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Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 16 November 2026

Debate

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Contribution

My Lords, I rise to address Amendment 50 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt. I agree with a great deal—probably the majority—of what the noble Baroness said on matters of which she has such practical and recent experience. But on the wisdom of incorporating this amendment into the Bill, it is my turn to have the misfortune to disagree. The need to direct juries on myths and stereotypes that may affect their assessment of evidence in appropriate cases should not be in doubt. It was certainly drummed into me 15 years ago with considerable force when I attended the Judicial Studies Board, now the Judicial College, for the course that was and is required of any judge or recorder before they can be certified to preside over trials of sexual offences. No doubt that training could and should be improved, as the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Neate, have suggested, but at the time it seemed pretty thorough to me. I would no more have contemplated not giving such directions in a case where they could be relevant than I would have contemplated not directing the jury on the standard of proof or the presumption of innocence. Had I been tempted to resist, there were constraints that would have made it very foolish to do so. There was even then clear guidance from the Court of Appeal. As it remarked in Miller—[2010] EWCA Crim 1578—the “courts have increasingly been prepared to acknowledge the need for a direction that deals with what might be described as stereotypical assumptions about issues such as delay in reporting allegations of sexual crime and distress”. I emphasise the word “need”. For any judge or recorder foolish enough not to follow such guidance, there was the risk of a brown envelope in the post: a notification from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division that a conviction had been successfully appealed. Since then, the obligation has only become clearer. Anyone who has read the relevant parts of Archbold or Blackstone, or the judicial bible now known as the Crown Court Compendium, or indeed the Law Commission’s final report of July 2025, will understand the complex range of factors that have to be balanced in deciding whether a direction is needed in a particular case and in crafting any necessary direction. They will also understand the great importance that is already placed on the duty of the judge, at more than one stage of the trial, to ensure that juries do not adopt the myths and stereotypes referred to in this amendment. I note that two of the specimen directions in the Crown Court Compendium relate expressly to cases of domestic abuse. The noble Baroness knows the courts very well, and it may be that there are indeed rogue judges who resist these directions and the guidance of the Court of Appeal and the Judicial College. But I respectfully doubt whether, if there are such dyed-in-the-wool characters, they are going to be deterred by an amendment that allows them to satisfy themselves that “a direction is unnecessary having regard to the circumstances of the case”. I wonder how much difference it is going to make in that sort of case. My objection to the amendment is not concerned with its wording or indeed its content; it is constitutional in nature. Ensuring a fair trial is pre-eminently the domain of the independent courts, not of government nor even of Parliament. The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, put it well just now: in dealing with a jury, the judges are in charge. In the words of an even more distinguished jurist, the late Lord Denning: “Someone must be trusted. Let it be the judges”. The noble Baroness cited a precedent. She cited Section 77 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, requiring judges to warn a jury of the need for caution before convicting on a particular kind of confession. The antiquity of that example is significant, both because it is now 40 years old and, more substantively, it predated the first issue of specimen directions by the Judicial Studies Board in 1987. Though she had other examples, there were none, so far as I could understand, that date from any time in the past 16 years. Even if they were wise precedents—I enter a caution about that—the occasional nature of them is clearly a reason for proceeding in this area with the greatest possible circumspection. In view of what she said about judicial independence, I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, to reflect on the precedent that would be set were this entirely well-intentioned amendment to be accepted into the Bill. Though unexceptionable in its content, the amendment would establish the extremely damaging principle that directions of this kind on matters of great public interest are an acceptable subject for different Governments, each with a parliamentary majority, to provide for in their own way—sometimes, no doubt, in the glare of publicity that may attend a particular case. Let me give an example. Is it beyond the bounds of possibility to imagine a future Government, less attuned than this one to addressing the scourge of violence against women and girls, and committed instead to the vigorous public waging of a war on woke, repealing this clause and replacing it with a command to the judges not to direct juries on so-called rape myths and stereotypes, or to give such directions only in exceptional circumstances defined by Parliament? This is too important a matter to be a political football. I urge my noble friend, as I hope I may call her after this, to take her ball off the pitch and to return it to the place where, under our constitution, it properly belongs.

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