Contribution
My Lords, I too thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for bringing this debate to the House today. In his Lord Renton lecture on a written constitution in 2023, he said that
“our constitution is sick (though the illness is chronic rather than acute)”.
That diagnosis, combined with the Prime Minister’s own interest in a written constitution, makes today’s debate timely. We have heard a range of thought-provoking contributions from across the House. The noble Lord’s constructive introduction was especially helpful given the complexity of the issues and level of disagreement on the right way forward.
The noble Lord briefly argued for a stronger Cabinet Manual and for putting HOLAC and the independent adviser, among others, on a statutory basis. That is separate from our debate today, but I gently point out that our constitution relies more on balances than on checks. As such, the proposals would undermine the flexibility of our constitution, to its detriment.
The constitution of the United Kingdom can be summarised in eight words: whatever the Crown in Parliament enacts is law. Ministers are drawn from and accountable to Parliament, and the judiciary ensures that the Government act within the law as set by Parliament. In recent years, the Prime Minister has shown an interest in a written constitution for the United Kingdom. He argued in his book Head North that devolution will not work
“unless we build the new Britain on the strong foundation of a written constitution”.
More recently, in June, the Prime Minister spoke of giving No. 10 North a mission to strive for equivalent living conditions in all parts of Britain, borrowing from the German Basic Law, which many noble Lords have referenced today—that is, the 1949 written constitution of the German state. Although the Prime Minister was not specific about which part of the German Basic Law he was referring to, I think it is reasonable to assume that he was reflecting on the 2006 amendment to the German Basic Law creating Article 104b, which established a mechanism through which the German federation can provide financial assistance to the federal states, or Länder, in order to:
“1. avert a disturbance of the overall economic equilibrium … 2. equalise differing economic capacities within the federal territory, or … 3. promote economic growth”.
Successive Governments have adopted measures to tackle inequality of opportunity across the United Kingdom, and it is not clear to me why a basic law or written constitution is a necessary prerequisite for effective progress towards that objective. Perhaps the Minister will take the opportunity to confirm whether the Prime Minister was indeed referring to Article 104b of the German Basic Law and to set out further details of his plans for a written constitution. If she cannot provide that clarity today, perhaps she would commit to writing with that detail.
Whatever the Prime Minister’s plans in respect of a UK version of Article 104b, he should consider carefully whether it might not be simpler, and no doubt much quicker, to place that provision on the statute book in the normal way, with the full inviolable authority of Parliament, rather than allowing his proposal to be bogged down in a more fundamental and extremely contentious debate about codified constitutions. As Lord Sumption argued in a recent UCL Constitution Unit blog,
“there is nothing that a written constitution could achieve that could not be achieved with equal efficacy by ordinary parliamentary legislation”.
Whatever the Prime Minister’s view of written constitutions may be, this Motion invites a much broader consideration of their benefits and disadvantages. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has expressed his support for a codified constitution that is reflective of existing arrangements rather than a vehicle for reform. Others have expressed their own views in this debate. Whatever benefits may be gained from having a written constitution, whether that be public understanding or clarity for lawmakers, we know that constitutional flexibility would be a victim of a written constitution, whatever form it may take.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has himself previously quoted the late US Supreme Court Justice Scalia on this point, who argued that:
“The very objective of a basic law ... is to place certain matters beyond risk of change, except through the extraordinary democratic majorities that constitutional amendment requires ... The whole purpose of a constitution—old or new—is to impede change or, pejoratively put, ‘obstruct modernity’”.
We have never fallen victim to that sea-anchor approach to constitutional rules, instead adopting a consensual style and system of conventions and practices that allow effective government to be carried on even in circumstances unforeseen by the drafters of a written constitution.
We have also, generally, been spared the frustrations of legal deadlock between Parliament and the courts. That simple constitutional principle—the sovereignty of Parliament—underpins so many of the processes and practices allowing the King’s government to be carried on without the intrusion of overmighty justices, as seen in the United States of America and elsewhere. In his 2025 lecture on the unwritten constitution, Lord Sales argued of our existing settlement:
“In the historical record, its flexibility has on balance been an advantage”.
I fully agree with him.
The position of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is that a written constitution need not be a revolutionary document, nor need it be a vehicle for radical reform. However, is it not the case that in all examples, bar the Kingdom of the Netherlands, codification of the constitution has opened the door to judgments in the courts that strike down new legislation that is in conflict with the text of the codified constitution? Is that not a revolutionary change in our constitutional settlement in itself?
Another major concern with any proposal for a codified constitution is the de facto obligation for judges to take political decisions. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, judges must, so far as possible, interpret legislation compatibly with convention rights. When that is not possible, the higher courts may issue declarations of incompatibility. Such declarations do not invalidate Acts of Parliament but, to make them, judges must undertake evaluative exercises that necessarily require them to balance competing public interests that should more properly be undertaken by Parliament—an argument so eloquently advanced by my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne.
Under the former European Communities Act 1972, courts were required to disapply domestic legislation which conflicted with directly effective European law. These arrangements forced judges to intrude into the political arena in a way that has been helpful neither to the judges themselves nor to our mode of democratic accountability. A codified constitution with the status of a higher law would take this further by inviting courts to set aside Acts of Parliament which they judged inconsistent with it. That would be a fundamental change in the way our constitution functions, and it is certainly not a step to be taken lightly.
There is no way of creating a higher form of law that does not dilute the principle of parliamentary accountability. If Parliament could amend or repeal it by ordinary legislation, it would have no higher status. If it could not, future Parliaments would be bound by rules they could not change through the normal democratic process.
What mandate, then, would be sufficient for the approval and amendment of a written constitution? If clarity is all that is sought then perhaps a supermajority in both Houses of Parliament would suffice. Or, if this is something that only those with a democratic mandate should decide, perhaps it ought to be approved by a supermajority in the House of Commons alone. If the latter is the case, is there a risk that this new document is then used by the House of Commons to weaken the ancient rights, liberties and duties of your Lordships’ House, or indeed other parts of the constitution, without recourse to the normal legislative process? Perhaps a mandate from outside Parliament, through referendums, would be more appropriate?
Both have their drawbacks. A parliamentary supermajority may be difficult to achieve and it would likely never be achieved without the governing party voting for a constitution or any amendment to it. In effect, it would remain in the gift of the Executive to create and amend constitutional rights. If referendums were to be the chosen mechanism, we might face costly national exercises in democracy even more frequently than we do now. We would need to see evidence that the electorate genuinely wanted to see more regular referendums if we were to consider that mechanism.
In its basic shape and function, the Crown in Parliament has guided this nation through the Industrial Revolution, the creation, expansion and dismantling of an empire, the successful prosecution of war against Napoleon and of two world wars, the creation of the welfare state after the Second World War and the market turn in the philosophy of government brought about by the late Baroness Thatcher. It has proved remarkably flexible and durable, adapting to pandemic and war, to changing needs and times and to evolving public, spiritual and moral values.
We must each of us ask ourselves, is there truly another country to which we can look and say, “We wish we were governed as they are”? For my own part, I think not. With all its advantages and compromises, we have inherited from those who sat here before us the most stable constitutional settlement in the democratic world, of which we can—and should—be justly proud.