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Lord Mance (CB)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 22 October 2026

Debate

Written Constitution

Contribution

My Lords, our uncodified constitution has four legs—short or long: common law, statutes, conventions and practice. Our modern system of administrative law, elicited from our well-respected Government Legal Service, has a measured guide, The Judge Over Your Shoulder, now in its sixth edition. Its witty acronym is JOYS, but I take this in the sense that it is a real joy, and a huge privilege, to live in a country which adheres to the rule of law. An important aspect of the courts’ role is to determine the legal limits of the powers conferred upon each branch of government. In the two Miller cases, in the first of which I sat, the Supreme Court acted to preserve the position of Parliament, not the Executive, as our ultimate democratic institution. Where our uncodified constitution stands out is in a certain lack of transparency, possibly accompanied with a degree of complacency, in its inability to act as a salient feature of national identity—it mystifies—and in its foundational principles of parliamentary sovereignty and privilege, the relationship of which with the other Diceyan principle of rule of law we are discussing this evening. As for transparency, there has been reference to the Cabinet Manual. In 2008-09, when I had the privilege of chairing the House’s sub-committee on European law and institutions, on which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, also served, we were interested to know the bases on which the Government chose to consult the House in respect of European legislative initiatives in Brussels. Our information was that in at least one Nordic country, its parliament was not merely consulted but dictated the Executive’s line on such initiatives, which are of course a form of primary legislation in many cases. The response to our inquiry was that the Cabinet Office guidelines were confidential. Only on 5 May 2009 were we able to thank the then Minister for Europe, Caroline Flint, for a letter putting several of the guidelines for the first time into the public domain. Now, of course, we have the Cabinet Manual of December 2010, but it has not even been updated to reflect our leaving the EU—although it is about to be, apparently, reformulated. As to the core constitutional principles of parliamentary supremacy and privilege, they operate well if exercised with restraint and respect. But can we, in modern conditions, still feel quite the same complacency as Mr Podsnap in Our Mutual Friend, when he declared that “We Englishmen are Very Proud of our Constitution, Sir. It Was Bestowed Upon Us By Providence. No Other Country is so Favoured as This Country”? Mr Podsnap did not see beyond Hadrian’s Wall or foresee devolution. He gloried in English exceptionalism without acknowledging any possible advantages in written constitutions. Today, we do not have to look abroad to see that our uncodified constitution has potential vulnerabilities. The supremacy of Parliament makes primary legislation immune to judicial review. Most written constitutions entrench fundamental individual rights, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has said, a model upon which UK Supreme Court Justices regularly adjudicate sitting in the Privy Council. The UK’s nearest equivalent, cleverly constructed to respect parliamentary supremacy, is the unentrenched Human Rights Act. But a Government commanding a parliamentary majority can simply repeal that at any time. With one exception, Parliament can do anything. The teasing exception already mentioned is that Parliament cannot bind itself. Nothing can be entrenched—although perhaps a way in the form of some sort of constitutional people’s convention, or even a referendum, would lead courts to recognise entrenchment. The privileges of Parliament, combined with Article IX of the Bill of Rights, make the appropriateness of parliamentary procedures forbidden territory for UK courts. However, this does not mean that nothing needs doing to improve or change them. The problems are well known. The Institute for Government has described the Government’s iron grip over the Commons timetable as “unusual in international terms” and needing modification. The insufficiency of parliamentary scrutiny and the prevalence, breadth and vagueness of delegated legislation have been robustly criticised in and outside Parliament by very strongly worded reports, with one entitled Government by Diktat: A Call to Return Power to Parliament and another entitled Democracy Denied?. A written constitution would probably address Parliament’s supremacy, although, with respect to what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said about the Netherlands, there is a law going through there to give ex post facto jurisdictional power to strike down to the Raad van State on similar lines to the Conseil constitutionnel in France. The Prime Minister co-authored Head North, as has been mentioned, looking with favour on the German Basic Law, which features scrutiny of both the supremacy and the internal procedural privileges of the German Parliament. The German constitution and its court were part of an essential new start, but both have won continuing acceptance as core elements of Germany’s legal and cultural identity. The court’s involvement with parliamentary procedures has been in the interests of democracy. It has prescribed general principles to prevent the misuse of majoritarian power: to ensure that Parliament is given sufficient time to debate proposed legislation; to ensure that minority parties have proper information and a proper say; to ensure the precision of legislation; and to avoid excessive or vague delegation of legislative powers to the Executive. At the same time, the German constitutional court has remained very sensitive to the greater democratic legitimacy of the German Parliament, and Germany is not governed by judges. The elective dictatorship of this country clearly needs to improve itself in less dramatic ways than a written constitution. There should be a new self-denying concordat by the Executive, with the Government identifying and agreeing to observe certain basic principles governing Parliament and its procedures. The German model is an interesting parallel and precedent. Such changes would revivify Parliament as the place where the nation’s concerns are debated and true political compromise occurs.

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