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Lord Kakkar (CB)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 22 October 2026

Debate

Written Constitution

Contribution

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady D’Souza. In so doing, I join other noble Lords in thanking my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich for having secured this important debate and introduced it in such a thoughtful manner. I am one who is opposed to the idea of a written constitution, because I am deeply attached to the orthodox interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty: the ability for a Parliament to make and unmake laws, for an Act of Parliament to be recognised as the supreme legal authority, and for the clear convention that no Parliament can bind its successor. To that I would add the simple principle that, ultimately, the other place enjoys primacy. As a result, because the other place is composed of the representatives of the people, not their delegates, we have a situation where the people are ultimately sovereign. However, there are circumstances under which we might need to consider a written constitution in the future: those identified in the preamble of the Parliament Act 1911, where if Parliament decided to compose a second Chamber not on a hereditary basis, as at that time, but on a popular basis then the interim arrangements of the 1911 Act, which governed, effectively, the relationship and powers between the two Houses, would need to be reconsidered. In defining the powers of, effectively, a second elected Chamber, there would need to be some kind of constitutional document. That ultimately would require interpretation, potentially by a different authority from one or two of the Chambers of Parliament—potentially a constitutional court. That is why, in principle, I have been opposed to an elected second Chamber. I have had the privilege of serving in two positions on two bodies mentioned by other noble Lords: for some years, I chaired the House of Lords Appointments Commission and, thereafter, the Judicial Appointments Commission. They are two very different bodies. The House of Lords Appointments Commission was composed as a result of a Written Ministerial Statement by the then Prime Minister in April 2000, which laid out the basis for appointment of the first commission and indicated that, in addition to making nominations for appointment to the Cross Benches, it would adopt the responsibilities of the then political honours vetting committee. The Judicial Appointments Commission, on the other hand, was established as a result of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and came into being in April 2006, and many of the regulations under which it makes appointments were brought into force in 2013. It is interesting that both bodies are subjected to parliamentary scrutiny: the chairman of the House of Lords Appointments Commission appears before the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in the other place and the chairman of the Judicial Appointments Commission appears before the Justice Committee in the other place. Both bodies appear before your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, so there is an important degree of parliamentary scrutiny. It is suggested that the House of Lords Appointments Commission should be put on to a statutory basis; it is merely advisory at the moment. There may well be some arguments for that. I was always quite anxious about that proposition because, in putting the body on to a statutory basis, one would then establish criteria for appointment in statute. I always wondered, therefore, whether appointments could be challenged or subjected to judicial review. That would put your Lordships’ House—indeed, this Parliament—in a difficult place where the judiciary might ultimately object to the appointment of somebody who had already taken their seat in your Lordships’ House, creating something of a crisis. On the other hand, in the Judicial Appointments Commission there are two clear statutory duties: to appoint on merit and to appoint individuals of good character. The work of the JAC was often challenged because it failed to achieve quickly enough substantial and sufficient diversity of the different jurisdictions and Benches. When those challenges were made, the statutory position was clear and the Lord Chancellor of the day was able to resist those calls and ensure that the JAC continued to be supported to make appointments on the basis of merit only. I make these observations because so many of the settlements that we enjoy and that have been broadly discussed in this interesting debate by other noble Lords are dependent on those who have the responsibility and privilege to act within our constitution to understand that envelope of responsibility and to act within it. If we are to consider a change and move away from these current constitutional arrangements, we will need to consider both positive and unintended consequences. For those reasons, I believe that it is appropriate for the flexible, pragmatic approach that we have enjoyed to date to continue. However, the point has been made that for certain bodies that play a role in our constitution, such as the House of Lords Appointments Commission and the Judicial Appointments Commission, further thought may be given to strengthening the way that Parliament itself can protect their work from excessive interference or becoming subjective to a particular mood not properly enjoyed by broad democratic consent. I believe that is something that should be considered. Ultimately, we have to continue to believe that our constitutional settlement as currently constructed provides protection. Certainly, the experience I had with regard to those two bodies confirms that the arrangements are appropriate as long as we continue to understand that it is Parliament that has the ultimate responsibility for scrutiny. Therefore, both the other place and your Lordships’ House must be able to effect their responsibilities with efficiency, determination and absolute confidence.

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