L

Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 22 October 2026

Debate

Written Constitution

Contribution

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow so many distinguished speakers. The primary purpose of a constitution is to establish the fundamental legal framework for governing a state. In the United Kingdom, two key facets of this are protecting and strengthening our democracy and providing a framework for effective government in accordance with the rule of law. I would measure the arguments for a written constitution against these two benchmarks. So, would a written constitution be more or less democratic? Jonathan Sumption pointed out in his Telegraph article of 9 August this year that a written constitution would “hand enormous political powers to the courts”, which would have the power to interpret it and overturn Acts of Parliament if they did not measure up to the courts’ interpretations. That point was echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, just now. Extending the role of our unelected judges in this way would distort our finely balanced separation of powers, weakening parliamentary sovereignty and thereby our democracy. Parliamentary sovereignty provides the flexibility to reform and strengthen our democracy. One can point to many of our statutes, such as the European Communities Act, the Human Rights Act, the Constitutional Reform Act and the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, when Parliament has legislated in a constitutional way. The same is true of devolution in the United Kingdom, which the Prime Minister thinks should be extended throughout the country by a written constitution. The beauty of our current system is that parliamentary sovereignty has enabled these constitutional statutes to be enacted and then to be repealed or amended subsequently through a normal legislative process, as has happened in the case of every single one of them. A written constitution could not so easily have achieved this, since the whole point, as has been said, would be to entrench it and give it a higher status than primary legislation, deliberately making it harder to amend or repeal and transferring power from elected politicians to the judiciary in the process. There has, of course, been social and political angst in the debates leading to the enactments and repeals I have mentioned, but take a moment to imagine the discord which the nation would endure in trying to decide what a written constitution should contain. There would certainly be calls for it to go wider than the Cabinet Manual. One has only to consider the recent heated debates on economic and social issues, such as whether a person is a man or a woman, which migrants should be allowed to stay in the United Kingdom, or the duties of the state to provide welfare and social care. The list goes on, and one could see some people arguing passionately for their inclusion in a written constitution, leading to fresh divisions in society. Far better, in my view, to rely on Parliament to decide such issues as and when necessary, in line with manifesto and other policy commitments, and to override unintended judicial interpretations by fresh legislation. I turn to the second purpose of our constitution—to provide a framework for effective government. Advocates of a written constitution might point to the ineffectiveness of our current system to get anything done. One is spoilt for choice, but just look at the seeming inability to deliver infrastructure projects such as Hammersmith Bridge, which has so far been closed for seven years and will not fully reopen until 2035. The Chinese replaced their multilane Sanyuan Bridge in 43 hours. Look at the massive cost overruns and delays of HS2, the broken prison system and the procurement failures and lack of investment in UK defence. Tempting as it is in the face of these failures to seize on anything which might make things better, it is not the fault of our constitution that some Governments over the past 15 to 20 years have failed to govern effectively or responsibly. A written constitution would make no difference. Ministerial accountability is already part of our unwritten constitution, for which the Prime Minister holds ultimate responsibility, and it can be enforced by means of the Ministerial Code and parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms such as Select Committees. The Public Office (Accountability) Bill, once implemented, may help to add statutory weight to the principle of ministerial accountability. In addition, there is political pressure, which, at an election, punishes ministerial incompetence or irresponsibility—or earlier, if our leaders are forced to quit. Seven Prime Ministers in 10 years speaks for itself. This and other political dramas in recent years show how our constitution can weather the fiercest storms. Some would say that a written constitution would be more transparent than our current convoluted statute book. They have a point. AI states that there are around 6,000 statutes in force, many totally incomprehensible because of extensive amendments to previous Acts. The Representation of the People Bill is a case in point. However, the answer is not a written constitution but a programme of legislative consolidation, which would vastly improve everyone’s understanding of what the law actually is. There is little hope of that. In conclusion, let us cherish the jewels in the crown of our unwritten constitution: parliamentary sovereignty, the separation of powers and ministerial accountability, which have protected our democracy for so long and which are the envy of written constitutions around the world.

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