Contribution
My Lords, in this House, we are a bit formulaic about congratulating colleagues on obtaining a slot for a topical debate, and I will not miss out today. However, my noble friend deserves more than that, because subjecting Britain’s lack of a written constitution to scrutiny is an essential exercise. Our unwritten constitution should not be taken for granted; nor should it simply be assumed that, because it is British and has survived for centuries, it must be the best approach, when most other countries—many, but not all, impeccable democracies—have written constitutions. It is a trifle odd that, despite not having a written constitution ourselves, we had no compunction about writing constitutions for parts of our colonial possessions as they achieved independence.
One reason for us to have a written constitution is that many of our fellow citizens believe that we do not have a constitution at all, when in fact we have a collection of conventions and statutes that serve that purpose. Such a fundamental misunderstanding cannot be entirely satisfactory. Our present unclear situation leaves a very large amount of scope for disagreement and recourse to the courts, including the Supreme Court, for interpretation. That, too, is not entirely satisfactory, giving rise quite recently to debate that detracts from our respect for the rule of law, which is fundamental to our freedoms. However, such recourse cannot be entirely avoided, and, as we have heard, would arise if we did have a written constitution. The absence of a written constitution also makes the teaching of our constitutional practice in schools and universities far more complex and difficult, and harder to absorb, than it would otherwise be.
So there is quite a list of arguments for switching to a written constitution, and there are plenty more than those I have mentioned, even leaving aside sloppy and self-serving ones drawn from the history of countries, including our nearest neighbours in the United States, who have and treasure their written constitution. But there are plenty of compelling arguments against switching in that direction. First, negotiating a written constitution would certainly be contentious, often opening up old wounds long since healed by time and patience. You only have to look at the Official Opposition’s policy of withdrawing the UK from the European Convention on Human Rights and its application by our courts to see how that might play out.
Writing a written constitution for the UK would be likely to throw up many difficult, and perhaps insoluble, questions about devolution and the definition of devolved powers, not to speak—this is really important—of the basic unity of the UK. It is a little hard to see an SNP Government in Edinburgh, a dual Government in Belfast and a Plaid Cymru Government in Cardiff easily agreeing to a text on what the United Kingdom consists of. Having seen the absence of clarity in the situation emerging from our recent efforts at devolution, it is not easy to sustain the argument that dealing with those issues in a written constitution would be easy or straightforward.
It is also perhaps relevant that we do not seem to be terribly good at writing constitutions. Not only are there quite a few ex-colonies that we endowed with written constitutions that did not stand the test of time, but look at the mess we made of the EU’s constitutional treaty, about which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, spoke. We happily allowed the European Community’s founding treaty, the treaty of Rome, which made no provision for a member state to leave, to have such a provision inserted and be retained in the Lisbon treaty—surely a case of painting a target on your own back for a decision that is now rather widely considered to have been an egregious error of judgment. Would we not have been better off without that?
Perhaps the most compelling argument against switching to a written constitution is the massive amount of legislative time that would be required to reach a conclusion. This time would be at the expense of more mundane legislative tasks, and it would risk the latter being neglected, rushed or fudged. We already promulgate too many imperfect laws without programming a lot more of them.
I have left out of this list of arguments against switching the likelihood that the means of choosing the Members of your Lordships’ House, and even more so of defining its powers relative to those of the House of Commons, could in itself prove just a trifle contentious and extremely hard to resolve.
I do not habitually come down to arguing against reform, but in this case I do, for reasons more of practicality than principle. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is quite a useful adage bequeathed to us by our transatlantic cousins.