rearrangement of the constitution but a genuine community-building task. If we neglect this, we risk devolution that will be technical but socially brittle. Ultimately, constitutional success depends on human beings rather than just written documents. Our uncodified constitution needs to be refreshed and reformed, not torn down and replaced. Will the Government take a comprehensive look and not just continue to muddle on?

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  19. Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)

    My Lords, in this House, we are a bit formulaic about congratulating colleagues on obtaining a slot for a topical debate, and I will not miss out today. However, my noble friend deserves more than that, because subjecting Britain’s lack of a written constitution to scrutiny is an essential exercise. Our unwritten constitution should not be taken for granted; nor should it simply be assumed that, because it is British and has survived for centuries, it must be the best approach, when most other countries—many, but not all, impeccable democracies—have written constitutions. It is a trifle odd that, despite not having a written constitution ourselves, we had no compunction about writing constitutions for parts of our colonial possessions as they achieved independence. One reason for us to have a written constitution is that many of our fellow citizens believe that we do not have a constitution at all, when in fact we have a collection of conventions and statutes that serve that purpose. Such a fundamental misunderstanding cannot be entirely satisfactory. Our present unclear situation leaves a very large amount of scope for disagreement and recourse to the courts, including the Supreme Court, for interpretation. That, too, is not entirely satisfactory, giving rise quite recently to debate that detracts from our respect for the rule of law, which is fundamental to our freedoms. However, such recourse cannot be entirely avoided, and, as we have heard, would arise if we did have a written constitution. The absence of a written constitution also makes the teaching of our constitutional practice in schools and universities far more complex and difficult, and harder to absorb, than it would otherwise be. So there is quite a list of arguments for switching to a written constitution, and there are plenty more than those I have mentioned, even leaving aside sloppy and self-serving ones drawn from the history of countries, including our nearest neighbours in the United States, who have and treasure their written constitution. But there are plenty of compelling arguments against switching in that direction. First, negotiating a written constitution would certainly be contentious, often opening up old wounds long since healed by time and patience. You only have to look at the Official Opposition’s policy of withdrawing the UK from the European Convention on Human Rights and its application by our courts to see how that might play out. Writing a written constitution for the UK would be likely to throw up many difficult, and perhaps insoluble, questions about devolution and the definition of devolved powers, not to speak—this is really important—of the basic unity of the UK. It is a little hard to see an SNP Government in Edinburgh, a dual Government in Belfast and a Plaid Cymru Government in Cardiff easily agreeing to a text on what the United Kingdom consists of. Having seen the absence of clarity in the situation emerging from our recent efforts at devolution, it is not easy to sustain the argument that dealing with those issues in a written constitution would be easy or straightforward. It is also perhaps relevant that we do not seem to be terribly good at writing constitutions. Not only are there quite a few ex-colonies that we endowed with written constitutions that did not stand the test of time, but look at the mess we made of the EU’s constitutional treaty, about which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, spoke. We happily allowed the European Community’s founding treaty, the treaty of Rome, which made no provision for a member state to leave, to have such a provision inserted and be retained in the Lisbon treaty—surely a case of painting a target on your own back for a decision that is now rather widely considered to have been an egregious error of judgment. Would we not have been better off without that? Perhaps the most compelling argument against switching to a written constitution is the massive amount of legislative time that would be required to reach a conclusion. This time would be at the expense of more mundane legislative tasks, and it would risk the latter being neglected, rushed or fudged. We already promulgate too many imperfect laws without programming a lot more of them. I have left out of this list of arguments against switching the likelihood that the means of choosing the Members of your Lordships’ House, and even more so of defining its powers relative to those of the House of Commons, could in itself prove just a trifle contentious and extremely hard to resolve. I do not habitually come down to arguing against reform, but in this case I do, for reasons more of practicality than principle. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is quite a useful adage bequeathed to us by our transatlantic cousins.

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  20. Lord Pack (LD)

    My Lords, I too follow in that honourable and venerable convention of thanking the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for securing this important debate, particularly at a time when democracy in different countries is being so tested both by economic and social strains and by authoritarians and extremists. That makes this a good time to consider how we might be able to strengthen or improve our democracy through the use of a written constitution. That is an argument my party has long made and, having listened carefully to several noble Lords express happiness or disappointment—I am not sure which it was—that the case for a written constitution had not been made more in this debate, let me summon up my courage and join the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, in setting out some of those points. I start with an emphasis on how written constitutions can take many forms. They take many forms in the degree to which they are embedded, and they take many forms in the degree to which they give power to judges. The USA’s example scores very highly on both those criteria, but it is by no means the only model available. The German Basic Law has been mentioned a couple of times by noble Lords, and it is worth emphasising that it has been amended more than 60 times, including perhaps most notably to allow a recent policy decision by the German Government to significantly increase defence spending. That illustrates that it is possible to have a written constitution that brings benefits but is sufficiently flexible that it does not require a religious schism or a civil war to be amended. One other thing that is, of course, common with written constitutions is just how widespread they are. I think I am correct in saying that every modern democracy other than New Zealand and Israel has a written constitution. There is a risk, obviously not in this House but sometimes in wider discussions on this topic, of a certain myopic insularity in talking about problems in theory with written constitutions that are, in fact, problems that many other countries have found solutions to and have practically implemented written constitutions to address. Across those different models, though, there is that common, essential quality of the idea that a written constitution provides some grit in the system and some limitation on the Government’s ability to do whatever, whenever, however and to whoever. Perhaps that is in many ways something that we are a bit more familiar with than we sometimes remember in these debates. One example of embedding such grit in the system is the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949. To some extent, they are embedded and, as the plurality of the phrase “Parliament Acts” illustrates, open to amendment. They have shown how a degree of embedding can be an extremely useful part of our constitution. There are reasons why such grit is useful and may become more useful in the near future. While we have, for the moment at least, the first past the post electoral system for the House of Commons, and we have a five or six-party system around the country—or, in Scotland and Wales, one might more accurately say a seven-party system—it means that in practice it is absolutely possible for a party to win a clear majority in the House of Commons on less than 30% of the vote. We could have a Government elected where two-thirds of those voting have voted against them, and our current set-up would give them very extensive powers that would flow from their majority in the House of Commons. Obviously, when making this point, I believe it is one of our constitutional conventions that somebody has to make reference to Lord Hailsham and elective dictatorship. But it is worth bearing in mind how much the electoral system has changed in practice since he made those comments, given how much lower the winning bar now is for Governments. That grit in the system can be extremely helpful as a protection for the unfashionable, the unpopular and the minority, and as an aid to better decision-making. In many ways, a written constitution could provide for our country what the House of Lords provides for Parliament. We do not take away the democratic sovereignty of the House of Commons but, by adding a little more process and grit and by being able to occasionally enforce a little more reflection, one might even say, on the House of Commons, we enable those democratic decisions to be better. There is also a benefit, as has been touched on by several noble Lords, of the consolidation aspect, as one might call it, of a written constitution: the ability to pull together different documents in a way that makes the way our rules operate clearer and more transparent. Noble Lords, I fear, are already slightly bored of hearing me talk about this in the context of election law, with the many benefits of having the clarity that comes from a robust, consolidated set of rules. But those benefits are by no means constrained simply to elections; they are benefits that can be taken much more broadly. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, quoted Gavin Esler making this point rather more poetically than I have. It is an important, valuable one. In the past, I have made the comparison with how sometimes our attitude towards the statute book and other laws and rules that we have is a bit like that of a teenager with a messy bedroom. You know that at one point, some time in the future, it is going to be worth tidying up, but you always find an excuse to put it off. Which is why my hopes have been raised by the fact that we now have a Prime Minister who has previously made such positive comments about the benefits of a written constitution. I very much look forward to hearing from the Minister what the government plans are to bring to life those previous comments by the Prime Minister. I am sure we can all hope, whatever we might think of the merits of the plans, that the Government are planning a route that requires neither civil war nor religious schism to bring about what the Prime Minister has previously praised so much.

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  21. Baroness Finn (Con)

    My Lords, I too thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for bringing this debate to the House today. In his Lord Renton lecture on a written constitution in 2023, he said that “our constitution is sick (though the illness is chronic rather than acute)”. That diagnosis, combined with the Prime Minister’s own interest in a written constitution, makes today’s debate timely. We have heard a range of thought-provoking contributions from across the House. The noble Lord’s constructive introduction was especially helpful given the complexity of the issues and level of disagreement on the right way forward. The noble Lord briefly argued for a stronger Cabinet M anual and for putting HOLAC and the independent adviser, among others, on a statutory basis. That is separate from our debate today, but I gently point out that our constitution relies more on balances than on checks. As such, the proposals would undermine the flexibility of our constitution, to its detriment. The constitution of the United Kingdom can be summarised in eight words: whatever the Crown in Parliament enacts is law. Ministers are drawn from and accountable to Parliament, and the judiciary ensures that the Government act within the law as set by Parliament. In recent years, the Prime Minister has shown an interest in a written constitution for the United Kingdom. He argued in his book Head North that devolution will not work “unless we build the new Britain on the strong foundation of a written constitution”. More recently, in June, the Prime Minister spoke of giving No. 10 North a mission to strive for equivalent living conditions in all parts of Britain, borrowing from the German Basic Law, which many noble Lords have referenced today—that is, the 1949 written constitution of the German state. Although the Prime Minister was not specific about which part of the German Basic Law he was referring to, I think it is reasonable to assume that he was reflecting on the 2006 amendment to the German Basic Law creating Article 104b, which established a mechanism through which the German federation can provide financial assistance to the federal states, or Länder, in order to: “1. avert a disturbance of the overall economic equilibrium … 2. equalise differing economic capacities within the federal territory, or … 3. promote economic growth”. Successive Governments have adopted measures to tackle inequality of opportunity across the United Kingdom, and it is not clear to me why a basic law or written constitution is a necessary prerequisite for effective progress towards that objective. Perhaps the Minister will take the opportunity to confirm whether the Prime Minister was indeed referring to Article 104b of the German Basic Law and to set out further details of his plans for a written constitution. If she cannot provide that clarity today, perhaps she would commit to writing with that detail. Whatever the Prime Minister’s plans in respect of a UK version of Article 104b, he should consider carefully whether it might not be simpler, and no doubt much quicker, to place that provision on the statute book in the normal way, with the full inviolable authority of Parliament, rather than allowing his proposal to be bogged down in a more fundamental and extremely contentious debate about codified constitutions. As Lord Sumption argued in a recent UCL Constitution Unit blog, “there is nothing that a written constitution could achieve that could not be achieved with equal efficacy by ordinary parliamentary legislation”. Whatever the Prime Minister’s view of written constitutions may be, this Motion invites a much broader consideration of their benefits and disadvantages. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has expressed his support for a codified constitution that is reflective of existing arrangements rather than a vehicle for reform. Others have expressed their own views in this debate. Whatever benefits may be gained from having a written constitution, whether that be public understanding or clarity for lawmakers, we know that constitutional flexibility would be a victim of a written constitution, whatever form it may take. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has himself previously quoted the late US Supreme Court Justice Scalia on this point, who argued that: “The very objective of a basic law ... is to place certain matters beyond risk of change, except through the extraordinary democratic majorities that constitutional amendment requires ... The whole purpose of a constitution—old or new—is to impede change or, pejoratively put, ‘obstruct modernity’”. We have never fallen victim to that sea-anchor approach to constitutional rules, instead adopting a consensual style and system of conventions and practices that allow effective government to be carried on even in circumstances unforeseen by the drafters of a written constitution. We have also, generally, been spared the frustrations of legal deadlock between Parliament and the courts. That simple constitutional principle—the sovereignty of Parliament—underpins so many of the processes and practices allowing the King’s government to be carried on without the intrusion of overmighty justices, as seen in the United States of America and elsewhere. In his 2025 lecture on the unwritten constitution, Lord Sales argued of our existing settlement: “In the historical record, its flexibility has on balance been an advantage”. I fully agree with him. The position of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is that a written constitution need not be a revolutionary document, nor need it be a vehicle for radical reform. However, is it not the case that in all examples, bar the Kingdom of the Netherlands, codification of the constitution has opened the door to judgments in the courts that strike down new legislation that is in conflict with the text of the codified constitution? Is that not a revolutionary change in our constitutional settlement in itself? Another major concern with any proposal for a codified constitution is the de facto obligation for judges to take political decisions. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, judges must, so far as possible, interpret legislation compatibly with convention rights. When that is not possible, the higher courts may issue declarations of incompatibility. Such declarations do not invalidate Acts of Parliament but, to make them, judges must undertake evaluative exercises that necessarily require them to balance competing public interests that should more properly be undertaken by Parliament—an argument so eloquently advanced by my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne. Under the former European Communities Act 1972, courts were required to disapply domestic legislation which conflicted with directly effective European law. These arrangements forced judges to intrude into the political arena in a way that has been helpful neither to the judges themselves nor to our mode of democratic accountability. A codified constitution with the status of a higher law would take this further by inviting courts to set aside Acts of Parliament which they judged inconsistent with it. That would be a fundamental change in the way our constitution functions, and it is certainly not a step to be taken lightly. There is no way of creating a higher form of law that does not dilute the principle of parliamentary accountability. If Parliament could amend or repeal it by ordinary legislation, it would have no higher status. If it could not, future Parliaments would be bound by rules they could not change through the normal democratic process. What mandate, then, would be sufficient for the approval and amendment of a written constitution? If clarity is all that is sought then perhaps a supermajority in both Houses of Parliament would suffice. Or, if this is something that only those with a democratic mandate should decide, perhaps it ought to be approved by a supermajority in the House of Commons alone. If the latter is the case, is there a risk that this new document is then used by the House of Commons to weaken the ancient rights, liberties and duties of your Lordships’ House, or indeed other parts of the constitution, without recourse to the normal legislative process? Perhaps a mandate from outside Parliament, through referendums, would be more appropriate? Both have their drawbacks. A parliamentary supermajority may be difficult to achieve and it would likely never be achieved without the governing party voting for a constitution or any amendment to it. In effect, it would remain in the gift of the Executive to create and amend constitutional rights. If referendums were to be the chosen mechanism, we might face costly national exercises in democracy even more frequently than we do now. We would need to see evidence that the electorate genuinely wanted to see more regular referendums if we were to consider that mechanism. In its basic shape and function, the Crown in Parliament has guided this nation through the Industrial Revolution, the creation, expansion and dismantling of an empire, the successful prosecution of war against Napoleon and of two world wars, the creation of the welfare state after the Second World War and the market turn in the philosophy of government brought about by the late Baroness Thatcher. It has proved remarkably flexible and durable, adapting to pandemic and war, to changing needs and times and to evolving public, spiritual and moral values. We must each of us ask ourselves, is there truly another country to which we can look and say, “We wish we were governed as they are”? For my own part, I think not. With all its advantages and compromises, we have inherited from those who sat here before us the most stable constitutional settlement in the democratic world, of which we can—and should—be justly proud.

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  22. The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Baroness Twycross) (Lab)

    My Lords, I add my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for securing this fascinating debate on the proposals for a written constitution and for his very thought-provoking introduction. This is a vast and complex subject that has been long debated, including in your Lordships’ House. We have heard many interesting contributions from across the House. Without picking out any particular favourites—but I am going to—I particularly enjoyed the contribution by my noble friend Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, which was both entertaining and fascinating, and also demonstrated some of the challenges we face in this area of debate. The Government warmly welcome the opportunity to debate these issues in Parliament. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made clear, this is of interest well beyond this Chamber, including among students, not least those taught by my amazing noble friend Lord Murphy of Torfaen. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, who said that a written constitution would make teaching students easier, which is one argument in favour of a written constitution, perhaps—though not necessarily a defining one. It was helpful to hear alternative views put forward to noble Lords by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, although I did not necessarily agree with everything she said. It was also interesting to hear the account from the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, of a failed attempt to write a constitution for the EU. I welcome the alternative view of the noble Lord, Lord Pack, in his support for a written constitution, which significantly balanced the debate. As noble Lords are clearly aware, our constitutional system is somewhat unusual. Noble Lords, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, noted that it is uncodified. As my noble friend Lord Stansgate said, it is not in one document but is dispersed across many documents and sources. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, said, it has evolved over time and is made up of conventions, statutes, judicial decisions, principles and practices. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, said in her remarks, it relies more on balances and checks. Like every constitution, it is imperfect. However, it is also flexible and adaptable. This is a core feature of our constitution and it has served us well, as many noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, made clear. It is not written down in a single place, yet it exists. I agree with my noble friend Lord Murphy that it is strong. I also agree that a written constitution does not in itself necessarily confer protection. As the noble Lord, Lord Howard, made clear, totalitarian regimes would not be deterred by a written constitution per se. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, said, all written constitutions are vulnerable to bad actors. The example given by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, of 1930s Germany demonstrates this powerfully, as did many other examples given today. It is the very features of the UK constitution that mean it is not frozen in aspic, and nor should it be if we want a political system that delivers for everyone. The noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, mentioned the need for trust and for us to rebuild it, and this is key. The Government’s priority is a politics that works for all people in all places, not just some people in some places. We are beginning the work of shifting power and resources away from Whitehall, as set out in the Rewiring the State Cabinet statement of 31 July. We have already launched the biggest transfer of power from Westminster in a generation. That includes the largest package of financial powers ever offered to English mayors, with a retained share of income tax revenues for the first time. We will replace the current model of consultation by default with new and modern forms of public participation. The noble Lord, Lord Pack, mentioned electoral reform. As the Prime Minister has announced, the Government intend to establish a new national commission on electoral reform, and he invited all political parties to be part of this work. We want everyone’s vote to count and everyone’s voice to be heard. The Government are not afraid of going further and, where there is a case for doing so, codifying elements of our constitutional arrangements. The noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, referred to the IfG recommendation of a new Joint Committee on the constitution. The establishment of a Joint Committee is clearly a matter for Parliament rather than government. I note that the Lords Constitution Committee is already undertaking an important inquiry into the UK’s constitutional safeguards, as mentioned by a number of noble Lords, and I look forward to reading the findings of that inquiry in due course. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, and my noble friend Lord Stansgate highlighted, the Government are currently drafting an update to the Cabinet Manual . The Cabinet Manual , as noble Lords will be aware, serves as an authoritative guide to the UK’s constitutional arrangements. It is the Executive’s view on the processes and rules around the operation of government, including the formation of a Government following an election. The Cabinet Manual is not intended to be a written constitution but acts as a practical document to help Ministers, officials and the public understand how government works and its interaction with other parts of the constitution. It was first published in 2011, and it has become significantly out of date, most notably, as has been noted during today’s debate, in its descriptions of the UK’s relationship with the EU, of general elections and of the devolution settlement. An update will therefore restore the manual’s status as an authoritative guide. The Government will seek feedback from parliamentary Select Committees on proposed revisions. This is intended to be a meaningful opportunity for MPs and Peers to support the updating process so that the manual continues to be a non-party-political document that provides a record of fact. My noble friend Lord Stansgate asked about progress and when the work was likely to come to a conclusion. I am pleased to be able to confirm to noble Lords that the update to the manual is well under way, and we intend to publish the updated manual early next year. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked for the Government’s view on a written constitution. The Government welcome feedback, continued discussion and debates, such as the one we are having today, on the next steps on constitutional reform. That is different to converting the UK’s uncodified constitutional arrangements into a single written document for its own sake. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, wisely cautioned us to consider the time and effort it would take to create a codified constitution, and the work of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, on this subject shows that constitutional reform is not a straightforward subject, and there are steps well short of a written constitution that we can consider. As time goes on, as society changes and as new issues emerge, constitutional arrangements need to adapt accordingly. Indeed, one of the main issues with written constitutions is that they can become out of date very quickly, as the procedures and rules for amending them may often be cumbersome and difficult to satisfy. Before I conclude, there are a couple of other points I wish to cover. A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carter of Haslemere, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett and Lord Boyd, referred to the role of the judiciary. We believe and are very clear that it is important that we have an independent judiciary. During the debate, the risk of creating an overpowerful judiciary under a written constitution was also noted, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Howard. An independent judiciary is, however, a cornerstone of our constitutional arrangements. The noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and others referred to parliamentary sovereignty. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, on the importance of parliamentary sovereignty as a central tenet of our constitutional arrangements. In conclusion, I once more thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for leading a very thought-provoking discussion on our constitutional arrangements. As the noble Lord, Lord Pack, said, it was timely, given what a testing time we live in. This Government’s priority is to establish a politics that works for all people in all places, not some people in some places. We are serious about constitutional reform, and we will take bold steps where there is a case to do so.

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  23. Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)

    My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response, and I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this scintillating debate. I was reminded as it went on of Oliver Cromwell’s speech to the first Protectorate Parliament of 1654, in which he famously said: “In every government there must be somewhat fundamental, somewhat like a Magna Carta, that should be standing and unalterable”. That caused me to reflect on two things: that we have been debating a written constitution in Westminster for almost 400 years without reaching a conclusion, but also that this might be one of those issues where the journey, in terms of the scrutiny it provokes, is more important than the destination. A formally binding, codified constitution was not generally thought to be on the horizon, notwithstanding the Prime Minister’s recent words, and appeared to many to be a practical impossibility, not least given the current politics of devolution. However, the predominant view that a written constitution is neither necessary nor feasible was vigorously challenged by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and by the noble Lord, Lord Pack, who described the advantages of grit in the system. Their views, I suspect, will have resonance outside this Chamber. As to the Prime Minister’s views, it was impressive to see them analysed in forensic detail from the Opposition Front Bench. The Minister was, perhaps, a little more circumspect, but if she writes the letter tentatively requested by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn—and I would not put a lot of money on that—I shall be fascinated to see it. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, warned us against the complacency of Mr Podsnap and suggested, as did the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that we might have something to learn from what has been done in other places. I feel sure, for my part, that the praise of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, for the German constitution is more securely founded than was the favourable opinion referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, of its 1930 predecessor. I could not agree more with the deprecation expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Howard, of politically appointed judges. I urge all who feel the same way to resist calls to abolish the Judicial Appointments Commission, which might not be a perfect institution but is, when one looks at the alternatives, a very necessary one. We had some constructive suggestions for constitution renewal relating to the Sewel convention, concordats, HOLAC, a stronger Cabinet Manual and so on, not all of them uncontroversial. But like much else we have heard this evening, they deserve further thought. I beg to move.

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  24. Motion agreed.

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  25. House adjourned at 6.27 pm.

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Source: UK Parliament Hansard API. Debate ID: 5423194.