Contribution
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Howard. I start by assuring him that I am not one of those judges who would seek to accrete further power to the judiciary. As the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, reminded us, he is a member of the Constitution Committee, as am I, but I speak in a personal capacity this afternoon. I have also been asked to convey the regrets of our chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, that he is unable to be here this afternoon.
The merits of a written constitution over an unwritten one such as ours are the stuff of endless discussion. However, before any profound change is proposed, there must be a hard-hearted look at what is wrong with the existing system, whether a written constitution would solve the problems identified, and whether it is feasible to produce one. All constitutions are vulnerable to bad actors. Examples abound around the world of Governments abusing their constitutions. As the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, reminded us, many of the most authoritarian countries have constitutions that look beautiful on paper but are worthless. A written constitution is generally only as good as the ability of a constitutional court independently to interpret it and declare conduct or legislation unconstitutional and that of the Government to comply with the court’s rulings.
Alexander Hamilton, a founding father of the United States and a draftsman of its constitution, observed that the judiciary is the weakest of the three arms of the state because it requires the executive to enforce its orders. This explains why so many Governments, including some in Europe in recent years, have sought to pack the judiciary with their placemen and remove others. A written constitution, in the end, provides only limited protection from bad actors.
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, reminded us, written constitutions usually arise in circumstances of political upheaval and change—sometimes peaceful, such as when new states are created, but often not. The United Kingdom is simply not in that position. Our constitutional settlement followed the Civil War, the restoration of the Stuarts and the Glorious Revolution, and it has constantly evolved since. Aspects of it are contained in legislation, but much of it is not. It is hedged around with conventions. As has already been noted, at its heart is parliamentary sovereignty. That is a key aspect of our constitutional settlement, and it necessarily includes the proposition that Parliament cannot bind its successors. Any legislation can be repealed or amended—including constitutional legislation.
I have not seen any convincing explanation of how Parliament today could pass legislation that is entrenched in the sense that it can be repealed or amended, for example, only with a supermajority in Parliament or by a referendum, which are mechanisms adopted in constitutions around the world. Moreover, proposals for a written constitution generally require widespread political support, and I wonder what the prospects are, realistically, of the House of Commons approving legislation, if a mechanism could be found, that restricted its own freedom of action in the future and very likely transferred final decisions of great political moment to the judiciary.
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, there might be advantage in placing on a statutory footing some of the constitutional guardrails that currently could be swept away at the stroke of a prime ministerial pen. Sir Peter Riddell, Professor Robert Hazell and the UCL Constitution Unit have done invaluable work on that. Such a move would at least require a Government to confront what they were planning to do through legislation.
However, there is an aspect of our constitution which provides constraints and protections against extravagant executive action of the sort that the proponents of a written constitution fear. That is the existence of conventions, which operate to give the Executive freedom of action but are not immutable. They include the conventions that operate in this House, itself an important constitutional guardian, and that govern the relationship between the Crown, the Executive and Parliament. Conventions work when all who are subject to them respect their boundaries, but, if one player does not do so, the others can be expected to modify their responses. It is probably fruitless to hypothesise on the circumstances in which that might happen because they are unpredictable, but it should not be supposed that the current arrangements are toothless.
I return to where I started. There is little doubt that our unwritten constitution is vulnerable to bad actors, but so too are all constitutions. However, I am unpersuaded that a written constitution is the answer. Ours continues to work well and can adapt. A written constitution would be unlikely to solve whatever problems have been identified, and it is not likely to be feasible.