Contribution
My Lords, I too follow in that honourable and venerable convention of thanking the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for securing this important debate, particularly at a time when democracy in different countries is being so tested both by economic and social strains and by authoritarians and extremists. That makes this a good time to consider how we might be able to strengthen or improve our democracy through the use of a written constitution. That is an argument my party has long made and, having listened carefully to several noble Lords express happiness or disappointment—I am not sure which it was—that the case for a written constitution had not been made more in this debate, let me summon up my courage and join the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, in setting out some of those points.
I start with an emphasis on how written constitutions can take many forms. They take many forms in the degree to which they are embedded, and they take many forms in the degree to which they give power to judges. The USA’s example scores very highly on both those criteria, but it is by no means the only model available. The German Basic Law has been mentioned a couple of times by noble Lords, and it is worth emphasising that it has been amended more than 60 times, including perhaps most notably to allow a recent policy decision by the German Government to significantly increase defence spending. That illustrates that it is possible to have a written constitution that brings benefits but is sufficiently flexible that it does not require a religious schism or a civil war to be amended.
One other thing that is, of course, common with written constitutions is just how widespread they are. I think I am correct in saying that every modern democracy other than New Zealand and Israel has a written constitution. There is a risk, obviously not in this House but sometimes in wider discussions on this topic, of a certain myopic insularity in talking about problems in theory with written constitutions that are, in fact, problems that many other countries have found solutions to and have practically implemented written constitutions to address.
Across those different models, though, there is that common, essential quality of the idea that a written constitution provides some grit in the system and some limitation on the Government’s ability to do whatever, whenever, however and to whoever. Perhaps that is in many ways something that we are a bit more familiar with than we sometimes remember in these debates. One example of embedding such grit in the system is the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949. To some extent, they are embedded and, as the plurality of the phrase “Parliament Acts” illustrates, open to amendment. They have shown how a degree of embedding can be an extremely useful part of our constitution.
There are reasons why such grit is useful and may become more useful in the near future. While we have, for the moment at least, the first past the post electoral system for the House of Commons, and we have a five or six-party system around the country—or, in Scotland and Wales, one might more accurately say a seven-party system—it means that in practice it is absolutely possible for a party to win a clear majority in the House of Commons on less than 30% of the vote. We could have a Government elected where two-thirds of those voting have voted against them, and our current set-up would give them very extensive powers that would flow from their majority in the House of Commons.
Obviously, when making this point, I believe it is one of our constitutional conventions that somebody has to make reference to Lord Hailsham and elective dictatorship. But it is worth bearing in mind how much the electoral system has changed in practice since he made those comments, given how much lower the winning bar now is for Governments.
That grit in the system can be extremely helpful as a protection for the unfashionable, the unpopular and the minority, and as an aid to better decision-making. In many ways, a written constitution could provide for our country what the House of Lords provides for Parliament. We do not take away the democratic sovereignty of the House of Commons but, by adding a little more process and grit and by being able to occasionally enforce a little more reflection, one might even say, on the House of Commons, we enable those democratic decisions to be better.
There is also a benefit, as has been touched on by several noble Lords, of the consolidation aspect, as one might call it, of a written constitution: the ability to pull together different documents in a way that makes the way our rules operate clearer and more transparent. Noble Lords, I fear, are already slightly bored of hearing me talk about this in the context of election law, with the many benefits of having the clarity that comes from a robust, consolidated set of rules. But those benefits are by no means constrained simply to elections; they are benefits that can be taken much more broadly.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, quoted Gavin Esler making this point rather more poetically than I have. It is an important, valuable one. In the past, I have made the comparison with how sometimes our attitude towards the statute book and other laws and rules that we have is a bit like that of a teenager with a messy bedroom. You know that at one point, some time in the future, it is going to be worth tidying up, but you always find an excuse to put it off.
Which is why my hopes have been raised by the fact that we now have a Prime Minister who has previously made such positive comments about the benefits of a written constitution. I very much look forward to hearing from the Minister what the government plans are to bring to life those previous comments by the Prime Minister. I am sure we can all hope, whatever we might think of the merits of the plans, that the Government are planning a route that requires neither civil war nor religious schism to bring about what the Prime Minister has previously praised so much.