Courts and Tribunals Bill
Monday, 16 November 2026
Contributions
Committee (2nd Day)
Relevant documents: 16th Report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, 5th Report from the Constitution Committee
Clause 6: Appeals from magistrates’ courts
Debate on whether Clause 6 should stand part of the Bill.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, as at Second Reading, I declare my interest as a practising barrister. When I was a very junior barrister, I was a practitioner in the criminal courts, both in the magistrates’ and youth courts and on appeals to the Crown Court, which is relevant to the clauses that we are considering in this group. The changes in the appeal mechanisms from the magistrates’ court to the Crown Court would not, in my submission, reduce the backlog but would undermine faith in our criminal justice system. I say this because in the present system, which works well, a person who is convicted or sentenced in the magistrates’ or youth courts may appeal as of right to the Crown Court. If it is an appeal against conviction, there is a rehearing of the charge before the Crown Court judge and, usually, two lay magistrates. Vexatious appeals are avoided by the fact that if the defendant chooses to spin the wheel on a spurious appeal to the Crown Court then there is a risk that the sentence can be increased. This sensible measure is, oddly, abolished by the measures in the Bill. At Second Reading, I reminded the House of some vital statistics in relation to this measure. Appeals against conviction represent just 0.4% of the Crown Court case load. The annual total to June 2026 is 2,418 appeals. Of those, 976 were successful, giving an overall success rate of 40%. However, that figure included appeals that were abandoned at court or before the hearing date. It is more relevant to look at the 1,746 contested appeals. As I noted at Second Reading, 56% of those contested appeals were successful. As a number of noble Lords noted at Second Reading, this shows a system that is working well and provides a valuable safeguard against summary justice in the magistrates’ court. I ask the Committee to consider excising Clause 6 from the Bill. All that clause does is introduce Schedule 2. I also ask for Schedule 2 to be excised from the Bill, by extension. That schedule will remove the automatic right of appeal from the magistrates’ court to the Crown Court and change the mode of appeal from a rehearing on the merits to a review of the safety of the conviction. All the key decisions will be taken by a Crown Court judge alone. The role of the lay justices in the Crown Court will be axed. That step is regrettable for a number of reasons. It will remove an element of justice for the defendant considering the person who will hear the appeal, in that it will remove the non-lawyer input into the appeal. Furthermore, it will remove the valuable expertise provided by the lay justices to the Crown Court judge when the judge is hearing an appeal on a topic that does not often come before the Crown Court—for example, a conviction on a traffic measure, a trading standards measure or another summary-only matter that is usually heard before the magistrates’ court. All that learning will not be available to the Bench hearing an appeal. Seven points arise. The first is that the current system is swift and cheap. As I have already highlighted, it is also effective in remedying injustices in the magistrates’ court by appeal to the Crown Court. The system proposed by Schedule 2 is a multiple-stage system. It will require an application for permission to appeal, which we will see in a moment. Furthermore, the new system will consume more time in the Crown Court, in that Crown Court judges will have to provide time in their diary to consider applications for permission to appeal, more often than not from litigants in person. They will need to discern, from an AI-generated transcript, the reasons why the magistrate came to their conclusions. They will need to determine whether there is a basis on which they should grant permission. If there is not, they need to give reasons for not granting permission. All that appears not to have been built into the whole purpose of the Bill: to cut the backlog in the Crown Court. The question I posed at Second Reading was: will this measure save time? It is clear to me that it will not. The second point is that the current system is fair and effective. The majority of contested appeals are allowed—a point I have already echoed. The third point, which was very unsatisfactorily answered by the Minister in his Second Reading response, is that the Law Commission is about to report on this very issue. Since 2022, the Law Commission has been working on a comprehensive review of the criminal appeals system in England and Wales. The Law Commission published its consultation paper in February 2025. The consultation has closed and we await the Law Commission’s final recommendations. The fourth point is that the Bill’s proposals are directly contrary to the Law Commission’s provisional recommendations. At paragraph 5.86 of the Law Commission’s provisional recommendations it recommended, provisionally, the retention of the current system of automatic rights of appeal. The answer given by the Minister to this is, “Well, we’ve had Lord Leveson’s report since and we prefer Leveson”, if I might noun the noble and learned Lord—if one can noun a verb, or verb a noun. In any event, the short point is that the Government’s answer is, “We don’t want to wait for the Law Commission; we simply want to enact Lord Leveson’s proposals”. That is a mistaken approach. The Law Commission is highly expert and has conducted a detailed analysis of the review of appeals mechanisms. The appropriate thing would be to wait and consider the Law Commission’s conclusions before legislating on what we should do in relation to appeals from the magistrates’ court.
The fifth point is that this is all contrary to the Justice Select Committee in the other place, which recommended that these measures should be postponed pending the outcome of the Law Commission’s report. The reasons are given in chapter 3 of its report:
“Appeals from the magistrates’ court represent a small and declining proportion of overall Crown Court receipts, with only 0.4% of magistrates’ court decisions appealed in 2025. The Ministry of Justice’s own data does not support the premise that appeals make a material contribution to the Crown Court backlog, and we are not persuaded that this proves a sufficient justification for the scale of reform proposed”.
I will be very interested to hear whether the Minister can provide an answer from the Government to the point raised by the Justice Select Committee and by me as to why we are not waiting. Simply saying “We prefer Leveson” is not good enough.
My sixth point is that these measures in the Bill will place a much greater burden on magistrates. The premise of the new system is that Crown Court judges will review the grounds of appeal alongside transcripts of the proceedings before the magistrates’ court—a number of other amendments in this group deal with the provision of those transcripts. The rather worrying answer that seems to come from the Government is that they propose to install electronic recording equipment at all magistrates’ courtrooms—with no idea of the timeline for how long that will take—and rely on AI to prepare transcripts. This is a very ambitious proposal—and I mean ambitious in possibly the most “Yes Minister” sense—because, clearly, the idea that an AI-generated transcript of magistrates’ court proceedings will give a sufficient flavour of the proceedings, or the reasons that the magistrates chose to convict, is not a satisfactory one.
Furthermore, there is the point that if these reasons are to be considered by the Crown Court on an application for permission to appeal, it means that the magistrates will have to appeal-proof their decisions. That places a greater burden on magistrates to craft comprehensive reasons to show that they have correctly applied the law to the facts, which will pose a greater burden on magistrates, and particularly on lay magistrates. The law of judicial review, which I know well, provides a clear example of the importance of adequate reasons in areas such as planning, housing and immigration. Decision-makers know that they have to show their workings to avoid successful challenge.
In the Government’s response to the Justice Select Committee’s report they rely on the existing case law that says that magistrates have to give only relatively brief reasons for their verdict. That is right, of course, but that is because under the existing law there is an automatic right of appeal on the merits. Thus, succinct reasons, which would otherwise be inadequate, are less problematic. Detailed reasons are not necessary under the current scheme because a convicted defendant can either exercise that automatic right of appeal by way of rehearing or ask the magistrates to provide detailed reasons to form a statement of case to the High Court. All that changes if the magistrates’ reasons become determinative of a Crown Court appeal. Under the new system, for the first time, magistrates’ reasons given at trial will be subject to scrutiny on appeal to the Crown Court.
Moreover, my seventh point is that this new system of appeals impacts significantly on access to justice. An issue raised in the discussion of the Bill generally is that legal aid is less easily available in the magistrates’ court than in the Crown Court. The income cut-off is just £22,000, so roughly half the defendants before the magistrates’ court defend themselves, whereas that is very rare in the Crown Court. Introducing a highly legalistic system of appeals will impact on access to justice for many middle-income defendants. Can they realistically be expected to analyse the magistrates’ reasons themselves and identify grounds of appeal?
At Second Reading, the Minister sought to address the points raised in relation to the appeal provisions by pointing to the fact that there is an automatic right of rehearing under the current system, meaning that this could adversely impact on victims and witnesses who may not be prepared to return to court a second time. The Minister said:
“We know that some appeals succeed not due to an identified error in the original trial but because victims and witnesses feel unable to relive the trauma with a second trial at appeal ”.—[ Official Report , 27/10/26; col. 1125.]
No statistics have been provided as to how many appeals this affects. I suggest that this is not the valid argument that the Minister suggested. Most cases in the magistrates’ court, of their nature because they are summary offences, are more minor than those heard in the Crown Court. The current system, which requires witnesses to give evidence a second time, is a factor that those advising defendants on an appeal would bear in mind. If a defendant drags a victim to the Crown Court to be cross-examined a second time, no doubt the court hearing the appeal would consider that, should it determine that the appeal was unnecessary, in its question of resentencing. That is all factored into the current system, so I am afraid it is not the slam dunk answer that the Minister suggested it might be.
The Minister further suggested that magistrates already give reasons for their decisions. That was the second answer he gave me. But, as I have pointed out, the current decisions are given on the basis that they need only be brief because of the current appeal system. So I am afraid that neither of the answers provided by the Minister at Second Reading was adequate. I hope that the Minister responding to this group will provide a more satisfactory response.
We have had summary justice in England and Wales for a very long time. Summary justice frequently is conducted by lay members of the public who have more limited sentencing powers. The flip side of the coin of summary justice—for which you can occasionally read “rough justice”—is that you have the right of an appeal to the Crown Court. If we take away that right, the consent to the system of summary justice begins to erode, as does confidence in the criminal justice system itself.
I considered whether it was appropriate to table amendments to Schedule 2 rather than just proposing to remove it, but these measures cannot be justified, particularly given the impending report from the Law Commission. The only thing is for it to be withdrawn in its entirety.
Lord Burnett of Maldon (CB)
My Lords, I declare an interest: I remain a member of the supplementary panel of the Supreme Court. It falls to me to introduce the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, supported by me and by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers and Lord Bellamy. In Committee last week, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to us as the “exquisite quartet”. I think we have all rather enjoyed that appellation, but I regret to say that only two of us are here this afternoon—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, and me—so we are reduced to a duet. Were your Lordships in the Wigmore Hall, you would be asking for your money back, but we will do our best. I am afraid that the noble and learned Lord and I also have to be elsewhere from the early evening at something from which it would have been enormously discourteous to have abandoned ship. I hope your Lordships will forgive us for not staying for the rest of Committee today. There are many amendments on which we might have been interested in making one or two observations. We do not support the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, to remove these provisions from the Bill altogether, but our amendments, starting with Amendment 37, seek to fortify the arrangements that need to be put in place before these new appeal provisions can sensibly be introduced. Amendment 37 seeks to ensure that there is appropriate training in this matter for magistrates, district judges and legal advisers—we regret that we misnamed them as “clerks” in the draft amendment—that there be recording facilities in the magistrates’ court, that there be transcription services for those recording facilities and that, critically, offices be established to assist the judges of the Crown Court in the administration of the hearing of appeals and permission applications. We also suggest that the Lord Chancellor must make a written statement when all those arrangements are in place. Consequent to Amendment 37, we have Amendments 65 and 73, which seek to prevent Sections 1 to 6 coming into force until such a statement is made. We should emphasise that, although we speak of Sections 1 to 6, our real target is to ensure that the courts are ready to operate the new appeal provisions before they come into effect. We also have Amendment 47, which would provide for the right of oral renewal after a refusal on paper of the grant of permission to appeal. This amendment provides for the court to operate in just the same way as the Court of Appeal Criminal Division operates at the moment. Since the new proposals seem entirely to rest upon the process within the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, it is difficult to see why this should not also apply for appeals between the magistrates’ court and the Crown Court. As the noble Lord, Lord Murray, has reminded us, the proposal in the Bill affects only one avenue of appeal from the magistrates’ court—the appeal as of right to the Crown Court. It is right to say that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, recommended that the existing unfettered right of appeal to the Crown Court, which, as has been mentioned, entails a full rehearing, should be replaced with a requirement that the defendant apply for permission to a judge of the Crown Court, and that the grounds of appeal against both conviction and sentence be made the same as those that apply at the moment between the Crown Court and the Court of Appeal. However, the proposal from the noble and learned Lord was developed in the context of his central proposal, which was a Crown Court Bench Division, and not in the context of more serious cases being transferred to the magistrates’ court. We would suggest that is a significant difference. The overall proposed test for granting permission, and then whether an appeal should be granted against either conviction or sentence in the Crown Court, is exactly the same as currently applies in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division.
In an attempt to demonstrate the need for new administration to be put in place for dealing with these applications before the provisions come into effect, I will spend just a moment or two explaining how appeals from the Crown Court currently work when they go to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. Those appeals are administered by the Criminal Appeal Office under the direction of the registrar, who is a senior lawyer. The office is staffed with lawyers and caseworkers who gather together the papers and organise both the permission stage and the hearing stage, if there is one. The office receives the application, which must set out the grounds of appeal and why the conviction is arguably unsafe or the sentence arguably manifestly excessive. The office then determines what papers the judge, who will in due course look at the permission application, needs to determine that application.
Papers on conviction invariably include the summing up, any documents associated with it and, importantly, any parts of the transcript relevant to the grounds of appeal, but only those parts. That decision and determination is made in the Criminal Appeal Office, and there is sometimes argument about it with the advocates supporting an appellant. It is absolutely critical that that happens to avoid the wasteful provision of unnecessary paper. It is the Criminal Appeal Office that makes arrangements for the transcripts to be provided from the recordings made in court. The papers are sent to the judge, and then the Criminal Appeal Office keeps tabs on turnaround to ensure that the papers are dealt with quickly. As a High Court judge who dealt with many such applications, I can attest to that.
The Criminal Appeal Office expedites the case or refers it directly for an oral hearing if it is a matter of real urgency—of course, if the new appeal mechanisms involve appeals against sentence from the magistrates’ court, it is quite likely that a number of those appeals will be against immediate short terms of imprisonment. If permission is granted, the office assembles the papers, enabling the court in due course to hear the appeal. Just as importantly, as the office is staffed by lawyers expert in the detail of criminal law, they highlight for the benefit of the judges and advocates points of law that may not have been picked up by the appellant or those advising him or her. Then, as we know, if permission is refused on the papers, there is a right to renew orally in court.
It is difficult to see how this new appeals process can work, and we suggest this is not really disputed, without establishing either a national office or regional offices—in this context, the latter are more likely—to support it and to administer the increased number of appeals going to the Court of Appeal. All the provisions we seek are designed to ensure that, when this comes into effect, it does so on a proper basis and with proper preparation.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, in this group of amendments the principal question is whether Clause 6 and Schedule 2 should form part of the Bill. My noble friend Lord Murray set out very clearly the provisions that he thinks should be removed—namely those ones. Like him, I am strongly in favour of retaining the unrestricted right of appeal to the Crown Court in respect of convictions and sentences imposed in magistrates’ courts. My noble friend’s arguments, all seven of them, are extremely powerful and I agree with him. I note too that, at Second Reading, his arguments attracted a formidable coalition of support—from my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne, of course, but also from the Labour Benches. The noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti, Lady Mallalieu and Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, were all supportive of the position adopted by my noble friend, as were the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Fox of Buckley. So there is a considerable body of informed opinion. Given the contributions that they have made and doubtless will make today, I will confine myself to noting just two points in support of my noble friend. The first, which he made at Second Reading and today, is that, of the contested appeals, 56% are successful. That surely demonstrates the need for an unrestricted right of appeal. The second point that my noble friend made was that appeals against conviction constitute only 0.4% of the Crown Court’s workload. That demonstrates, if it needed to be demonstrated, that these appeals do not add to the backlog. Against the possibility, even the likelihood, that the Government will seek to ram these proposals through Parliament using their oppressive majority in the House of Commons, this Committee should seek to improve the Bill. In that respect, I do not agree with my noble friend, who shrank from that, and it is in this context that I have tabled my eight amendments that are intended to address that. They fall into two classes, substantive and procedural. I turn first to the substantive. I suggest that the permissive ground should include the interests of justice, so that permission to appeal must be granted if the interests of justice so require. Such a criterion accords with the principles of natural justice, and I am bound to say that I cannot think of any principled objection to that proposition whatever. Such is the effect of Amendments 39, 40, 41 and 42. Then I turn to the procedural points that I have sought to address in my amendments. I suggest that the permissive regime should entitle the defendant to make oral and written representations to the judge. If the former, there would have to be a hearing; such is the effect of Amendments 43, 44 and 45. The Bill, as drafted, provides that a hearing depends on the discretion of the judge. The judge is not obliged to hold a hearing; he can decide on the papers alone. I regard that as very unsatisfactory. The other procedural change that I recommend to this Committee is the subject of Amendment 46. This would provide that all relevant parties have available to them all the appropriate material that they require. This includes a recording of the proceedings in the magistrates’ court and, if appropriate, a transcript of those proceedings. As the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett and Lord Thomas, spoke of today and at Second Reading, this raises serious questions of procedure, funding, administration and legal aid. They are very complicated and demanding questions, and these practical issues, leaving aside questions of principle, may of themselves be sufficient to persuade the Committee that we should stick with the unrestricted right of appeal. To summarise my position, I am very much with my noble friend in his substantive arguments; I agree that we should delete Clause 6 and Schedule 2. But, against the possibility that the Government will not agree with this eminently sensible proposal, we need to improve the Bill. It is for that reason that I have taken the liberty of tabling eight amendments with that objective in mind.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I speak very much as a layperson and may not understand all the nuances and details of how the law works, so forgive me. I support the removal of Clause 6 and Schedule 2 from the Bill, as put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, who explained incredibly well all the details of why it is important. There is a lot at stake in this group of amendments, because of what it potentially represents. The denial of the automatic right to appeal could lead to serious injustices and that is not, I am sure, what the Government intend. I also back Amendments 40, 41 and 42 from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, because, at the very least, it should be made explicit in the Bill that the right to appeal should be granted if the interests of justice require it. I can see no reason why the Government could object to that. How could they say that that was a problem? What is at stake here is the risk of unfair, unjust outcomes in magistrates’ courts if the defendants are unable to exercise their right to appeal. We should have at the forefront of our minds that such decisions could see an individual being locked up and deprived of their liberty for up to two years. I must press the Minister: why is the clause in the Bill? I do not understand it. As we have heard, there is no evidence that defendants’ right to appeal has been exercised frivolously or vexatiously. So, why remove a vital safeguarding right against wrongful summary conviction or excessive sentences imposed by magistrates? On the statistics that the noble Lord, Lord Murray, gave on the overturning of certain numbers of convictions and sentences, I remind the House what that translates into: approximately 1,000 miscarriages of justice were corrected via the appeals route. That is an important gain for the justice system, which we should celebrate and pat ourselves on the back for, not now start denying. At Second Reading, the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, reminded us that the Post Office workers were wrongly convicted in magistrates’ courts. I want to know what would happen to them under the Bill if they lost the right to have a rehearing in a Crown Court. What is even more baffling is that removing the statutory right of appeal will, as we have heard, not fix the Crown Court backlog. Indeed, the campaigning charity Justice has pointed out that the replacement of our effective automatic right to appeal magistrates’ decisions with a multistage permission system is complicated and—this is the key point—highly likely to be inefficient. What work have the Government done on the practicalities here? I am worried that the clause would, for example, make it almost impossible for those who might wish to appeal to be able to negotiate the complexities of legal rules et cetera. That is why I support Amendment 46 from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Given that many individuals who appear before magistrates are unrepresented, how will they access audio recordings, written transcripts and other relevant information if left to their own devices? How will they come up with sufficiently robust legal arguments, or even apply for appeal? Who will help defendants find lawyers to assist them in preparing grounds for appeal? The bizarre bit of this is that the Government seem to believe, wrongly in my opinion, that juries comprising 12 ordinary people will not be able to cope with complex fraud cases and will want to dispense with jury trials in those instances. Yet the same Government seem happy to abandon an individual layperson seeking to appeal a magistrate’s decision, leaving them to their own devices to draft complicated legal arguments to justify why a sentence or conviction should be further considered. That seems to me to be completely contradictory and, I am afraid, a recipe for injustice. So I hope the Government will look seriously at this issue and drop Clause 6 and Schedule 2. At the very least, I hope they will give some responses to those of us who are concerned about the practical problems that this will achieve and how it is better to enhance justice rather than lead to a lack of justice.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, it seems to me rather odd that the Government think it so important that we should have a change in magistrates’ appeals to the Crown Court when they are only 0.4%. I am also concerned that individuals in the magistrates’ court are largely not represented. I am further concerned that the Law Commission will be giving its consultation decision and that we are going through this process before it has given us its views; but looking at the reality, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said, this is likely to go through in some way or other. Having made those points, I entirely agree with every word that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, said and accept them for the reasons he has given. I am not going to waste time by saying any of it all over again. I support Amendments 42 and 44 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. If we are going to move into an appellate system requiring permission, the interests of justice should be standing high up, so that is what is looked at. I also refer to Amendment 47 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. It is crucial that where a decision to grant permission has been refused without an oral hearing, the defendant should be able to renew it. It is crucial that the defendant have this right, particularly because, as has already been said, most litigants in person will have absolutely no idea how to set out what was wrong in the magistrates’ decision. It is going to be very difficult for magistrates to set out in detail why they have found against a defendant, and the idea that the litigant in person is going to write out in a sensible way all the points of law and all the facts of the case seems to me very difficult. It makes it even more important that there is a national office or regional offices staffed by lawyers to try to put the thing into some sort of order. The Government have to think again about how they are going to create this and achieve what they are setting out, rather sublimely, without—I have a suspicion—looking at the detail and how it is really going to work.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, the Committee may wish to bear in mind that an automatic right of appeal in every case is very much the exception in English justice, in both criminal law and civil law. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, referred to the need for leave to appeal on appeals from the Crown Court. In this context, as the Committee has heard, 56% of appeals on liability and substance succeed. Therefore, the question for me is whether the Bill contains sufficient safeguards to ensure that the sifting process can identify the strong cases, or at least the strongly arguable cases, and remove the hopeless cases. I am not confident that the Bill as drafted contains those safeguards. The amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, and the others who have signed them, and the amendments from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, go a long way to satisfying me that the sifting process can be conducted in an efficient manner. I respectfully agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that it is crucial to have an opportunity for an oral hearing—no doubt a brief oral hearing—in which the case can be put in person to the Crown Court judge about why there are at least properly arguable grounds of appeal.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, we have some reservations about the proposition of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, that Clause 6 should simply be removed from the Bill. Broadly speaking, though, we take the view that the amendments, particularly those relating to permission to appeal, moved by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, should be supported. That, again, is subject to some reservations that I will mention now. It is as a matter of simple justice, as I think everyone who has spoken in this Committee has recognised, that workable, stable and effective rights of appeal from magistrates’ courts should be in place, so that, where magistrates’ courts make decisions that are wrong, those decisions should be open to reversal by a higher court, which we agree should be the Crown Court, and that that reversal should not be dependent upon technical difficulties being overcome by appellants who are often unrepresented. The restrictions on appeals in the Bill seem to be based largely on a desire simply to cut the number of appeals and to make an associated cut in the resources spent on such appeals. We cannot accept that desire as a justification for those restrictions. As has been said several times in this Committee, if we consider present appeals from the magistrates’ courts to the Crown Court, the system is generally working well. There is not an undue number of appeals—indeed, that number is very low—and they have a very high success rate. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, put that position very persuasively, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray, himself gave the statistics, as he did at Second Reading. This is all much more important because, if this Bill now goes through as drafted, there will be many more, larger and more serious cases to be heard by the magistrates, both because of the removal of the right of election and because of the increased sentencing powers that are to be given to the magistrates. So the Bill should be a reason for improving the appeal procedure, not restricting it. Certainly it should be streamlined. We agree that it is reasonably arguable that appeals be heard in the context in which they should be heard—that is, appeals against conviction should be allowed if the convictions are unsafe, and appeals against sentence should be allowed if the sentences are manifestly excessive. Those principles and that context should go without saying. For our part, we can see some reason for a permission stage, but I am far from clear that the case advanced by the Government makes the permission requirement necessary. One has to consider the delay and the cost inherent in a permission stage as well as the high success rate of the system as it operates at present. However, if there is to be a permission requirement, I fully agree that there needs to be an oral permission hearing if requested, and that the original decision on paper should be reversible, much as it is in the Court of Appeal. That process needs to be well organised, and it needs to work efficiently and without undue delays. We also accept that there is a reasonable argument that appeals against conviction should be by way of review rather than a complete rehearing, with the need for witnesses to be recalled to give evidence for a second time, which often causes trauma for witnesses and brings with it the dangers of inconsistency, and of inconsistency itself being relied upon during the course of the appeal hearing, which sometimes lengthens hearings unnecessarily. Those are difficulties that need to be overcome. We accept entirely Amendment 37, whether from the duet or the quartet, as it has been an extraordinary anomaly that we have not had recorded hearings in the magistrates’ courts and transcripts as a matter of course. If we are to establish a reasonable appeal procedure, it is essential that there are recordings and transcripts. We are simply unpersuaded by the hesitation of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, on the question of recording and transcripts. His questioning of the use of AI may be acceptable given the present state of AI—though even that I doubt—but it goes far too far. We must have recordings and transcripts, and they must be able to be relied upon during the course of any permission hearing. We have heard also in the amendments about magistrates’ training, which of course is part of the picture. Magistrates’ recruitment is also part of the picture. We are concerned about the speed with which this is happening, given the Law Commission’s impending advice. We agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that we should await that advice before proceeding. We need to consider, exactly as she suggested, giving some sort of assistance to appellants in putting their appeals together in such a way as to illuminate the points of law that arise. Whether that is by a system of national or regional offices, it would involve a rethink of the way we deal with these matters. If defendants are going to be unrepresented at the lower court and will then have to put together grounds of appeal in such a way as to convince the court that they have a reasonable argument for appeal, it is difficult to see how that can be done in our present system, where parties get very little outside help, particularly if they are unrepresented at the hearing at first instance. All these things need real consideration and I am not sure that we have had enough consideration to date. The Law Commission may well help.
Lord Ashcombe (Con)
My Lords, I feel somewhat outgunned here as a non-lawyer. We have heard excellent points on this group from across the Benches, led by my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth, about the broader impact of Clause 6 when combined with the other changes being made to the magistrates’ courts more broadly across the Bill. The Bill will increase the sentencing powers available to magistrates and increase the magistrates’ courts’ power through the removal of the defendant’s right to elect trial on indictment, while also removing a safeguard against wrongful summary conviction and potentially excessive sentences. As has been echoed throughout this debate, I appreciate the importance of the magistrates’ courts within the court system, but introducing restrictions on a defendant’s ability to appeal their decision does not seem right. The appeal system is not overused given that, as we have heard, only 0.4% of decisions in the magistrates’ courts were appealed in 2025. So this provision is unlikely to assist with the backlog and, in fact, risks further increasing the burden to the Crown Court with an added permission stage. Therefore, what has prompted these specific reforms? As the various amendments in this group demonstrate, there is a clear concern as to the impact of changing the existing appeals system. I hope the Minister will address these issues in her closing remarks.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Baroness Smith of Cluny) (Lab)
My Lords, the notices put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, seek to oppose Clause 6 and Schedule 2 standing part of the Bill, while Amendment 39, from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, seeks to preserve the existing right of appeal from magistrates’ courts to the Crown Court. Currently, all appeals against conviction or sentence received in a magistrates’ court proceed to a full rehearing in the Crown Court, in which parties re-attend to give evidence again. For appeals with no reasonable grounds, this is wasted Crown Court time. In his review, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, identified that appeals by rehearing can cause significant distress to victims and witnesses, some of whom may drop out of the process as they feel unable to relive the trauma of a trial a second time. It is unacceptable that we have a system in which some appeals succeed for this reason. This can be avoided by introducing a permission stage, to filter out appeals without merit at an earlier stage, supported by the introduction of audio recording in magistrates’ courts. Importantly, this is neither a novel nor exceptional approach. A permission stage exists for appeals from the Crown Court to the Court of Appeal, which routinely hears much more serious cases, where the deprivation of liberty is generally far greater. We are not restricting the right to appeal; we are ensuring that appeals are more targeted and effective, providing appropriate safeguards for defendants while sparing victims and witnesses from avoidable trauma.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I wonder whether the Minister might give us an indication of the statistics. It is very easy for the Government to say that there are appeals where victims are impacted, but there is a risk here of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. How extensive is this problem? So far, we have heard no statistics from the Government as to why it is said that avoiding the trauma of giving evidence a second time is a good reason for introducing these measures, which, as we have heard from across the Committee, would have considerable downsides.
Baroness Smith of Cluny (Lab)
I can help the noble Lord with some statistics. Plainly, trauma can affect victims of crime across a whole range of crimes, but, while sexual crime is a small percentage, it is an important one none the less. In 2025, there were 124 cases, with a good number of victims affected. We heard from the victims who took part in the Public Bill Committee in the other place that the trial was so traumatic that they simply would not do it again and would not have been able to take part in a rehearing of their case.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
Could the Minister comment on a different set of victims: namely, victims of miscarriages of justice? Is there any possibility that anyone could ever appeal? If you appeal against any conviction, there will be a victim who will say that they could be traumatised. How would one ever challenge a miscarriage of justice? Is it possible in that world?
Baroness Smith of Cluny (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this, because it gets to the heart of the question and the point of principle that these measures have been brought forward to address. At present, you have a full rehearing. That is not simply an attempt to deal with the miscarriage of justice; it is a full rerun of the case—another bite of the cherry. Miscarriages of justice are perfectly adequately taken care of in a proper appeals system, which is what we are seeking to bring in. There is no reason why there should be an automatic right of appeal just because you do not like the decision, even if it is without merit. The system that we will introduce will align with the system for serious crime and ensure that, where things have gone wrong in a trial, an appeal is appropriate. I will deal with the specific question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Murray, which was also mentioned by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss: why are we not waiting for the Law Commission to report before bringing forward these measures? We welcome the Law Commission’s work on criminal appeals, but the project was commissioned in 2023, before the review of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, into the criminal courts and the proposed reforms in this Bill. Its consultation therefore did not take into account wider changes in the criminal courts, which will bring more cases into the magistrates’ courts, thereby potentially increasing the volume of appeals to the Crown Court. However, the Government have engaged, through our officials, with the Law Commission on our proposed changes to magistrates’ courts appeals. It really comes down to a point of principle. Quite simply, you should not be entitled to a full rehearing of your case; you should be entitled to an appeal if something has gone wrong and there is a point of law to be argued. Before I move on to more specific amendments, I will deal with the question of litigants in person, which was raised by a number of noble Lords, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I reassure the Committee that we are mindful of the impact of these measures on litigants in person, and I give an assurance that this is being looked at and thought about carefully. Amendments 40, 41 and 42 seek to broaden the test for permission to appeal from the magistrates’ courts so that the Crown Court must grant permission when it is in the interests of justice. The test for granting permission in the proposed legislation is based on the well-established test used in the Court of Appeal: is it reasonably arguable that the appeal will succeed? It will not generally be in the interests of justice to hear an appeal where there are no reasonably arguable grounds for appeal. Including an interests of justice test in addition is, we believe, unnecessary. A court might hear an appeal in the interests of justice where a party seeks an authoritative, binding judgment on a particular legal question. Under the rules of legal precedent, the Crown Court cannot provide a decision on the law that is binding on magistrates’ courts generally, whereas the High Court can. Appeals by stated case to the High Court would therefore be a more appropriate route for an appeal in this circumstance. Amendments 43, 44 and 45 from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, seek to introduce a right for defendants to make oral representations to support their application for permission to appeal. I note that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, supported this as well. We anticipate that permission to appeal will be granted on the papers in most instances, but we recognise that an oral hearing will sometimes be necessary for the Crown Court judge to determine whether to grant permission to appeal. That is why we have a provision in new Section 108A in Schedule 2 so that judges can hold an oral hearing where they feel it is necessary, for example to seek further information on the issues identified in the permission application. The key here is whether it is necessary to hold an oral hearing, which a judge is best placed to determine. This amendment could create a situation in which Crown Court time is routinely taken up by hearings that are not required. Amendment 46 seeks to ensure that audio recordings and transcripts are available to appellants seeking permission to appeal and to all other parties. In the Crown Court to Court of Appeal, copies of audio recordings are not provided to parties, although arrangements can be made to hear the audio recordings, and transcripts can also be made available, as we have heard. Our measure allows for this. Schedule 2 to the Bill inserts new Section 108S into the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to provide that rules of court can be made concerning the production of audio recordings and transcripts, and that transcripts can be provided to any persons. The existing legislation is therefore broad enough to allow for the provision of transcripts and the hearing of audio recordings through the Criminal Procedure Rules, in line with practice in the Court of Appeal, with no legislative amendment being required. Amendments 37, 65 and 73 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas—spoken to today by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, and supported by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—respectively seek to ensure that the new appeals process is properly supported before it is commenced. Amendment 37 lists essential delivery requirements, not optional extras, and I reassure the noble and learned Lord that implementation planning is well under way. We are already working closely with the judiciary, the Judicial College and His Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service to ensure that sufficient magistrates, district judges and legal advisers receive the necessary training before implementation. Recording facilities in every magistrates’ court are a critical part of our reforms. HMCTS has piloted recording in seven courtrooms, with the evaluation informing our plans for national rollout. We will ensure that these facilities, alongside transcription services, are in place before commencement to support appeals. We will also ensure that sufficient administrative support is available to Crown Court judges. HMCTS is developing staffing and operating arrangements to ensure that support is in place from day one. However, flexibility over how that support is organised is necessary, so it should not be prescribed in primary legislation. I have heard what has been said about the practicalities in the debate this afternoon. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, spoke of a national office and the need for the necessary administrative arrangements around the triaging to be sufficient—and we hear him. Indeed, points about measures to ensure that sifting is undertaken, with appropriate safeguards, made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, were also well heard. Pertinent points have been raised today, and I assure noble Lords that they are heard.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
The Committee heard the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, develop at some length the precise characteristics of the appeals office in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, and the various functions that that office performs. It sounds as though that goes rather beyond the concept of administrative assistance. Can the Minister confirm whether there will be a Crown Court appeals office, whether there will be regional Crown Court appeals offices, and, specifically, what plans have been made to establish, staff and fund those offices?
Baroness Smith of Cluny (Lab)
I would be very pleased to meet with the noble Lord in due course to discuss these arrangements more fully. I do not have all the information to hand just now, but I want to reassure the Committee that the important practical measures that have been raised, not only in this debate, are being listened to, heard and actioned. Amendment 47, also tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, would introduce a right to renew an application for permission to appeal following refusal on the papers, mirroring the process from the Crown Court to the Court of Appeal. This was supported by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. If an appellant appeals against a conviction or sentence received in the Crown Court to the Court of Appeal and their permission is refused, there is no onward right of appeal to the High Court. In this context, it is appropriate that an option to renew permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal exists. By contrast, if an appellant from the magistrates’ courts to the Crown Court has their permission refused, they have an onward right of appeal to the High Court. The refusal of permission can be challenged by appealing by case stated or judicial review. The reason we have not included a renewal option is that there are existing routes to challenge a refusal of permission in the Crown Court. There is also a risk that, by including a renewal option, we would see an unsustainable number of appellants renewing their permission and receiving an oral permission hearing, placing greater strain on the Crown Court, which is contrary to the aims of the measures in the Bill. So, given what I have set out, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Murray, will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Advocate-General for her remarks and all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. It was perhaps of note that, of all the Members of the House who spoke, there was no voice in support of the Government’s proposals as they stand. Some very valuable points were made in relation to improving these amendments, in the event that they are not wholly withdrawn. In particular, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, made a very valuable point about the need for proper preparation, if a situation is to come to pass whereby these provisions are ever actually deployed.
The Minister’s final remarks suggested that the answer to there being no oral renewal hearing was that there could be a judicial review or appeal by way of case stated. This line is perhaps somewhat startling, because it is not as if the Administrative Court, or indeed the King’s Bench Division, has plenty of spare capacity to hear lots of renewals against appeals from the magistrates. Further, there does not appear to be any provision for legal aid for those sorts of appeals, and one can anticipate a good deal of chaos. We shall see, perhaps on Report, where those matters go.
I also thank the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, for his support for the withdrawal and, in particular, the point that he made about the impact on justice. The overall thrust of the Committee’s contributions is that there is something special about the importance of appeals from magistrates’ courts, given the nature of lay justice. Perhaps that is the answer that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, did not discern when he was considering why this is the only form of appeal that is without a permission requirement. Perhaps it is because there is an opportunity for rough justice by non-lawyers. The House will have to think deeply about that on Report. For now, I am prepared to withdraw my opposition to the clause standing part.
Clause 6 agreed.
Amendment 37 not moved.
Amendment 38
Moved by
38: After Clause 6, insert the following new Clause— “Magistrate training and allowances(1) The Lord Chancellor must—(a) consult the Lord Chief Justice to confirm that a sufficient number of magistrates who exercise functions affected by sections 1, 2, 5 and 6 have completed training in the exercise of those functions,(b) consult lay justices about the rates of allowances payable to them, and(c) implement the payment of those rates of allowances to lay justices.(2) The Lord Chancellor must make a written statement to both Houses of Parliament when the duties in subsection (1) have been completed.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment seeks to probe the relevant training and allowances payable to magistrates.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 38 is grouped with two other amendments, but it is the principal amendment in this group. It is about proper preparation, to use a term just used by the noble Lord, Lord Murray, even if we are not with him on everything that he has just been saying. The other amendments are about commencement in relation to the issues in Amendment 38. The issue of capacity, in every sense, was the subject of Amendment 36 from the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, which was debated on the first day in Committee, and training is part of that issue. She has experience as a magistrate, which I do not, but we are very much on the same page. Her amendment would have required annual reviews of capacity to manage the case load on the part of magistrates. My amendment goes perhaps to a previous step: ensuring that training is completed. I know that training is part of the Government’s plans and those of the Judicial College, and there is work going on. This was also implicit in Amendment 37 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon. I was intending to report to him the various collective nouns that we covered rather late on the first day, but he has gone, so I will tell him later. The Minister said in response to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, that the Government were “already committed in Clause 20 to post-implementation monitoring and review of the reforms ”.—[ Official Report , 10/11/26; col. 207.] I should emphasise “post”-implementation monitoring. That was in col. 207 and, in col. 208, he then explained that that clause is limited to issues of disproportionality. I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, cannot be here again today, because he has been very concerned with this. I do not dispute the importance of that, but all Governments always commit to keeping legislation under review. My amendment is more extensive than that, and certainly more extensive than Clause 20. In the amendment, I also refer to allowances. I think I heard the Minister say—he can correct me, because I certainly do not want to I misquote him, and this may have been on an informal occasion—that he recognises that there may be an issue around allowances that is something more than just the reimbursement of expenses to magistrates in recognition of their public service. This was what I had in mind in this clause. Of course, there could not be complete recompense for income lost. Indeed, not everyone loses income during service as a magistrate. Many Members of the Committee, however, will be familiar with working very odd, very long hours in order to fulfil public services. It is not about that sort of recompense. Making a payment is a public recognition of the service. That is what I had in mind in the amendment. I am grateful for the information on the recruitment campaign that the Minister’s office has send me. I have not come across any of the advertising telling us all that we could become magistrates, but then I accept that I am not in the target audience. I beg to move.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I support Amendment 38 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It is especially important because of the special circumstances that magistrates face because of the Bill, with the huge deluge of work and responsibility heading their way. I am concerned that the Government have not given those kinds of practicalities enough thought and forward planning. In response to me at Second Reading, the Minister—I thought rather cavalierly—batted away concerns I raised about magistrates’ preparedness by assuring the House that the Magistrates’ Association had expressed support for the Bill. Indeed it has, but is also true that the Magistrates’ Association has stressed that magistrates’ courts would need sufficient resourcing, probation support and increased recruitment, not just of more magistrates but of legal advisers to handle the increased workload and the different type of workload. The Magistrates’ Association described a shortage of legal advisers, despite a large-scale recruitment attempt, as a “significant constraint” on seeing through what the Bill introduces. Considering and thinking through extra payment and, in particular, training is very important as magistrates will, effectively, be doing a completely different role. A significant proportion of the magistracy is likely to be relatively inexperienced in dealing with complex matters—that is not a criticism—because magistrates’ courts are designed for trying minor offences. We are now asking them to try more serious offences that can mean they have the capacity, as I said earlier, to imprison someone for up to two years. Therefore, we must have a sense of a really clear plan. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on raising this; she is trying to solve a problem that really exists and I hope the Government will respond positively.
Lord Ashcombe (Con)
My Lords, we have heard concerns from noble Lords about the impact these reforms are going to have on magistrates’ courts, especially if they are not prepared for them. Amendment 37, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, in the previous group also sought confirmation regarding the training provided to magistrates. These amendments, brought to us by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seek also to question the allowances that will be available to magistrates. These amendments raise a legitimate concern about the extent to which magistrates are adequately prepared and supported for these reforms. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Lemos) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling these amendments. Due to the mysteries of grouping, we also discussed magistrates capacity towards the end of the last day of Committee proceedings, but it was very late in the evening and we were all in a rush—although I am sure that, even at 10pm, noble Lords hung on my every deathless word. This will be an opportunity to emphasise the point in prime time, as it were. On the question of the review, my noble friend Lord Katz will deal with the amendments from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, in a later group. Before I go into my remarks, I think that the question the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, asked me was whether any magistrates supported these reforms, to which my reply was that the Magistrates’ Association supported them—we can check the record on this. I do not regard that as “cavalier”. I certainly did not suggest that the Magistrates’ Association had not expressed concerns; I have met with the Magistrates’ Association, and I have heard its concerns. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, might rather withdraw the “cavalier” assertion in relation to what she said. These amendments seek to ensure that magistrates’ training and allowances are in place before the measures in Clauses 1, 2, 5 and 6 commence. The Government are confident that the magistrates’ courts can deliver the reform set out in the Bill, and we are already taking action to ensure that the magistrates’ courts are set up to succeed. I want to set this out carefully for the record and for the benefit of noble Lords today. The capacity of the magistrates’ courts has been raised a number of times and in different ways, and it is at the heart of the success of the Bill. The Government are very much aware of that. As noble Lords will no doubt be aware, the magistrates’ courts have a higher volume and higher turnover due to jurisdiction. The magistrates’ courts handle more than 90% of all criminal cases each year. In 2025, they handled almost 1.5 million cases, and 73% of those cases were completed at the first listing. Triable “either way” offences progress substantially quicker in the magistrates’ courts than in the Crown Court. As I said at Second Reading and on the first day in Committee, the question is not just the size of the backlog but waiting times and the speed with which cases can be processed. The magistrates’ courts typically handle triable “either way” cases four times faster than the Crown Court. From the perspective of victims, witnesses and, indeed, the defendants, that is a considerable benefit. The average at-court time for a not guilty “either way” trial case in the magistrates’ court is about five months, compared to 18 months in the Crown Court where the defendant is on bail. I am sure noble Lords would agree that that is a substantial benefit, not just to the system but, as I said, to victims, witnesses and defendants. The Bill’s economic impact assessment, published on the Bill’s introduction to the other place in February 2026 and supplemented by an appendix published on introduction to your Lordships’ House, set out that the structural reforms would increase demand in the magistrates’ court by around 8,500 sitting days per year in steady state following implementation—we want to be completely transparent about that. The Government are already expanding the capacity of magistrates’ courts to meet this demand, increasing funded sitting days from 114,000 last year to 125,800 in 2026-27, with a target of 131,000 sitting days by 2028-29. We are confident we will meet that.
Alongside sitting day investment, we are investing £287 million across the court estate in vital repairs and digital upgrades. At Second Reading, we heard a great deal about the need to improve the facilities, and that is why we are spending that money. An additional £13 million per year will go to criminal legal aid in the magistrates’ courts, to ensure that we are maximising capacity.
Our publication about the magistrates’ courts this month set out that we still expect triable “either way” not-guilty trial cases to be dealt with considerably quicker in the magistrates’ courts after our reforms. We estimate that, on average, these cases will be heard in eight to nine months, whereas defendants on bail are currently waiting 18 months on average for this type of case to be heard in the Crown Court. Last time, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, challenged me on what evidence we had. I am sorry that he is not in his place to hear my answer.
As noble Lords discussed last week, as well as speeding up justice for victims, witnesses and defendants, these reforms to the trials of “either way” offences will also have a beneficial impact on the backlog in the Crown Court. Without making these changes, the Crown Court backlog will continue to rise. As a result of these changes and the various other measures the Government have announced, our modelling shows that the Crown Court backlog will peak in 2028 and start to fall in 2028-29, putting the whole system on a more sustainable trajectory, with considerable benefits for victims, witnesses and defendants.
Magistrates recruitment is a crucial plank of our work to ensure that the magistrates’ courts are set up to succeed. I am very sorry to hear that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has not seen our advertising campaign. She must come to the MoJ—it is everywhere. I would like to reassure her that she is very much in the target group.
The Government are committed to rebuilding the magistracy to 21,000 magistrates by 2028-29. This target is ambitious, but I am pleased to confirm that we are ahead of our stated ambitions, with almost 1,500 appointments made since April—twice as many as during the equivalent period last year. We recognise that magistrates are an important part of a wider workforce in the courts. Some 50 deputy district judges were recruited in 2025, and we identified a reserve list of 86 additional candidates, whose appointments are now under way. Alongside this, there is ongoing recruitment for 30 district judges. Since April 2025, 166 additional legal advisers have been appointed, with a further campaign for 80 legal advisers underway.
Recruitment should also reinforce the magistracy’s connection with, and representation of, the community it serves. Our “You’ve got the makings of a magistrate” campaign—which magistrates, along with the Magistrates’ Association, were crucial in shaping—is intended to dispel misconceptions about who does and can serve, and broaden the pool of applicants.
We are already seeing a substantial increase in the diversity of magistrates, as people from all walks of life sign up to help deliver justice in their local community. I have seen some of the responses, and I have a great deal of respect for the people applying and the way in which they present their commitment to public service as lay people. In 2025-26, 17% of new appointments were from ethnic minority backgrounds, compared with 14% of serving magistrates, and more than a third of new recruits were under 50, compared with less than a fifth of the existing magistracy. Women account for 55% of new appointments, compared with 57% of magistrates currently in post.
On the crucial question of the magistrates’ courts’ ability to handle more serious cases, magistrates are already experienced in hearing serious and complex cases in both criminal and family jurisdictions, for example, with complex domestic abuse issues. Youth courts—such as the court in which the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, sits—routinely hear cases involving violent offending and have sentencing powers of up to 24 months. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, noted, the Judicial College has already begun planning training for magistrates, legal advisers and district judges for the Courts and Tribunals Bill reforms, and the Government have increased funding for training in line with estimates provided by the Judicial College for the additional resources required.
I can assure noble Lords that, as with the increase of magistrates’ court sentencing powers to 12 months, sentencing powers will not be extended until sufficient magistrates, legal advisers and district judges have completed the necessary training.
Finally, on allowances, magistrates are volunteers—they are proud lay people, and we are proud of them and grateful for their contribution—and they do not receive a salary. However, they can claim reimbursement for eligible expenses and financial loss incurred through their judicial service. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, suggested that I recognise the importance of this; I always recognise the importance of the work of volunteers and the need for them to be treated with the greatest respect. Clause 18 will make it easier to update the categories of reimbursable expenses through secondary legislation, avoiding unnecessary delays while retaining parliamentary scrutiny.
I apologise for that rather long and detailed answer. Since so many questions have been raised at Second Reading and in Committee on the capacity of magistrates’ courts, I wanted to answer as fully as possible, both for the record and for your Lordships. With those assurances, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, this is Committee so of course I will, but I have to say that, as interested as I was to hear what the Minister said, very little of it related to my amendment. He went very much wider, advocating for the changes in the Bill. My amendments are really quite narrow—perhaps I will come back to them. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for referring to preparedness, which is more than capacity. She also reminded us that the Magistrates’ Association, which I believe represents about half of the existing magistracy—I might not have that correct, but it is certainly not all magistrates—has rightly reminded the Government that the wide issue of resourcing is very relevant to its success in implementing these reforms. The Minister referred to the extension of magistrates’ jurisdiction. I was glad to get that little piece of information, which had not lodged in my head before, about the staged implementation of what is in the Bill. But even now many magistrates will have experience of complex cases. He referred to domestic abuse, but we will require far more of them to have far more experience. The Minister says that not every Member of the House will have hung on his every word, but that is what Hansard is there for, and that was why I referred specifically to some of the points that he made quite close to close of play last week. I heard what the Minister said. I cannot say I am satisfied, but of course I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 38 withdrawn.
Schedule 2: Appeals from magistrates’ courts
Amendments 39 to 47 not moved.
Schedule 2 agreed.
Clauses 7 to 10 agreed.
Amendment 47A
Moved by
47A: After Clause 10, insert the following new Clause— “Expert evidence in criminal proceedings: regulated experts(1) Expert evidence may be given in criminal proceedings in England and Wales only by an individual who is a regulated expert.(2) An individual is a “regulated expert” in relation to expert evidence on a matter if—(a) the individual is registered with, or is a member of a profession regulated by, a body designated under subsection (4)(a) in relation to that matter, and is in good standing with that body, or(b) where no body is so designated in relation to the matter, the individual meets the standards of competence, accreditation and conduct specified under subsection (4)(b).(3) A court must not admit expert evidence given in contravention of subsection (1) unless no regulated expert in the relevant field is reasonably available.(4) The Lord Chancellor must by regulations to be made by statutory instrument—(a) designate bodies for the purposes of subsection (2)(a), and(b) specify standards for the purposes of subsection (2)(b), which must include compliance with any code of practice issued under the Forensic Science Regulator Act 2021 so far as it applies to the matter.(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (4) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.(6) In this section “expert evidence” means evidence of opinion, or of the results of analysis, given by a person on the basis of specialist knowledge, skill or experience.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would provide that expert evidence may be given in criminal proceedings only by experts who are registered with a designated regulatory body or who meet specified standards, subject to a limited exception where no regulated expert is available.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Victims’ Commissioner, Women’s Aid and the wider groups of charities and NGOs that make up the group that specialises in domestic and sexual abuse work, which continues to work tirelessly to ensure that victims and witnesses are treated appropriately during their time in the courts system. Because of the way the Bill is set out, we have to table similar amendments for the criminal courts and the family courts in some of these areas because they relate to different parts of the Bill. Amendment 47A sets out how those giving expert evidence in criminal proceedings must be overseen by a regulatory body or profession. The reason for this is that, in recent years, people have been giving evidence as experts who in reality are not qualified, expert or held accountable to their profession for the evidence if it is not expert or independent. I declare an interest here. My husband, a design electrical engineer, has been an expert witness in criminal and civil cases. He is a member of the Institution of Engineering and Technology, the IET. In becoming a member of this professional body, he had to demonstrate that he had the appropriate academic and professional qualifications. Being a member of that body would reassure all those in the court case that he was able to provide evidence to assist the court. However, there has been a tendency in recent years in all three courts—criminal, civil and family—for people who are not members of a regulatory body or profession, and whose qualifications to speak may therefore not be expert, to call themselves experts in an area. The CPS’s definition is: “Expert evidence is admissible to furnish the court with information which is likely to be outside the experience and the knowledge of a judge or jury … An expert witness can provide the court with a statement of opinion on any admissible matter calling for expertise by the witness if they are qualified to give such an opinion … The duty of an expert witness is to help the court to achieve the overriding objective by giving opinion which is objective and unbiased, in relation to matters within their expertise. This is a duty that is owed to the court and overrides any obligation to the party from whom the expert is receiving instructions”. There are references there to which Criminal Procedure Rules these refer to. It continues: “CrimPR 19.2(3)(d) also obliges all experts to disclose to the party instructing them anything (of which the expert is aware) that might reasonably be thought capable of undermining the expert’s opinion or detracting from their credibility or impartiality”. Unfortunately, in the court system there are no formal standards or regulations relating to them to guarantee that they can demonstrate that expertise. This amendment sets out a definition of a regulated expert and says a court must not admit expert evidence given by an unqualified person other than in truly exceptional circumstances. It also says the Lord Chancellor must designate bodies that people should register with and specify the standards and codes of practice used for compliance. The family courts, and to a lesser extent the criminal courts, have found themselves with unqualified so-called experts, mainly in psychotherapy, whose independence has been questioned. But this is not just about psychiatry and psychotherapy experts. If regulation is brought in for experts across the board, using their professional body or regulator, it will strengthen juries’ confidence that the expert witnesses have the expertise that is needed and the skills to understand that they are servants of the courts, not promoting their own issues, which I am sorry to say has happened more recently. I also have Amendment 47B in this group, a probing amendment that our colleagues tabled in the Commons. It would require the Government to make regulations extending the protections in Clauses 8 to 10 to other offences whose complainants are victims within the meaning of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. The existing eligibility is too tight. This proposes to use the helpful definition in the Act. Clause 8 covers compensation claims relating to sexual offences, Clause 9 is on false complaints and Clause 10 is on evidence of propensity to commit offences involving domestic abuse. Amendment 47B seeks to ensure that the protection for victims elsewhere applies here too. Amendment 52B is my final amendment in this group. It “seeks to create a presumption that child witnesses, and complainants in section 17(4) offences, may give evidence by video recording or pre-recorded cross-examination if they wish. The court must grant the direction unless it is satisfied that refusal is in the interests of justice and must give reasons if it refuses”. This amendment and the others I have laid are trying to help clarify and smooth the processes for vulnerable people and victims facing a complex courts process that is impenetrable to them.
Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 introduces pre-trial video-recorded cross-examination as a special measure. This measure has been rolled out only to the Crown Courts; when it is used, eligible victims are cross-examined via a video recording at an earlier date before trial outside the courtroom setting. Only the judge, lawyers and defendant are present in the courtroom on the day of the Section 28 hearing and screens can be used to prevent the defendant seeing the victim. If Section 28 is granted, the questions that will be asked during cross-examination have to be approved by the judge at the ground rules hearing, so any improper or vague questions are removed. The recording is then played back on the trial date to the jury. This prevents any need for the victim to attend the trial.
Following a Section 28 hearing, victims are not usually required to give evidence again. However, there are certain circumstances in which they may be called back. There are barriers to granting a Section 28 hearing at the moment, because access is not automatic and remains subject to judicial discretion. There are also factors beyond the victim’s needs that appear to be influencing access, including concerns about conviction rates, that court delays can work against victims, that Section 28 can be granted and later withdrawn and that eligible victims currently face different thresholds for accessing Section 28. These factors create uncertainty and inconsistency for victims. That is why this amendment would help, as it would ensure parity of service for victims.
I have also signed Amendment 49 from the noble Lord, Lord Russell, on victims’ right to review a discontinuance of proceedings after the accused has been sent to trial. This amendment would ensure that the victim has a chance to ask for a review where a discontinuance is proposed; at the moment, they do not. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, and I have laid amendments on the right to review for some years now in order to ensure that the victim’s voice is heard before a case is discontinued. I look forward to hearing his argument. I have also signed Amendment 52 from the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, on the special measures direction, which goes further than my Amendment 47B. I am happy to support her amendment too.
This group of amendments is trying to ensure that the rights of victims and the support for victims in the courts are consistent and fair. The amendments aim to close loopholes and improve processes. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. I beg to move.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, as was the case at Second Reading, on these occasions the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I tend to come at matters from a slightly different direction from the majority of noble Lords, particularly those who have a legal qualification. While a lot of the discussion is about the intricacies of the legal profession and areas where it is particularly sensitive, we come at it from a different direction. Despite all the nuances in the judicial system, its problems and the rules within it, we are concerned about what actually happens to the victims. If all these attempts by the judicial system to make things work to its own satisfaction have the opposite effect on victims, it is important that their voices are heard. That is what is behind this group of amendments. I support Amendments 47A and 47B from the noble Baroness. I agree that the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, goes even further, so I support that even more. However, I will speak primarily to Amendment 49, which is about the victim’s right to review. As the noble Baroness said, we have tried to argue this case on several occasions, not least when the late lamented Baroness Newlove was here and was able to speak with all the force that came from her own searing personal experience, as well as the experience she had in being instrumental in setting up the role of the Victims’ Commissioner and then, on two separate occasions, holding it in a very distinguished way. Essentially, we are trying with this amendment to enable the CPS to discontinue proceedings in the Crown Court up until the trial, bringing its opportunity to do so in line with the opportunity in the magistrates’ court. Importantly, this change would mean that proceedings could be ended at a later point and still be reinstated where it is determined that the prosecution was ended in error. For victims, this would be an important safeguard, enabling them to exercise their right meaningfully to challenge CPS decision-making. One might ask why this change is needed. Currently, the CPS can end proceedings in two principal ways in the Crown Court. It can do so within a narrow timeframe by discontinuing proceedings, which allows it to reinstate proceedings at a later point, or it can offer no evidence, which it can do right up until the start of the trial. The latter is, in effect, an acquittal of the defendant, meaning that even where proceedings are ended in error, there are no means to reinstate them. Following campaigning by a victim known as Jade Blue, who was subject to this procedure, in June 2025 the CPS launched a pilot in the West Midlands for rape cases, enabling survivors to be told that a decision has been made to offer no evidence and to request a review before final closure. This approach aims to provide an additional safeguard, allowing decisions to be reconsidered before proceedings are halted. We are told that this scheme is being robustly evaluated to ensure that the right balance is struck between victims’ rights to review, the requirements of the court process and the defendant’s rights to timely notification. I would be happy if the Minister could update us on exactly where that has got to, and whether it is likely to be rolled out. Would this increase the likelihood of more cases being reinstated? One concern that the Government may have is that this would enable the Crown Prosecution Service to take this up rather enthusiastically and be even more exercised in stopping some of these cases happening. Yet discontinuance processes or powers are quite common in a variety of jurisdictions, not just in this country. They are common in several Australian territories and New Zealand, and are available in Scotland, the United States of America and Canada. All the evidence shows that rates of reinstatement are extremely low, even where the regime is more liberal than it is in this country. This tends to indicate that prosecutor behaviour limits the use of the power to reinstate cases to those very rare ones of wrong decisions or where further evidence has become available, and to use the theoretically wide power sparingly and only where appropriate. The power to discontinue is already available in magistrates’ court up to the point of trial in England and Wales. Even so, reinstatement there is so rare that it is difficult to find any examples of its use. That is the case we are putting forward. For a small group of victims, this would be a very important right and would not leave a victim of rape or a sexual offence hanging at the point that they thought there might be a trial, where they are told that not only would there not be a trial but there was no chance of a trial in future. For all those reasons, I hope the Government will answer in a compelling and full way, and above all will indicate where their thinking is at the moment and how this process of evaluating a new way of doing this is proceeding.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, my Amendment 52 is a practical amendment based on a simple proposition: where a child witness or a witness already recognised by law as vulnerable or intimidated wishes to use a screen, live link or prerecorded evidence in chief, they should not have to apply for it. It should be available automatically, unless there is good reason not to allow it. These are not exceptional measures. They are not novel. Nor are they granted only in rare circumstances. Prerecorded evidence in chief, screens and live links are the three most common special measures used in criminal courts every day all over the country. In the overwhelming majority of cases, applications are made, considered and granted as a matter of routine. If that is the reality, we should ask a simple question: why are we still requiring vulnerable witnesses to jump through a procedural hoop to obtain something that everybody expects them to receive anyway? The current process creates delay, paperwork and uncertainty—more importantly, uncertainty for victims and witnesses. Giving evidence is often the most stressful part of the criminal justice process. Many victims spend months, sometimes years, worrying about what will happen when they finally enter that courtroom. They deserve clarity from the outset about the basic protections that will be available to them but, instead, we tell them that an application has been made and that a decision will follow. Technically, that is true but, in reality, the measure is almost certain to be granted, so what purpose is served by making vulnerable witnesses prove that they need what everybody already knows they need and are overwhelmingly likely to be given? My amendment would reverse that: it would provide that eligible witnesses were entitled to these basic and routinely used measures without having to make a formal application. They could simply indicate which measure they wished to use and the court would grant it, unless there were compelling reasons why doing so would be contrary to the interests of justice. I anticipate that my noble friend the Minister may raise a number of concerns, so I want to anticipate what she is going to say and address that. The first may be that judicial discretion must be preserved. I agree entirely; that is precisely why this amendment preserves it. The court would retain an explicit power to refuse a measure where it would be contrary to the interests of justice. Defendants retain the right to object, and judges retain complete control over how the arrangements operate in practice. The amendment would remove unnecessary bureaucracy, not judicial judgment. The second possible objection is that not every court can currently provide every measure in every case. Again, I understand that concern, but I do not believe that it is a reason for maintaining the present system. The Government are rightly investing in specialist rape and serious sexual offences courts and are to be commended for doing so. More broadly, screens, live links and video evidence facilities are now a normal part of criminal court infrastructure across England and Wales. If there are still places where these basic facilities are lacking, the answer is surely to improve the provision of the facilities or to move the case to a better equipped court and not to deny vulnerable witnesses a presumption in favour of their use. The risk that the infrastructure may occasionally—in my experience, rarely—fall short cannot justify preserving a system that routinely creates uncertainty for thousands of victims. The third argument may be that better information and guidance can achieve the same outcome. I respectfully disagree. Better information is welcome, but it is not the same as better rights. A victim can be given excellent information about special measures and still be left wondering whether those measures will be available when they come to give evidence. Information cannot provide certainty; a statutory entitlement can. There is also a wider practical benefit. Every routine application consumes time and wastes scarce public money. Police officers have to prepare paperwork; prosecutors then have to review that paperwork; the defence representatives then consider the paperwork, and the judges then also consider it and must determine it. All that effort is expended for an outcome that is, in most cases, entirely predictable. When the courts are under enormous pressure, we should be asking whether scarce resources are being used wisely. Surely judges should be spending their time deciding genuinely contested issues rather than processing applications that everyone expects to succeed. My amendment adopts a practical and proportionate approach. It applies only to the most common and least controversial measures. It does not extend to measures such as prerecorded cross-examination under Section 28 or other arrangements that might require a more detailed judicial assessment. Those would continue to be dealt with through the ordinary application process, so this is not a radical amendment but a modest and targeted reform. Indeed, Scotland has already moved in this direction through its vulnerable witness reforms. Parliament there has recognised that some standard measures have become so routinely appropriate that requiring an application no longer serves a useful purpose. In truth, that is where we are as well. We would not design this system in this way if we were starting from scratch today. The amendment says that where Parliament has already recognised that a witness is vulnerable and the protection sought is routinely granted in courts across the country, the default position should be that the witness receives it. It would reduce bureaucracy, save judicial and prosecutorial time, preserve defendants’ rights and preserve judicial discretion. Above all, it would give vulnerable witnesses something that they too often lack: a measure of certainty. For those reasons, I hope the Government will look favourably on this reform.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I support the amendment. It occurred to me, reading some of the briefings, that the more one normalises this type of measure, the less a witness will be under pressure by being told that her—it is usually “her”—evidence will be less credible by her having applied for those special measures.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I entirely accept, of course, what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said about the desirability of experts being properly qualified and experienced before giving evidence in criminal proceedings, just as they have to be in civil proceedings. However, without knowing what the Government are going to say in response to this, I am a little concerned by the potential restriction that this amendment would involve. A judge would have to decide in any case, regardless of this amendment, whether or not evidence was admissible. That would include whether the particular witness had the relevant experience and qualifications before giving evidence. It is a regular feature of the area of law in which I have practised for many years that there is often quite detailed cross-examination of an expert’s experience, qualifications and suitability to give evidence on a particular issue. That can result in the exclusion of that evidence, or it can be part of the evidence that allows a tribunal, whether it is a judge or a jury, to decide whether it can rely on that evidence. What worries me about this amendment is that it would effectively create state control over experts. I noticed that there is a get-out clause. Does it mean, therefore, that someone could come along and say, “I know a bit about handwriting”? No, it cannot mean that. I suspect that, laudable though its aims are, this may result in an unnecessary examination of the suitability of experts, so that a defence or prosecution may say, “He is not a regulated expert, even though he has been allowed to give evidence”. The whole question of regulation would assume a rather intrusive role, notwithstanding the desirability of proper experts helping the court.
Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, said, if we were designing a system of special measures today, we would establish a statutory presumption that child witnesses and complainants eligible under Section 17(4) would be entitled to give evidence via pre-recorded video screens and live link without formal application, while preserving the right of the parties to make representations and the court’s power to refuse to give a direction where this would be contrary to the interests of justice. That is precisely what the noble Baroness’s explanatory statement says. I agree with it and I support this amendment.
Lord Ashcombe (Con)
My Lords, these amendments concern different aspects of victims’ rights. On the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, Amendment 47A raises questions as to the regulation of expert witnesses. It is important that expert witnesses are experts in their field. However, legislating to make it a requirement that they are registered with a designated body seems overburdensome and could be overly restrictive. Between a judge and lawyers present in the courtroom, it should be possible for them to ascertain and show whether or not an expert witness is indeed an expert. Amendment 47B, albeit a probing amendment, seeks to extend the protections offered under Clauses 8 to 10 of the Bill. Victims should certainly receive the appropriate protections, no matter the situation. The practical implications of doing it in such a way as the amendment suggests ought to be considered before this is enacted. Amendment 52B seeks to create a presumption in favour of video-recorded evidence and cross-examinations for child witnesses. This would allow vulnerable victims to give evidence without physically appearing in court. In considering this measure, we should also ascertain the practical impact and whether it would affect the pressures on court capacity. I hope the Minister will be able to provide that assessment when she responds to this debate. On a similar note, Amendment 52, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, seeks to establish a statutory presumption for child witnesses to be entitled to give evidence via pre-recorded video screens and live link. Again, it would be necessary to ensure that these provisions were compatible with the right to a fair trial and the practical implementation. Finally, Amendment 49, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, seeks to extend the period in which the CPS may discontinue proceedings in the Crown Court to the start of the trial, so that it is in line with arrangements in the magistrates’ courts. We must consider the impact of late discontinuances and reinstatements on defendants and whether it could affect court delays. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Smith of Cluny (Lab)
My Lords, I begin with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, who explained in his remarks that he comes to these issues from the perspective of victims, as indeed does the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. That sentiment perfectly encapsulates how the Government come to these issues too, so I hope that we can find a way to make common cause. The amendments in this group relate to distinct topics, so I will address them in turn, starting with Amendment 47A, from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I was grateful for the opportunity last week to meet the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who raised with me, among other topics, Amendment 47A. I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, could not join the meeting last Friday; technical challenges prevented it—and affected several million other people at the same time. I recognise the concern for ensuring that expert witnesses who provide evidence in criminal proceedings are appropriately regulated and qualified. However, it is the Government’s position that the existing Criminal Procedure Rules and Criminal Practice Directions provide proportionate standards for judges to consider when determining the admissibility of expert evidence. This includes requiring expert witnesses to be competent and for their opinion to be sufficiently reliable. In determining this, the court can take into account any lack of accreditation to prescribed standards where it might be expected. Experts are required to provide qualifications, experience and accreditation to the court, and to provide notice of anything which may detract from their credibility. Expert witnesses must also sign a declaration of truth, confirming that they have complied with their overriding duty to provide an objective and unbiased opinion to the court. In any event, we would have concerns about the practicalities of listing a designated regulatory body for every applicable profession in secondary legislation. The amendment’s requirement for this secondary legislation to undergo the affirmative procedure would make it difficult to keep this list relevant and up to date. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, alluded to, some experts may not fall neatly within its categories. I have certainly been involved in cases where some rather unusual experts were involved but who were, none the less, very helpful to the court. The system needs to be flexible to account for such instances. The current regime provides proportionate safeguards while giving flexibility to the court in admitting evidence which will provide judges and juries with information outside their knowledge. Amendment 47B, also from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to extend Clauses 8, 9 and 10 so that they apply in all cases where there is a victim within the meaning of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. The purpose of Clauses 8 and 9 is different from that of Clause 10, so I will take them separately. Clauses 8 and 9 are designed to address specific evidential issues that arise in sexual offence prosecutions. They reflect recommendations from the Law Commission’s review of evidence in sexual offence cases, which identified the continuing impact of myths and misconceptions on trials for cases of this kind. These clauses focus on two specific tropes that have been shown by the Law Commission, as well as the Crown Prosecution Service, to be regularly admitted without sufficient evidential basis in sexual offence cases: first, that previous allegations are false and the complainant is a serial liar; and secondly, that applications for criminal injuries compensation are made with the intent of using victimhood for financial gain. The clauses introduce an elevated test of admissibility for this type of evidence. Similar evidence introduced in other offence types would still be required to meet the standard test of relevance or the admissibility criteria for non-defendant bad character evidence. We do not have the evidence to justify an elevated admissibility threshold across the full range of criminal offences. If the noble Baroness has any evidence or information that we are unaware of, I would be pleased to meet her to discuss this. Indeed, I would be pleased to meet her in any event—and perhaps we will do it in person this time. Clause 10 serves a different purpose. It specifies that previous domestic abuse offences of whatever kind can demonstrate a propensity to commit a domestic abuse offence. This is the approach taken with child sex offences and theft offences. Expanding Clause 10 to other offences would have limited effect. The existing bad character framework already permits previous convictions for any offence to be admitted where they demonstrate a propensity. The issue in domestic abuse cases is that abusive behaviour can manifest through a wide range of offences. This has led to inconsistency in the admission of such evidence, and Clause 10 seeks to provide greater clarity in that regard. For those reasons, the Government do not consider it appropriate to extend Clauses 8 to 10 in the manner proposed by this amendment. I recognise the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, about ensuring that victims have meaningful access to justice where prosecutorial decisions to terminate cases have been wrong, which is expressed in Amendment 49. I am grateful to the noble Lord for meeting me last week to discuss it. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made clear her support for this amendment. It would extend far beyond rectifying errors and would make fundamental changes to how all Crown Court cases may be terminated, not just those subject to a victim’s right to review. This would have significant implications for victims, defendants and the entire criminal justice system. Allowing prosecutors to terminate cases at a later stage without a verdict, while retaining the ability to institute fresh proceedings for the same offence, would extend the uncertainty inherent in discontinuance to defendants whose cases have progressed further through the Crown Court. It could also leave victims without closure and bring an end to the protection provided by any bail conditions or remand in custody relating to those discontinued proceedings. Additionally, reinstituting cases would require fresh proceedings beginning back in the magistrates’ court, which risks creating further delays for victims and significant inefficiencies, contrary to the purposes of our criminal court reforms. However, we sympathise with the issue that the noble Lord seeks to draw attention to. We hope a better solution is the Government’s commitment to getting it right first time as an approach to supporting victims’ rights. I welcome the practical steps the CPS has taken towards this, such as increased senior oversight when terminating serious sexual prosecutions and the early victims’ right to review pilot in the West Midlands, which the noble Lord referred to, which has shown promising results. The Government will continue to work with partners on this. I am pleased to confirm to the noble Lord that the early victims’ right to review scheme has been rolled out to every CPS area across England and Wales from 13 July this year, and the feedback so far has been very positive.
Finally, Amendments 52 and 52B from the noble Baronesses, Lady Levitt and Lady Brinton, respectively, relate to the use of special measures in the Crown Court. In relation to Amendment 52, the Government are completely committed to helping victims and witnesses give their best evidence through access to special measures and this Bill. We are adopting the Law Commission’s recommendation to make special measures clearer and more consistent. The Government are also investing in improved special measures facilities in our rape and serious sexual offences courtrooms and rolling out independent legal advisers who can advise rape victims on special measures and help them understand judges’ decisions and challenge rejections. This Bill targets improvements where they are needed most, rather than introducing an automatic entitlement. Support must reflect individual needs, and judges must consider fairness and practicality. An entitlement could raise expectations that cannot be met and risk delays if preferred measures are unavailable and alternatives have not been considered.
With regard to Amendment 52B, I reassure the noble Baroness that the Government are committed to the availability of high-quality pre-recorded evidence to support victims and witnesses giving evidence.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
I am puzzled about why in Scotland, where the noble and learned Baroness has a distinguished career, trauma-informed practice has been made statutory. My noble kinswoman was suggesting that trauma-informed practice be made statutory. Why is it not being done here?
Baroness Smith of Cluny (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising this matter. The entire Bill is of great interest to me as I look at the two systems. Trauma-informed practice is undoubtedly the best way forward in approaching any of these measures and any criminal trial. A trauma-informed approach has been taken to the measures that we bring forward. There is already a presumption that police video interviews will be admitted as evidence in chief for children and victims of sexual offences, and any further evidence from a child will be given via video link. We do not think that an entitlement to pre-recorded evidence would be appropriate. These measures require greater judicial scrutiny as they have greater implications for the management of the trial. Section 28 can help victims give their best evidence, but it will not be right for everyone. Victims can choose to apply for Section 28, and judges approve its use based on the circumstances of the case. To support the use of video evidence, we are investing in courtroom technology through the digital audio-visual evolution programme and rollout of specialist RASO courtrooms. We are also creating a power to order edits to remove inadmissible or irrelevant material from Section 28 recordings to support their use in retrials. Our independent legal adviser service will be able to advise adult rape victims on special measures and help challenge rejections where appropriate. I acknowledge the important points that the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, has raised, including certainty for those taking part in the trial process, and I recognise the points made around trauma-informed practice. This is an area of concern, and the Government are continually seeking to improve the process. I would be pleased to meet any noble Lord who has signed the amendment to discuss any of these measures further. Given those explanations of the Government’s position on these amendments, I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will withdraw hers.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I thank everyone who has spoken in this debate on these amendments. They come from different perspectives but have one aim in mind: to provide a smoother and clearer process for victims and witnesses as they get into the court system. I am disappointed by the Minister’s response. There are various points that it would be useful to discuss face to face. I apologise: despite trying three different devices on Friday, Microsoft prevented me joining the meeting. Perhaps we can try again and hope it will not happen again. If anybody who has spoken in this debate wants to join that, I would welcome that. These are the key points for me. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks; I completely understand where he is coming from. He referred to the point that judges assess people. We have experience of some judges in the family courts approving people who claimed that they were qualified psychotherapists but were a member of no organisation. They then had the power to give reports on children who were then taken away from the other parent. That is very serious and part of the problem. We will come to that issue in later amendments today. Why is it a matter for the criminal courts? It is because in coercive control and similar cases, particularly where there is domestic abuse, we are seeing the same tactics tried by these people, who are brought in because they have a very particular view—often coming, I am sorry to say, from the American court system. I worry about that growing. Just to be clear, I was not trying to suggest that my husband is in this category at all. Many expert witnesses are professionally qualified and are members of bodies, and it would be really helpful for the judiciary, and not unnecessary bureaucracy, if that were looked at. I thank the Minister but will end on this point. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, helpfully reminded us that Scotland has adopted a trauma-informed approach for victims. These amendments seek to get closer to that and it would be good if we could go the whole way. Although I will not press my amendment, I would certainly like a meeting and may bring some of these issue back at the next stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 47A withdrawn.
Amendment 47B not moved.
Clauses 11 to 15 agreed.
Amendment 48
Moved by
48: After Clause 15, insert the following new Clause— “Jury equity and protection for advocates appearing before juries(1) In a criminal court before a jury no advocate is prohibited from reminding the jury of the principle of jury equity.(2) No advocate may be held in contempt of court, or otherwise sanctioned, solely or principally for reminding the jury of the principle of jury equity, or for breaching a judicial order contrary to subsection (1) above.(3) For the purpose of this section, “jury equity” means the principle that jurors cannot be required to reach a verdict of guilty by reason of any judicial direction or any threat of sanction.”Member’s explanatory statement This new clause seeks to prevent criminal trial advocates being barred from reminding juries of the common law principle of jury equity. It further prevents a criminal trial advocate from being held in contempt of court or otherwise sanctioned for referring to the principle.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, in moving this amendment in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, I apologise for the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. As noble Lords know, she is among the most assiduous Members of this Committee and, indeed, the House. She was here for the debate on the first group of amendments but, alas, she has a long-standing commitment that precludes her attending this particular group, at least at its start. I hope the Committee will accept me as a most unworthy substitute and will accept her apologies. The purpose of Amendment 48 is to ensure that an advocate cannot be held in contempt, or subject to regulatory sanction, simply for reminding a jury that a judge is not entitled to direct them to convict. As we all know, judges are entitled to direct the jury to acquit but not to convict. That is a well- and long-established principle of law. It goes back to Bushel’s case in 1670 and was reaffirmed by the great Lord Chief Justice Lord Mansfield in the case of Shipley, which was decided in 1784. On that occasion, Lord Mansfield said: “It is the duty of the judge … to tell the jury how to do right, though they have it in their power to do wrong, which is a matter … between God and their own consciences”. That principle has been reaffirmed by the House of Lords in the case of Wang, and it has been followed since then in our jurisdiction and in some Commonwealth countries, particularly in Canada. The principle was addressed directly by that great jurist Lord Devlin in the collection of his Hamlyn lectures entitled Trial by Jury . He said that “by far the greater purpose that is served by trial by jury is that it gives protection against laws which the ordinary man may regard as harsh and oppressive”. I interpose the thought that that is even more important when Executives make frequent recourse to Henry VIII clauses, or, as my noble friend Lord Howard remarked, Joseph Stalin clauses. Lord Devlin went on to say that trial by jury “is also an insurance that the criminal law will conform to the ordinary man’s idea of what is fair and just. If it does not, the jury will not be a party to its enforcement”. In the 18th and 19th centuries, there were examples of juries following this approach because they frequently refused to convict when a person was charged, for example, with stealing a sheep, which at that time in history was a capital offence. There are indeed more recent examples, as the Committee will know, the most well-known perhaps being that of Clive Ponting. Mr Ponting was a civil servant. He acted as a whistleblower—he alleged that Ministers had misled Parliament over the sinking of the “Belgrano”—and was charged under the Official Secrets Act. The judge correctly directed the jury that Mr Ponting did not have a defence in law but the jury refused to convict, presumably because they felt it was unconscionable to do so. There is another such case, the instance of Michael Randle and Pat Pottle. They were a couple who assisted George Blake to escape from prison and subsequently flee to Russia. They admitted that fact in a book that they wrote, and 26 years later they were prosecuted. The judge said they had no defence in law, and he was right, but the jury refused to convict, probably because they took a view that, after 26 years, it was unconscionable to convict. It is sometimes argued, and perhaps it will be argued by the Minister today, then what is called the jury equity is contrary to the oath sworn by jurors. I suggest that that is a mistake. The juror’s oath is in these terms: “I swear by Almighty God that I will faithfully try the defendant and give a true verdict according to the evidence”, and the affirmation is in like terms. It is an offence for a juror to try the issue otherwise than on the basis of the evidence. That is the effect of Section 20C of the Juries Act 1974, which was inserted by amending legislation in 2015. However, I suggest that a juror who has heard the evidence and decides that he or she cannot in conscience convict is not in breach of law or of the oath. That is to be contrasted with a juror who indicates in advance that he has no intention to acquit or to convict. That is actually what happened in the case of Mr Davey. Mr Davey was scheduled to be a juror in a case involving an alleged paedophile. Having been sworn, he put on to his Facebook the following: “Woooow I wasn’t expecting to be in a jury Deciding a paedophile’s fate, I’ve always wanted to” convict “a paedophile”. In fact he used a very vulgar word instead of “convict” but, as this is polite society, I am not going to use it. He concluded: “& now I’m within the law!” It is quite plain that advocates must respect judicial rulings. A judge is entitled to direct the jury that there is no legal defence to an offence charged on the indictment. What the judge is not entitled to do is to direct the jury that they must convict. That is the law, and I can see no reason in principle why an advocate, in his or her final speech to the jury, having addressed the directions of the judge, should not conclude by telling the jury that whether they acquit is a matter for them. I beg to move.
Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)
My Lords, I oppose this amendment, not because I do not agree that the principle of jury equity exists—it is clear that it does and the Court of Appeal has made that clear—but because the amendment goes a good deal further, if I may respectfully say so, than the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, suggests. It gives, in my respectful submission, an inaccurate and wholly inadequate definition of what jury equity is. Amendment 48 says in proposed new subsection (3): “For the purpose of this section, ‘jury equity’ means the principle that jurors cannot be required to reach a verdict … by reason of any judicial direction or any threat of sanction”. That is obvious, but jury equity is much more than that. That it is more than that is hinted at in the Member’s explanatory statement, which says: “This new clause seeks to prevent criminal trial advocates being barred from reminding juries of the common law principle of jury equity”. In English law, the principle of jury equity is that the jury has the power, in the exercise of its independent judgment and conscience, to acquit a defendant even where the evidence appears to establish that the offence has been committed by that defendant and the law would otherwise require a conviction. That goes far beyond any question of a judicial direction. The essential distinction is between the jury’s legal duty to apply the law on the one hand and its practical power on the other, over which the judge has no control, to refuse to convict. This is because although the judge may direct a jury to acquit—and judges often do—a judge can never direct a jury to convict. Some of the examples in which a jury may decide to acquit in these circumstances could be: if they believe the law, although technically applicable, would produce an unjust result in the particular circumstances; or the prosecution is oppressive; or the defendant’s conduct is morally justified, notwithstanding its technical illegality; or that a conviction would offend the jury’s collective sense of judgment. Again, all this goes far beyond the question of a judicial direction. None of this is in any doubt, but my view is that the amendment would carry with it a severe practical danger. It pokes the bear, threatening the existence of jury equity as a viable doctrine, for it also says in another subsection “no advocate is prohibited from reminding the jury of the principle of jury equity”. This appears to be a right granted to advocates without qualification. Its results are wholly unpredictable and likely to lead to anxiety and confusion in the minds of jurors. On the one hand, the judge will be telling the jury that they must convict where the evidence makes them sure that the defendant has committed the offence. On the other, defence counsel will be saying, “Hang on, members of the jury. That’s all very well, but even then, jury equity allows you to acquit if your conscience demands it”. This is a recipe in a criminal trial for absolute chaos. In my view, the power of jury equity granted to juries should be left as it is. That is to say: respected by the law and left to their collective conscience, untrammelled by statute, whose intervention is likely to call into question the principle itself and lead to calls for it to be curtailed.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a practising barrister, although it is a very long time since I appeared before a jury. More recently, I certainly appeared before a jury as the recorder, on which occasion of course they complied with all my directions—at least, I hope they did. The Committee may wish to be reminded of what has provoked this amendment. There were criminal proceedings earlier this year against a defendant, Charlotte Head, a member of Palestine Action. She was accused of criminal damage after she broke into a factory near Bristol and, after a retrial, she was convicted and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Her case is completed. Another defendant was convicted of the more serious offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm on a police officer. Members of the Committee may remember that terrible case: the police officer, a woman, had her spine fractured after she was hit with a sledgehammer. That defendant was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. Miss Head had claimed that she had a defence of reasonable excuse for the criminal damage, in that she was seeking to destroy weapons that would otherwise be unlawfully used in a so-called genocide in Gaza. That was her defence: reasonable excuse. The judge ruled that there was no defence of reasonable excuse. He therefore directed that views on Gaza and genocide were irrelevant to the trial, and that evidence going to such issues should not be relied upon in counsels’ closing speeches. The judge also directed that the jury were not to be informed that a judge may not direct the jury to convict—so-called jury equity—and that counsel, in their closing speeches, were not to invite the jury to disregard the court’s rulings of law. Contempt proceedings are pending against defence counsel for allegedly—I emphasise, allegedly—disobeying those rulings. That is the background to this amendment. The Committee may wish to know that this amendment is topical and that, I suspect, is why it has been brought forward. Those contempt proceedings are, as I say, ongoing against the barrister and will be heard by a High Court judge or judges, subject to appeal. The proceedings will determine whether a judge may, in those circumstances, lawfully instruct defence counsel not to refer, in a closing speech, to jury equity. I express no view whatever on whether the judge was so entitled and no view, of course, on whether the barrister was in contempt of court. What seems plain and obvious is that it is much better for Parliament to wait for the determination of those pending proceedings before considering any legislation on this topic. The judicial decision that we are awaiting may establish that counsel has the right to address the jury on jury equity, in whatever form it takes—that which appeals to my noble friend Lord Macdonald, or that which the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has referred to. The judicial decision may accept that proposition. If it does, and the court reaffirms that basic right of counsel, this amendment is entirely unnecessary. If, by contrast, the decision of the court determines that an advocate does not have this right, or has the right only in limited circumstances, the scope of the advocate’s powers and duties at common law and the reason for the court’s decision will greatly assist any future parliamentary assessment of this issue. So I suggest to the Committee that this amendment may well be unnecessary but is, in any event, premature.
Baroness Goudie (Lab)
My Lords, I support my noble friends Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Juries are periodically irritating not just to politicians; they may annoy judges too. But if judges prevent advocates reminding juries of their ancient prerogative to acquit without fear of reprisals, an important strength of juries would be cancelled. If judges prevent advocates reminding juries of their rights under pain of sanctions, lawyers will be in fear. None of this is ideal and I look forward to the Minister’s comments.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, the Committee should listen with particular care to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, just said. It seems to me that, if there are pending contempt proceedings, it would be very unwise of this Committee to support this amendment at this stage.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, this amendment, ably moved by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, is about the right of the jury to acquit as a matter of conscience—a right that is at the heart of our jury system. In a few moments, I will turn to the question of whether we should duck the issue now and wait for court proceedings, but the principle is that, once a jury is empanelled for a trial, the defendant is in the jury’s hands. It is for that reason that, when a judge makes a decision that the prosecution has adduced insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction—in this, I agree with two of the speeches that have been made—it is still for the jury to give the decision. That is why the judge is bound to invite the jury, on the basis of the insufficiency of evidence, to return a verdict of not guilty. The defendant is in the charge of the jury. So it is with the right to acquit. Even if it is the case that the judge expresses the view that the evidence of the defendant and the defendant’s witnesses do not amount to a defence, it is for the jury to make the decision of guilt or innocence. That is one of the reasons why, in our discussions on this Bill about jury trial and the right to elect, many of us have argued that the jury system democratises criminal justice. It is not just that a jury of citizens is involved in the decision but that the decision as to guilt or innocence is genuinely the decision of the jury. It is a question of the jury’s conscience being constitutionally permitted to trump the rigidity of the strict law. That is the principle that has been upheld by the courts time and again. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, referred to the decision in Bushel’s case and the decision of Chief Justice Vaughan. The jurors had been fined for delivering a not guilty verdict of unlawful assembly against William Penn and William Mead in the face of a direction from the recorder of London that they convict. The Chief Justice held that the jury was entitled to give a verdict according to their convictions, and that principle has been followed throughout the common law jurisdictions. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, made the point that they include not just Canada but notable cases in the United States, New Zealand and other jurisdictions. We all remember the Ponting trial in 1984—at any rate, we do in this House—when, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said, Clive Ponting was tried on an indictment under the Official Secrets Act for leaking classified documents about the sinking of the “General Belgrano” during the Falklands War in 1982. He was acquitted in the face of a plain direction from the trial judge that the defence—that his actions were in the public interest—should fail. The case of Trudi Warner in 2024, just two years ago, concerned a prosecution of Miss Warner for contempt for holding a placard outside a court, which was in the course of hearing a case against a number of climate change activists. Her placard read: “Jurors, you have an absolute right to acquit a defendant according to your conscience”. For that action, the then Solicitor-General sought to bring contempt proceedings. In refusing the Solicitor-General permission to proceed with those contempt proceedings against Ms Warner, Mr Justice Saini cited the Hamlyn lecture delivered in 1956 by Patrick Devlin, then a High Court judge, from which the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has quoted.
It has always been an anomaly that lawyers have been considered disentitled from reminding the jury of the principle of jury equity when addressing them, and that is the anomaly that subsection (1) of the amendment’s proposed new clause would remove. To that extent, I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, in his saying that a jury should not be referred to the principle of jury equity by counsel in their closing speeches. If they were not so entitled, then they would be debarred from reminding the jury of what has long been considered a cardinal principle of English law: jury equity. Moreover, that is a principle of which many jurors will be aware from their own general knowledge and outside reading. They cannot be expected to refrain from informing other jurors about the principle in the jury room. Without counsel on both sides being entitled to address the issue, where do jurors get their guidance? The judge is going to direct on the law, and the jury are going to decide on their conscience. It is simply artificial to suggest that the jury should not be entitled to receive guidance from counsel on that principle. Jurors should not be kept in the dark about a cardinal principle of law.
There is a problem with the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. This amendment is before Parliament as a result of it being moved by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. Can it be that this Parliament should not decide on the merits of that amendment if it is put to a vote? This Parliament is sovereign and entitled to take that decision. One can see some practical arguments for why Parliament might benefit from the lapse of time and from waiting to hear what the judges have to say about the pending contempt proceedings, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggested, but that is not to say that they oust the fact that this Parliament is now seized of this amendment. If this amendment is required to remove that wrong, then I suggest that, in the interest of honesty, transparency and good sense, the amendment should be passed, unless it is withdrawn at the request of the mover.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
Is there not a distinction to be made here? Of course, Parliament can do this, but should it do this? That is the question.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
That is a matter for the conscience of individual Members of Parliament and individual Members of this House. The amendment is before the House. If the amendment is right—some noble Lords have said firmly that it is, and others have said that we should wait—then noble Lords will make the decision on that basis, and that is right. I believe that jury equity is a cardinal principle of law; that it is right, and that it is about conscience trumping strict law at the wish of the jury. I do not believe that it should be for the court to decide whether a defendant or counsel should be found guilty or not guilty of contempt at any particular time, and I do not believe that the Committee should delay a decision on the basis that those proceedings are pending, but those are the points made by the noble Lords who took a different opinion after the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, voiced his.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
Is this amendment really necessary?
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
Yes, it is, because at the moment there is plainly some doubt about the principle of jury equity in the belief of the tablers of the amendment. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, powerfully made the case that this amendment is necessary. I also believe that the present position, which is that counsel is held to be disentitled from reminding the jury of the principle of jury equity, is a principle—
Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)
My Lords, I do not think there is any doubt at all that jury equity exists; the Court of Appeal has said so on more than one occasion. But does the noble Lord really foresee no practical or philosophical difficulties for a jury directed by a judge that, if they are sure beyond reasonable doubt—or sure as the phrase is now put—that a defendant is guilty, they should acquit him, when defence counsel says, “Even if you are sure on the evidence that he’s guilty, you should acquit him”? Does the noble Lord see no difficulty in that as a proposition at the end of a trial? Can he not conceive of it causing some difficulty in the jury room?
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
Not if the position is correctly put. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, just said that the judge should direct that they will convict if they are satisfied so that they are sure. That is not the law of the land. The law of the land is that they may not convict unless they are sure. But they are still entitled, because of the principle of jury equity, to take the view, “There is evidence that could persuade us to convict, but we are not going to do it”. I do not see why the law of the land should be interpreted in such a way that the jury is disentitled from hearing, from the judge as well as from counsel, that the principle of jury equity entitles them to say, “We are going to acquit in conscience”, just as Clive Ponting and others were acquitted because of the conscience of the jury, which trumps the strict law. That is the principle. I am happy to give way.
Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)
The noble Lord invites me to come back, so I will. In that case, every direction given by a judge on the burden of proof and the standard and quality of the evidence would have to be accompanied by the further direction, “Never mind any of that; if your conscience tells you to acquit, you can acquit”. That is a preposterous position to adopt.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
The point is that a judge is entitled to direct a jury only that, before they may convict, they have to be satisfied so that they are sure of the guilt of the defendant.
Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)
We should continue this in the tearoom.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, if I may, I will intervene between the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. When this House sat in its appellate capacity, there was a custom sometimes for judges who took a different position to earlier judges to say that they had the misfortune to disagree. Well, I have the misfortune to disagree with my noble friend Lord Hailsham, but I have the fortune to be supported by the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, in his very short and unambiguous contribution. The main points have been set out, but I suggest that one has to distinguish between three quite separate principles, and it is important that we do not get them mixed up. The first principle is that a jury cannot be compelled by the judge, or, frankly, by anybody else, to convict. That is the principle at the heart of the speech given by my noble friend Lord Hailsham. That is the principle that has been set out in a number of cases at the highest level. That is the principle that Lord Devlin, in an extrajudicial capacity in the Hamlyn lectures, was talking about. The second principle is that a jury is under a duty to apply the law as directed by the judge. Thirdly, it is suggested that an advocate is entitled to remind the jury of the first proposition, notwithstanding the second proposition and also notwithstanding an express order of the judge. I suggest that the first proposition, as we heard from my noble friend Lord Hailsham, is plainly right. The second proposition—that a jury is under a duty to apply the law as directed by the judge—is also right. But the third proposition is both wrong and does not follow from either of the first two propositions. I respectfully agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, that juries can be annoying. Juries are one of the glories of our criminal justice system. They have tremendous public support. It is one of the reasons why we on these Benches have been fighting against some of the Government’s original proposals on juries. So I entirely accept that juries can be annoying, and in certain circumstances they seem to bring back verdicts that are bizarre, perverse or unusual—call it what you will. But this amendment goes far too far. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the particular origin—frankly, a political origin—of this amendment. But if this amendment were to become law, its effects would go very much further. I will give an example of how its effects would work in a way that I suggest the proposers of this amendment—especially, I say respectfully, the two who are not in their place today—would find incredibly offensive and perverse. Take a rape trial. Suppose defence counsel seeks to suggest that a complainant’s clothing amounted to an invitation to sexual intercourse. Of course, we all regard that as offensive. The judge would rightly—I underline “rightly”—prohibit that submission from being made to the jury. Could counsel, on the basis of this amendment, none the less remind the jury that, never mind what the judge has said to them, the jury cannot be compelled to convict, and then claim statutory immunity from contempt of court proceedings as well as—this is in the amendment—regulatory immunity from proceedings brought by the Bar Standards Board? That would be a preposterous result. Respectfully, I can especially imagine the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, on the “Today” programme the morning after, fulminating about what an appalling result that would be. I suggest that this amendment is sufficiently widely drafted that it would invite precisely that argument. Why, I ask rhetorically, should we introduce that uncertainty? I invite the Committee to look at proposed new subsection (2), which, as I have mentioned, refers not only to contempt of court proceedings but to judicial sanction. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said something about the background to this amendment. I do not want to comment, and obviously will not comment, on that particular case, but I want to say something about the principles involved, because they are thrown up by this amendment. If I need to, I declare my interest as counsel, although I have only ever done one criminal case. In the Tottenham magistrates’ court, I defended somebody charged with driving without due care and attention—mainly because they were a member of a band and I had just done a rather expensive royalty case for them previously in the Commercial Court. They thought that, because I could do the latter, I could do the former—a proposition that was undermined by their conviction. Although I make that declaration, it is not of any real value. The answer in any court—whether it is a magistrates’ court or, frankly, the Supreme Court—to a judge who refuses to allow an advocate to say something is to appeal. That is the way the system works. That is the way—if I may put it, not disrespectfully—the game is played. Indeed, in preparing for today’s debate, I happened to notice that in today’s papers there is a case going the other way. A barrister has been sanctioned by the Bar Standards Board—I think for 12 months—because, in that case, the judge required counsel to put a particular question to a witness and the barrister did not want to. With the jury there, he said to the witness something like, “I don’t really want to ask you this question, but I’ve been told by the judge that I have to, and it’s all ridiculous”—I paraphrase, but it was something like that. Again, he was flouting the order of the judge. Therefore, whether it is something you can say, something you cannot say or something you must say, the way courts work is that the judge is in charge. It seems to me clear that judicial independence is at the heart of our system of justice and the rule of law, and jury independence is one of the great protections of our criminal justice system. But jury independence does not require advocate immunity, and neither of those requires the erosion of the trial judge’s authority to ensure that verdicts are reached according to law. I look forward to the Minister’s response. Although I am tempted by the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that we should, so to speak, kick this into the long grass, I would be interested to see whether the Government, like these Benches, would oppose this as a matter not only of timing but of principle.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, before the proceedings close, I should declare an interest as a practising barrister, even though I have not done a jury trial for something like 40 years, and have never seen the need to do so in a case involving criminal law. I declare it now because others have.
Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)
As the noble Lord has done so, I will too.
Lord Garnier (Con)
I also declare the same interest.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
What about me?
Baroness Smith of Cluny (Lab)
My Lords, the Government recognise and value the importance of the independence of juries. Juries must be free to deliberate and reach their verdict without pressure or interference, on the basis of the evidence presented in court and the law as directed by the judge. Advocates have an important and distinct role in putting their case before the court and ensuring that defendants receive a fair trial, but it would be inappropriate for advocates to remind juries that they can reach verdicts according to their conscience or to encourage juries to do so. Jurors swear an oath to try the defendant faithfully by applying the law as directed by the judge to only the evidence presented in court, and there must be confidence that cases going through the Crown Court will be decided according to the same legal principles. It would at the least be confusing—the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, calls it preposterous—for juries to be reminded that they can reach a verdict according to their conscience and act in a way that could ultimately undermine confidence in the outcomes delivered in the Crown Court and by the justice system. In so far as this amendment is directed at individual cases around freedom of expression, the Government are absolutely committed to upholding freedom of speech and expression. It is a fundamental right and the defining value of our open and diverse society. Our legislation reflects this. But if the law leads to outcomes considered unjust by the public and by Parliament, it is for Parliament to debate and change the law, not juries or advocates. Judges are responsible for ensuring that proceedings are fair and lawful. They must be able to determine the proper limits of advocacy to ensure that the administration of justice is not undermined and to enforce the directions where those limits are breached. We must preserve freedom of expression and the independence of juries without weakening the safeguards that enable judges to conduct fair criminal trials and deliver just outcomes. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, makes reference to a particular case and argues that any such measures would be premature. I will not comment on those extant court proceedings, but others supported the idea that it could be premature. The noble Lord asks whether I am tempted by this. I am not, and nor are the Government. The Government do not support this amendment on principle, as set out so eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald. Timing is not the issue for the Government; it is an issue of principle.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I have just three points. First, I have clearly poked the bear, to use the phrase of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald. I do not make apologies for that. It has been a very spirited debate. Secondly, to refer to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, yes, in one sense it is premature, but one takes the opportunity when it presents itself, and this Bill is a proper vehicle for highlighting this point. Thirdly and lastly, I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. We all agree that the judge is not entitled to direct a jury to convict, but we cannot assume that every juror knows that. They do not necessarily read the judgment of Lord Mansfield in 1784. Why should they? It seems to me difficult to assert the principle that an advocate should not tell a jury what its rights are and what the law is. But I recognise that, for the moment at least, I do not have the majority in this Committee. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment 48 withdrawn.
Amendment 49 not moved.
Amendment 50
Moved by
50: After Clause 15, insert the following new Clause— “Directions on myths and stereotypes(1) In a trial on indictment for a sexual offence or an offence involving domestic abuse, the judge must give the jury a direction on myths and stereotypes that may affect their assessment of evidence, unless satisfied that such a direction is unnecessary having regard to the circumstances of the case.(2) A direction under subsection (1) may be given in general terms or by reference to any issue arising in the proceedings.(3) Such a direction should ordinarily be given before the prosecution calls evidence, unless the interests of justice require it to be given at another stage of the trial.(4) Where no direction is given at the commencement of the trial, it must be given when the relevant issue arises.(5) The judge must, when summing up, give a direction on myths and stereotypes appropriate to the issues in the case, whether or not such a direction has previously been given.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment would require judges in trials for sexual offences and domestic abuse offences to direct juries on myths and stereotypes that may affect their assessment of the evidence, unless such a direction is unnecessary in the circumstances of the case. It makes it clear that such directions should not ordinarily have to wait until the summing up but should be given to assist the jury before or at the time the issue arises.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the support of Claire Waxman, the Victims’ Commissioner, Dame Nicole Jacobs, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, and His Honour Peter Rook KC, a former Old Bailey judge, former vice-chair of the Parole Board and co-author of one of the leading academic texts on sexual offences. This amendment has two purposes. First, it would ensure that a direction on harmful myths and stereotypes is given to juries in all cases where such a direction is needed, but, importantly, it does not seek to dictate what the formal content of that direction should be. Secondly, it addresses timing. If these directions are to be effective, they should not necessarily be left until the very end of a trial, after assumptions and misconceptions may already have taken root in jurors’ minds. In appropriate cases, my amendment would encourage judges to give them at the outset and, where necessary, reinforce them during the course of the proceedings. The amendment enshrines a simple proposition: trials should be decided on evidence, not on misconceptions about how victims are expected to behave. What are these harmful myths and stereotypes? They are assumptions about how a so-called “real” victim of rape or domestic abuse would behave. For example, some people assume that rape will usually result in visible injury and that, therefore, if there is no injury, the allegation is somehow less credible. Yet research demonstrates that many victims of rape sustain no physical injury at all. Some assume that a genuine victim would report what had happened to them immediately, yet delayed reporting is common. Some assume that, if a victim remains in contact with the perpetrator, returns to an abusive partner or continues with aspects of everyday life, that somehow demonstrates that they were not really a victim. Again, research and experience tell us that the reality is far more complex. Those are examples of things that are not evidential conclusions; they are harmful misconceptions based on stereotypes, and they matter because of the nature of the offences with which we are concerned. Rape, serious sexual offending and domestic abuse usually occur in private. There are usually no eyewitnesses. Physical evidence may be limited or non-existent. As a result, in most of these cases juries are being asked to make difficult assessments of credibility and reliability. Jurors bring integrity, experience and common sense to their role, but they are ordinary members of the public. They are not specialists in trauma, victim behaviour, coercive control or the psychology of abuse. Faced with difficult questions, it is entirely understandable that jurors may ask themselves how they think they would have reacted, how a friend or a family member might have reacted or how a victim would usually behave. The difficulty is that those assumptions are often wrong. That is why the judicial directions on myths and stereotypes matter. Their purpose is not to tell a jury what conclusion it should reach. Their purpose is not to favour the prosecution. Their purpose is not to make convictions easier to obtain. Their purpose is to remind jurors that there is no single correct way for a victim to behave, and that assumptions therefore should play no part in their assessment of the evidence. Far from undermining fairness, these directions are intended to protect it. Indeed, nothing in my amendment would prevent robust defence advocacy. Defendants are entitled to be defended fully and fairly, and defence advocates must remain free to challenge evidence, test reliability and explore apparent inconsistencies. What should not happen is an invitation, whether explicit or implicit, for a jury to reason from stereotype. The proposition that a complainant did not report immediately and therefore must be lying is not an evidential argument; it is reliance on myth and misconception. The purpose of a judicial direction is simply to ensure that jurors understand that distinction. This amendment would not solve every problem that has been identified, particularly in some recent high-profile cases, but it would provide a modest and important step towards ensuring that our courtrooms consistently reinforce the principle that cases should be determined by evidence rather than by prejudice or stereotype. The principal objection raised to this proposal is that it intrudes upon judicial independence. During the Private Notice Question on 9 November, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, who I am sorry to see is not in his place this evening, asked whether it was “unprecedented for Parliament to seek to instruct judges on how they should direct juries”, and suggested that doing so would constitute “an unacceptable intrusion upon judicial independence ”.—[ Official Report , 9/11/26; col. 17.] I have the greatest respect for the noble and learned Lord and could not agree more that judicial independence is one of the cornerstones of our constitution. Indeed, if my amendment sought to tell judges how to decide cases, what verdict a jury should return, what evidence should be believed or what sentence should be imposed, I would oppose it myself—but it does none of these things. It would merely require a judge, in appropriate circumstances, to remind jurors that assumptions and stereotypes are not evidence. It does not seek to dictate the words used, because these are entirely matters for the discretion of the trial judge and will depend wholly on the issues in the case. Judicial independence protects judges from interference in their decisions, but it does not prevent Parliament legislating for fair trial procedures. With the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, I question whether drawing that constitutional distinction is really sustainable. All jury directions are themselves part of the law. They exist only because Parliament and the senior courts recognise that certain things matter sufficiently that jurors must be reminded of them or helped with how to approach them. Nor is it correct to suggest that statutory directions are unprecedented. Parliament has legislated before where it considered that fairness required a warning or direction to be given to the jury. I will give four examples. I am sorry to be boring about it, but it is important that they are on the record and it is known that this has happened. They are four examples of when Parliament has required that a jury be directed about particular topics. Section 77 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 requires a warning in relation to certain confessions made by mentally disabled people. Section 90 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 requires a warning to the jury where a witness anonymity order has been made. Section 32 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 requires a warning to be given where evidence has been given using special measures. Section 39 of the same Act requires a direction to the jury where a defendant has been prohibited from personally cross-examining a witness. In all four examples, the mandatory language is used in the statute. The principle that Parliament may require a judge to warn a jury about a recognised evidential danger is well established. The real question is not whether Parliament may legislate in this area—Parliament plainly may—but whether myths and stereotypes create a sufficiently serious risk to the fairness of proceedings to justify legislative action. That is a policy question, not a constitutional one. In fact, Clauses 8 to 10 of this Bill all represent parliamentary intervention in areas where judges already apply the existing law. They do so because the Government have concerns about consistency of judicial approach and want to make the law clearer about admissibility of evidence and when certain applications can be made. This Bill itself therefore proceeds on the basis that Parliament may legitimately act where greater consistency or greater protection is required. If that proposition is constitutionally acceptable elsewhere in the Bill, it is difficult to see why it suddenly becomes objectionable here. The real issue is not whether Parliament can act but whether it should.
That brings me to what is, in truth, the central issue: consistency. Many judges—in fact, most judges—already give excellent directions on myths and stereotypes. The Crown Court Compendium contains valuable guidance, and the Court of Appeal has repeatedly recognised the value of such directions and encouraged their use. The guidance remains just that: guidance. The compendium permits such directions; it does not require them. In relation to domestic abuse, the language used is extremely cautious. It leaves the issue largely to the judgment of the trial judge as to whether to say anything at all. This position has persisted for many years. The Court of Appeal has permitted—indeed, encouraged—the giving of these directions, and so has had ample opportunity to make such directions mandatory but has chosen not to. That is notably different from its approach in other areas of criminal law. To take just two examples: in identification cases, the Turnbull direction to the jury is mandatory; and in cases involving adverse inferences from silence, specific directions are required. The senior courts have not taken the same approach in relation to myths, misconceptions and stereotypes.
That leaves us with an important question. If, after two decades of judicial guidance, encouragement from the Court of Appeal and repeated recognition of the value of these directions, they nevertheless remain discretionary, are we not entitled to ask whether the existing mechanisms are capable of delivering the consistency that victims deserve? Those judges who already follow best practice will be virtually unaffected by this amendment. Indeed, I suspect that those judges constitute the overwhelming majority, but this amendment is not directed at the majority; it is directed at those cases in which, for whatever reason, best practice is not being followed.
I put a simple question to those who oppose this amendment. If every judge already gives these directions whenever they are appropriate, what possible objection can there be to victims knowing that this safeguard is guaranteed by law? If there are cases in which such directions are not being given when they should be—and the available evidence suggests that there are—why should Parliament not act? That, it seems to me, is the real issue for this Committee. This amendment is not about increasing conviction rates; it is about increasing confidence. A defendant who is convicted may appeal, but a victim who watches harmful myths or stereotypes shape a trial and sees the judge do nothing has no equivalent remedy.
Too many victims already approach the criminal justice system with profound anxiety. Too many fear that they will be disbelieved. Too many fear that they themselves will become the subject of scrutiny. Too many emerge from the process saying that they wish they had never reported the offence in the first place. Whether every such perception is justified is, in one sense, beside the point. A justice system depends on public confidence. People must believe that they will be treated fairly if they come forward. That confidence is particularly important for these serious offences, which remain significantly underreported.
I recognise that the Law Commission ultimately rejected a statutory requirement, but Parliament is entitled to reach a different conclusion on the policy question. Indeed, the Government have not accepted every recommendation made by the Law Commission in this area. The fact that the Law Commission reached one conclusion does not absolve Parliament from making its own judgment.
This amendment would not place England and Wales in uncharted territory. We have the advantage of having my noble and learned friend the Advocate-General for Scotland here. Scotland has introduced statutory provisions addressing misconceptions in sexual offence cases. Australian jurisdictions, including Victoria and New South Wales, have adopted legislative approaches requiring judicial intervention where harmful assumptions may affect jury reasoning. The principle therefore has recognised support in comparable jurisdictions without, as far as I am aware, causing any constitutional crisis.
Ultimately, the question seems to me to be a straightforward one. If we accept that myths and stereotypes can distort decision-making, if we accept that judicial directions can help address that risk, and if we accept that those directions are not always given consistently, then Parliament is entitled to consider whether a statutory safeguard is required. Best practice is valuable, the Crown Court Compendium is valuable and judicial training is valuable—none of those things is in dispute. However, the question is this: are they sufficient? Where fairness, consistency and public confidence are at stake, best practice alone is not always enough, and sometimes Parliament must act to ensure that best practice becomes universal practice. I beg to move.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, it is an honour to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt. I am sorry that I was too late to sign her amendment, but she knows she has from these Benches our full support. I read in Hansard her Private Notice Question to the Minister a week ago today regarding mandatory jury directions on harmful myths and stereotypes in trials for rape and serious sexual offences—RASSO. In that same Question, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, was helpful in referring your Lordships’ House to read the Crown Court Compendium on sexual offences and jury directions. I am convinced that the vast majority of lawyers in this House are already very familiar with it, but it was an interesting read over the weekend. As a non-lawyer, I read the chapter on sexual offences and I found it extremely helpful. However, it does not resolve one of the issues that we have covered both in this Bill and in previous Bills, and that is when a small number of judges do not follow this excellent compendium and do not give directions or advice to the jury. In her contribution, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, raised one of the myths about doubting rape victims if they did not report the rape immediately. It is commonplace for victims to block out what has happened while they are trying to come to terms with the thing, and that can be for quite a long time. As a parallel, I remember that the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse found that most of the serious historical cases of child sex abuse were not reported for years; sometimes, as with Nicky Campbell, decades can pass before victims can bring themselves to speak of it. These myths must not be permitted to happen during cases. Research shows that myths around the victim in RASSOs are still believed unless they are challenged, and the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, outlined some of them. These include that few people can accurately identify that most rapists know their victim; fewer people—a quarter—knew that victims will not always be distressed when talking about what happened to them; and only a third of respondents to the survey knew that women rarely make up allegations of rape. Then there is the behaviour of defence barristers. One rape survivor, Morwenna Loughman, said: “Defence barristers rely on these myths … I lived that reality throughout my trial … we shouldn’t have to, but I expected the lazy dissembling of ‘you were drunk, what were you wearing, you invited him back, you asked for it, you’re easy’”. One victim reported that a defence barrister at a sentencing argued that, as the victim has been asleep or unconscious, it meant that she had not been deeply affected by what the defendant did to her. Victim Support’s Suffering for Justice report found that three-quarters of survivors of sexual violence are subject to rape myths during cross-examination. The Victims’ Commissioner and other victim support organisations say that victims tell them that their credibility was assessed against these stereotypical expectations of how a victim should behave. The Law Commission found that the discretionary approach to giving directions was inconsistently applied, specifically in which directions are given, the content and the timing in the proceedings. It relies on individual judges identifying myths, deciding whether to intervene and then crafting the directions, and that creates inconsistency. Some studies have found that judges rarely countered rape myths because they were not obliged to. Amendment 50 would ensure that concerns are addressed about the consistency of tailoring directions, as judges would still retain discretion where directions are unnecessary in the specific circumstances of that case. However, it would ensure that relevant directions are necessary. That is why, from these Benches, we support Amendment 50. I have laid Amendment 53E, to deal with the other key element to breaking the problems of rape myths, as well as the facts of domestic abuse and other RASSOs. Amendment 53E would strengthen judicial training and guidance. This has not been my first amendment on judicial training and guidance, and I think there are more to come shortly. The Law Commission has recommended that the Judicial College should develop guidance to support judges when lines of questioning are used that rely on rape myths and misconceptions, or to respond appropriately when these generalisations are used in advocates’ speeches. However, it needs to be more than guidance. This is a complex area, and Amendment 53E sets out the arrangements for the resources and reporting mechanisms for judicial training. The amendment proposes that the Lord Chancellor should make available the resources for training, with a list of the areas to be covered, and the confirmation that, where there is a new appointee of a recorder, deputy district judge in the magistrates’ court, or a justice of the peace, they have completed the training. It then goes on to say that the Lord Chancellor should report to Parliament once a year on how many people have concluded the training and any other relevant data. Finally, it says that the Lord Chief Justice—not the Lord Chancellor—is the person who defines what needs to be in the training, as well as the delivery of it, keeping the policy and practice separate. I have also signed Amendments 53G and 53H, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neate. Amendment 53G brings us back to the theme of training, this time training on domestic abuse for judges in criminal cases and certain child welfare cases. Amendment 53H makes the case for a duty for the Government to ensure that there is high-quality, evidence-based mandatory training on domestic abuse for criminal court professionals and those involved in certain children’s law cases. We absolutely support both of these amendments from these Benches.
Baroness Neate (CB)
My Lords, it is truly an honour to follow the noble Baronesses, Lady Levitt and Lady Brinton. I fully support both of their amendments. My Amendments 53G and 53H are introduced in order to be clear that the Government should take responsibility for ensuring that all professionals in the courts—I am particularly concerned with the family courts—including the judiciary, have a level of knowledge and understanding of domestic abuse that is commensurate with the fact that domestic abuse is present in the vast majority of cases before the family courts: 83%, according to the Domestic Abuse Commissioner’s 2025 report. I know from personal experience how easy it is to believe you understand domestic abuse and then to be shown that you do not. It is a transformative experience to arrive at a full understanding of how coercive control is established and deepened: suddenly you see the power perpetrators of coercive control hold and how. You can see how they manipulate and convince family, friends, the victim herself—it normally is “herself”—and, importantly, professionals, and how terrifying and ultimately deadly it can be. Once you see it, you cannot unsee it. But without seeing coercive control for what it is, if you yourself have power over a victim’s life then you can unwittingly enable and even promote the perpetrator’s control. Every professional with power over the lives of children, survivors and perpetrators should have the opportunity to understand domestic abuse fully, and this includes being aware of how power and control are built and exercised over everyone around the perpetrator, including professionals. The judiciary are far from being the only professionals who sometimes tend to believe they could not possibly be manipulated by a controlling perpetrator of abuse. We owe it to survivors and their children to acknowledge that this manipulation does take place and to take steps to address it. Experience has shown that voluntary training is not adequate because it relies on people’s belief that they need it. The higher status a professional has, the stronger, sometimes, their belief that they can see through even the most determined attempts by individuals to use the system to their advantage.
I feel somewhat intimidated in this company for suggesting that some judges may require more training. I am not a lawyer, but I have seen many times as an advocate for victims that the family courts can make the threats of perpetrators come true. We owe it to children to ensure that the family courts never unwittingly enable and promote coercive and controlling abuse. Only thorough training for everyone involved can achieve this. My amendments seek to ensure that the responsibility is placed upon government to make this training available, resource it fully and monitor its delivery.
We all know that it is all too easy to throw the word “training” around as though it were a panacea. I am aware, even in the short time I have been in this House, that we see report after report call for training. Of course it is not a magic bullet, but there is a genuine gap here in knowledge and understanding—a gap that is then filled with myths that run deep in our culture about violence against women. There are spurious but extremely convincing claims by perpetrators and others. My Amendments 53G and 53H seek to close that gap, ensure that it is closed and monitor the difference this makes.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, I rise to address Amendment 50 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt. I agree with a great deal—probably the majority—of what the noble Baroness said on matters of which she has such practical and recent experience. But on the wisdom of incorporating this amendment into the Bill, it is my turn to have the misfortune to disagree. The need to direct juries on myths and stereotypes that may affect their assessment of evidence in appropriate cases should not be in doubt. It was certainly drummed into me 15 years ago with considerable force when I attended the Judicial Studies Board, now the Judicial College, for the course that was and is required of any judge or recorder before they can be certified to preside over trials of sexual offences. No doubt that training could and should be improved, as the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Neate, have suggested, but at the time it seemed pretty thorough to me. I would no more have contemplated not giving such directions in a case where they could be relevant than I would have contemplated not directing the jury on the standard of proof or the presumption of innocence. Had I been tempted to resist, there were constraints that would have made it very foolish to do so. There was even then clear guidance from the Court of Appeal. As it remarked in Miller—[2010] EWCA Crim 1578—the “courts have increasingly been prepared to acknowledge the need for a direction that deals with what might be described as stereotypical assumptions about issues such as delay in reporting allegations of sexual crime and distress”. I emphasise the word “need”. For any judge or recorder foolish enough not to follow such guidance, there was the risk of a brown envelope in the post: a notification from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division that a conviction had been successfully appealed. Since then, the obligation has only become clearer. Anyone who has read the relevant parts of Archbold or Blackstone, or the judicial bible now known as the Crown Court Compendium , or indeed the Law Commission’s final report of July 2025, will understand the complex range of factors that have to be balanced in deciding whether a direction is needed in a particular case and in crafting any necessary direction. They will also understand the great importance that is already placed on the duty of the judge, at more than one stage of the trial, to ensure that juries do not adopt the myths and stereotypes referred to in this amendment. I note that two of the specimen directions in the Crown Court Compendium relate expressly to cases of domestic abuse. The noble Baroness knows the courts very well, and it may be that there are indeed rogue judges who resist these directions and the guidance of the Court of Appeal and the Judicial College. But I respectfully doubt whether, if there are such dyed-in-the-wool characters, they are going to be deterred by an amendment that allows them to satisfy themselves that “a direction is unnecessary having regard to the circumstances of the case”. I wonder how much difference it is going to make in that sort of case. My objection to the amendment is not concerned with its wording or indeed its content; it is constitutional in nature. Ensuring a fair trial is pre-eminently the domain of the independent courts, not of government nor even of Parliament. The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, put it well just now: in dealing with a jury, the judges are in charge. In the words of an even more distinguished jurist, the late Lord Denning: “Someone must be trusted. Let it be the judges”. The noble Baroness cited a precedent. She cited Section 77 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, requiring judges to warn a jury of the need for caution before convicting on a particular kind of confession. The antiquity of that example is significant, both because it is now 40 years old and, more substantively, it predated the first issue of specimen directions by the Judicial Studies Board in 1987. Though she had other examples, there were none, so far as I could understand, that date from any time in the past 16 years. Even if they were wise precedents—I enter a caution about that—the occasional nature of them is clearly a reason for proceeding in this area with the greatest possible circumspection. In view of what she said about judicial independence, I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, to reflect on the precedent that would be set were this entirely well-intentioned amendment to be accepted into the Bill. Though unexceptionable in its content, the amendment would establish the extremely damaging principle that directions of this kind on matters of great public interest are an acceptable subject for different Governments, each with a parliamentary majority, to provide for in their own way—sometimes, no doubt, in the glare of publicity that may attend a particular case. Let me give an example. Is it beyond the bounds of possibility to imagine a future Government, less attuned than this one to addressing the scourge of violence against women and girls, and committed instead to the vigorous public waging of a war on woke, repealing this clause and replacing it with a command to the judges not to direct juries on so-called rape myths and stereotypes, or to give such directions only in exceptional circumstances defined by Parliament? This is too important a matter to be a political football. I urge my noble friend, as I hope I may call her after this, to take her ball off the pitch and to return it to the place where, under our constitution, it properly belongs.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, Amendment 50 was convincingly and elegantly argued for by the noble Baronesses, Lady Levitt and Lady Brinton, but I want to raise some concerns about it that are slightly different to those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, although he gave me food for thought. One of the things that concerns me is the idea that juries particularly need direction on myths and stereotypes in trials, particularly for sexual offences. That seems to me to be rather unnecessary, unfair and unevidenced, and potentially undermines juries’ reputations, and is arguably based on some myths and stereotypes of who is on a jury. It is important that we understand that juries have been able to weigh up and assess what happens in the courtroom very well. We have just seen a jury trial—I am referring to the Russell Brand trial—in which the jury negotiated its way through all sorts of legal verbiage and lively exchanges in the courtroom that might be said to have used some of such myths, and yet the jury managed to sift through all of that and came out with nuanced verdicts on a range of charges. Generally, in rape trials, juries are more likely to convict than acquit defendants. This is one reason why so many of us were unhappy that one of the original arguments used to justify the restriction of jury trials was that it was to deliver a swifter and fairer justice system for victims, in particular those affected by violence against women and girls. Some of us just felt uncomfortable that this was hiding behind victims. We heard a slight echo of that earlier, when the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Smith of Cluny, used female victims in particular to justify removing the automatic right to appeal. That always makes me feel rather anxious. I was glad to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, assure us that this is not an attempt to interfere in juries’ independence, but there is a danger that it could potentially have a chilling effect on barristers defending the accused, and we need to ensure that defendants get a fair trial. It is important that we always remember that the people being defended also have to be heard, and there are lots of myths and stereotypes around that as well. I worry about a potential political football being used and statutory overreach. Amendment 50 seems to mirror the views of the Secretary of State for Justice, Alex Norris, who only today announced that he has written to the Bar’s disciplinary body complaining about lawyers using rape myths, saying that barristers should face disciplinary action, including being barred from practice, if they do not comply. However, evidence needs to be robustly tested in court and that can mean pushing complainants. It can be uncomfortable, but barristers surely must be free to run their cases as they see fit and do their best in defending their clients. The jury must be able to hear all this and draw its own conclusions without interference or overreach from Parliament into the criminal justice system. Ensuring a fair trial is equally important as what can sometimes be over-interference on behalf of women victims, when, in fact, that is a political question rather than a legal one.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
The noble Baroness said that both I and the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, had quoted myths about the public view. We were quoting from the findings of the 2024 CPS research on the public understanding of rape and sexual assault, and from the London Rape Review of 2019.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
We also quoted from the Law Commission’s report.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I was suggesting that sometimes presumptions are made about the public’s views that are unfair, and I am challenging them. It is called stereotyping and myths. It happens to all sorts of people.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, will not be surprised to hear that, as on many occasions, I completely and utterly disagree with what she said. I was very happy to add my name to Amendment 50 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, not least because I thought it was right that at least one male of the species should put their name to an amendment in the group. I find it disappointing and somewhat shaming that more men are not prepared to stand up and talk about the situation that many women victims find themselves in in rape and sexual offence trials. When I read that the barrister who defended Mr Brand had said that the pretrial publicity had “poisoned the well of justice”, my mind went back several years to another prominent figure, a certain Mr Jonathan Aitken, who stated that the “sword of truth” would prevail. When the sword of truth prevailed, it ran straight through him and sent him off to prison, so people should be extremely careful about making exhortations of that nature. The Criminal Bar Association’s 2023 response to the Law Commission consultation states: “We agree that victims of sexual offending might sometimes feel that they are being subjected to a level of scrutiny that is unjust. It is the responsibility of those who investigate, prosecute, defend and try cases to ensure that lines of enquiry do not extend beyond that which is necessary and that the complainant understands the rationale behind any particular invasive line of enquiry”. I have also read the Crown Court Compendium —an interesting, if not hugely exciting, tome, but it is pertinent to what we are talking about. It says that, for rape and sexual offence trials, it is now mandated that the judges and the prosecuting advocates involved have to undergo specialist training, which has to be repeated on a three-year cycle. There is no requirement for the defending advocate to also have any training.
What we experienced during the recent, rather infamous trial was that the defendant—for reasons best known to himself—and his team chose a defending attorney who had a particular outstanding specialism: financial fraud. If you read on the internet some of the descriptions of this distinguished King’s Counsel you will find that he is renowned for his expertise in cross-examination. That is precisely what the victims in this particular case experienced: a level of clinical and quite accusatory examination, which was extremely uncomfortable. I put it to your Lordships and to the Government that there is an imbalance in the fact that the judge and the prosecuting advocate must have specialist training but the defending advocate does not. We should look at this and do something about it, because there is clearly an imbalance. I am sure that defending advocates do exactly what they should do in many cases and are very respectful of the victims, but in some cases, I am afraid, they do not.
I will briefly quote the words of the victim, Morwenna, who the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, referred to, on what it feels like to be a victim in a rape trial:
“There’s a particular cruelty with rape trials, because it’s not just the scourge of cross-examination you must contend with, it’s what is said about you in your absence. You’re ‘just a witness’, and yet the crime scene is your body. Your trauma, your wellbeing, your trustworthiness as a human being become fodder for ridicule, judgment and speculation. You are the evidence”.
I absolutely acknowledge the force of some of the cases that were put by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others about the principle of the independence of the judiciary, but despite the fact that this has been a requirement for many years, there are still cases where rape trials are taking place and the experience of victims is unimaginable awful. It is fine to have a principle which says that this should not be happening because everybody should be following what they are meant to be doing, but the reality is that that is not the case. As we have said, that is partly because the defending advocate is not required to have that training, but it is also clearly the case that, in some cases, judges—for whatever reason—do not stress the importance of recognising these stereotypes in the right way and at the right point in particular trials. There is an imbalance at the moment. These are, obviously, probing amendments in Committee, but there is a real issue here.
Briefly, on the other amendments, the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, and I have the privilege of serving on the post-legislative scrutiny committee of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, so we are steeped in this—I think that occasionally we almost feel that we are subject to coercive control as we listen to some of the evidence, which is not great. That evidence demonstrates that there is a crying need for focused, precision training in specific areas: first, to make sure that people understand some of the behaviours and concepts, and secondly, so they have practical ways to deal with them and how to respond to them. In particular, they need not only to be able to deal with perpetrators and to understand what is behind their silken tongue but to deal with traumatised survivors, who may be in shock, inarticulate or traumatised and who need specialist, sympathetic help to enable them to express what has happened to them, and probably their children, and to find a way through it—and perhaps to find a way, if and when it ever goes to court, to stand up and describe it in terms that a jury will understand and respect.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a practising barrister—I am sorry I did not do that in the previous group. I am not a criminal lawyer, although in the long-distant past I both prosecuted and defended rape cases. I was also a recorder in the criminal courts and was subjected—although that is not quite the right word—to the excellent training provided by the Judicial Studies Board, subsequently the Judicial College. It was a very high standard of training, very conscientious, and provided by senior judges. There has been criticism of the level of training that has been offered or is offered. The Judicial College provides training to all courts to judges in England and Wales on behalf of the Lady Chief Justice, whose statutory duty under the Constitutional Reform Act is to maintain “appropriate arrangements for the … training and guidance of the judiciary”. Nobody can deal, as a judge, with serious sexual offences unless they have been on appropriate courses from serious and senior judges, and they have to have an update, which is by seminar on a regular basis. Induction and continuation seminars are each two-day, in-person programmes, with lectures by experienced judges and independent experts. They are provided—to summarise this—with a toolkit, which is regularly updated, almost annually and often more frequently, taking into account delegate feedback and broader developments to make sure that they are reflecting up-to-date evidence. It includes understanding common rape myths, which was referred to by the noble Baroness, understanding complainant behaviour, and the risks of myths and stereotypes biasing juries in some way. I have spoken to a few judges about the noble Baroness’s amendment, and although I think most of them would understand what lies behind it, they have not been enthusiastic about it. I know, for example, that the Lady Chief Justice is not enthusiastic about it. Why? It is because she gave a lecture to the Bar Council in public yesterday to say as much. The noble Baroness referred to the training in the Crown Court Compendium —I think she said she was impressed, although the noble Lord, Lord Russell, was rather bored by it. I can understand that; it is quite heavy going, although I am sure he would agree that it is nevertheless very thorough. It says that judges should alert the jury to guard against preconceived assumptions and approach the evidence without prejudice; that directions may be given at the start of the trial rather than only at the end where the judge considers that appropriate; and that the timing is a matter for the judge in the circumstances of the individual case. It further states that guidance may be necessary, for example, if there is a delay in making the complaint, if the complainant’s clothing is said to be revealing, if there has been a prior sexual relationship between the complainant and the defendant, a lack of physical struggle or signs of injury, or apparent lack of distress when giving evidence. The problem about these cases, as I am sure anyone who has been involved in this will agree, is that they all differ on their facts. What is crucial as part of the Crown Court Compendium is this: directions should be “tailored” to the case and must be given in a fair and balanced way and put in the context of the evidence and arguments raised by both prosecution and the defence, and they should be discussed with advocates and generally provided in writing. It seems to me that it is very difficult for a judge to avoid those very clear guidelines when they will have been trained, and very highly trained. The fact that they should be tailoring to the individual case is surely a matter for an experienced judge to take into account. I fear that this ignores that, and I am afraid that I am against it.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I put my name to this amendment with some hesitation. I was keen that it should be widely discussed, as it has been today. I declare that I was not only a family judge but, like all other judges, I had to try some crime. However, perhaps more important, I was one of the chairmen of the Judicial Studies Board, which is now the Judicial College. Certainly, the work that I did with judges was intense—probably not frequent enough, but certainly when it happened. We did not have just judges to teach us. There was a day—I remember it very well—when I started as a judge. Senior judges thought that only judges could teach judges, but by the time I became one of the chairmen, we were asking every other discipline to tell judges what we ought to do. One of the great benefits of the Judicial College is the breadth of the training that comes to the judges. I strongly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, that it is very odd that defending counsel are absolutely free at the moment, as it would appear, to say whatever they like. The recent example is disturbing, and it seems that the Bar Council or possibly the Criminal Bar Association might look at that—but that is for them. The real issue here is: should it be mandatory or discretionary? Listening to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I have some concerns as to whether this should really be in primary legislation. What worries me is that victims will be very concerned, particularly about the way that they are treated by the Bar from time to time. However, on the other hand, there is a danger that some judges may not put great emphasis on myths and so on. I have to confess that I remain uncertain as to what should be the result of this. I very well understand how the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, has put this forward, and it is extremely helpful that she has done so. However, having put my name to an amendment for the first time in my life, I am very uncertain as to whether I should have done so.
Lord Goldsmith (Lab)
My Lords, I have not spoken in this debate so far and I apologise for that, but I am driven to do so by the debate that has taken place. I came expecting to be not persuaded by my noble friend Lady Levitt of the need for this amendment to be in statute, but she has changed my mind. Of course, I started from the position, as I hope everyone else did, that it is important that myths and stereotypes are understood, but I hoped that the answer was that it is sufficiently dealt with at the moment by the training and by what is said in the Crown Court Compendium , which deals with the matter well. However, I am troubled by what has been said on two aspects, one for the amendment and one against it. The one for the amendment is that there are judges who are not following this. By the way, it is for the judges and not for counsel to be dealing with this. I much prefer the idea of directions being given than that standards are laid down for defence barristers and how they should operate. Of course, the Bar Council should do that. Here I make a declaration that I was, once upon a time—it now seems a very long time ago—chairman of the Bar, and of course I am a practising lawyer still, although these days I do not practise in criminal work. All those reasons persuade me that this is a good amendment, it is the right thing to do, and it will cover those cases where at the moment, for some reason, there are victims who are losing out very badly because things are not being said by the judge which ought to be, to counter the impression that is otherwise being given. I am troubled by the one aspect—this is the point that goes the other way—which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, raised: is there a risk of this being a precedent that leads us to a bad place? I listened to what my noble friend Lady Levitt said about previous examples. I will study them when I have read Hansard so I can see exactly what they are. When this comes back, as I imagine it will, I would like to be reassured that there cannot be a risk of this being used as a bad precedent in a way, whether it is by the sort of example that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, gave, or whether it is simply used in other areas, that Parliament is interfering with the justice system and with the independence of judges.
However, the amendment is well drafted in that it does not specify the direction that is to be given. It seeks that the judge give a direction, and that it may not be given if it is unnecessary. Judicial discretion is preserved, which is important. I agree that, in general, the direction should be given before evidence is given, and definitely at the end by the judge. There is a risk of things happening in court, during cross-examination, that the jury has not understood or has not picked up on. Some of the things that we now know are myths and stereotypes do not prove the truth of what counsel is trying to assert.
I anticipate that this will come back. I would like to be persuaded that there is no risk of a precedent going the wrong way, but otherwise I believe that the amendment makes a very important point that we should be following.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, like other Members of the Committee, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, for raising a most important issue. My noble friend Lord Russell of Liverpool correctly said that it is vital that men as well as women speak on this subject. I hope he will accept that to oppose this amendment does not mean that I or others are any the less concerned about sexual stereotypes and myths in rape and other sexual offences cases. I oppose the amendment because chapter 20 of the Crown Court Compendium sets out in considerable detail rulings of the Court of Appeal over many years and directions to be made by the judge to the jury in this context. The guidance makes clear a number of vital points. The first, at paragraph 15, is that the judge should—I emphasise “should”: it is mandatory—alert the jury to guard against making “unwarranted assumptions” in sexual offences cases. It is important that the judge should alert the jury to guard against this. Secondly, the compendium then sets out in considerable detail a range of such unwarranted assumptions. They concern a complainant’s “delay in making a complaint” and “inconsistent accounts given by the complainant”, neither of which should be held against her; the “lack of emotion/distress when giving evidence”; the clothing she wore on the relevant day; the fact that she may have had a previous sexual relationship with the defendant, and that there may have been “some consensual sexual activity on the occasion of the alleged offence”. The directions are very clear: each of those myths and stereotypes is unwarranted and should not be held against the complainant in assessing whether her account should be believed. The third point that the compendium makes, which the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, referred to, is that it is vital that the judge directs the jury in a “fair and balanced way” and puts the direction in the context of the evidence in the case and the arguments that had been advanced by counsel. I share the concern expressed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about the conduct of some defence counsel in this context. That is not addressed by this amendment, but it is vitally important. Fourthly, the directions “must be crafted with care and … discussed with the advocates in advance”. Fifthly, a sensitive and important question is giving thought to the most appropriate time for the judge to give these directions—at the outset of the trial, during the trial or in the summing up. Judges must weigh up all these factors. The compendium then sets out in considerable detail specific directions which need to be adjusted to fit in with the circumstances of the case and the arguments that have been advanced. To give the Committee the flavour of just how comprehensive and sensible these directions are, I refer to example 12, which is headed “fear; although no use or threat of force, physical struggle and/or injury”. The direction to the jury is that “it is important for you to know that just because D did not use or threaten to use any force on W, and W did nothing to prevent D from having sexual intercourse and was not injured, this does not mean that W consented to what took place or that what W said happened cannot be true. Experience has shown that different people can respond to unwanted sexual activity in different ways. Some may protest and physically resist throughout the event. But others may be unable to protest or physically resist. This may be out of fear or because they are not a very forceful person. In law there is a difference between consent and submission”. These are detailed directions on a specific myth or stereotype and there are many more that cover the whole range. I did not understand why the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, criticised these directions, except perhaps in relation to domestic abuse, for which there are specific directions. Why are these directions not mandatory? It is because everything depends on the circumstances of the individual case. However, there is an obligation on the trial judge to give appropriate directions in a sexual offences case. That has been made clear at least since the Court of Appeal judgment in the Miller case, as long ago as 2010, which my noble friend Lord Faulks referred to. The courts have regularly told judges that this is what they must do. If they are not doing it, with all this guidance in the compendium and all these requirements in Court of Appeal judgments, it is slightly unrealistic to think that Parliament enacting a specific provision will make all the difference. In any event, neither the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, nor any other noble Lords, have referred to any evidence that judges are not complying with their obligation to give these directions. I also mention—as, in fairness, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, did—that the Law Commission looked very carefully at this subject and recommended in its 2025 report that there should not be a statutory requirement to give directions in this area because it feared, rightly, that that would damage the flexibility required in this context. I have as great a concern about myths and stereotypes in sexual offences cases, but I do not accept that a statutory requirement is the answer.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I do not want to appear to be ignoring Amendment 50, but I am not going to say anything about it. I want to refer to the two amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, who talked about domestic abuse and issues around that. I declare that I was chair of the charity Refuge for a long time. It was quite a long time ago, but I have a feeling that things have not changed dramatically. The noble Baroness refers in Amendment 53H to “the impact of trauma on memory, communication, behaviour and engagement with court proceedings, and best practices for reducing retraumatisation within courts and tribunals”, which all seems immensely important. When the noble Baroness said that you can start working in this field thinking that you understand, and then you realise that actually, you do not, that struck quite a chord with me. I am mentioning this because it seems to me that the term “trauma” has been devalued. People say, “I had a bad cold: I was traumatised”. Sometimes it is not as absurd as that, but we have lost the real meaning and the real impact of “trauma”. I hate hearing government departments, among others, saying, “Oh, everything we do is trauma-informed”. If they say that, it says to me that probably it is not.
Baroness Brown of Silvertown (Lab)
My Lords, I will make one tiny point. I listened to everything the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, and I agreed, obviously, with much of it. But I wonder why directions are not given, therefore, in all cases that come before us. I would evidence to him that the Law Commission and the Victims’ Commissioner say that this is an issue. I fail to understand why we do not wish to give rape victims—women who are in court desperately trying to tell their story—the best opportunity they have of putting those points across without being denigrated and having spurious nonsense about what a victim should behave like put before the jury.
Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)
My Lords, I can be very brief because other members of the Committee have said much of what I was going to say. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, I found the speech made by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, extremely persuasive, but I did not agree with her, so I depart from the noble and learned Lord in that. My anxiety is about Parliament prescribing directions for judges to give juries, for all the reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. I am particularly concerned, as he was, about this becoming a parliamentary habit under Governments of different hues. That is a serious and substantial concern, and it is one reason why we have not gone down that route, certainly not since the creation of the Judicial Studies Board—now the Judicial College—which puts so much work into training judges, providing continuing training and crafting these directions. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has made clear how detailed the compendium is. It is a model document of its type, probably the best in the common law world. The directions it prescribes are model directions, probably the best in the common law world. As has been said, there may be some judges who do not follow these directions. However, in recent days I have spoken about this matter to a number of judges who conduct these sorts of cases, and, to a man and woman, they have all been aghast at the idea that judges with the tickets to conduct such cases, and undergoing this training, might not be giving these directions. I therefore remain somewhat sceptical about that. As the Lady Chief Justice has said, all trials are so different. They all are so dependent on particular context that great nuance is required in the conduct of those trials by the judges to ensure fairness in the proceedings. This is more likely, in my view, to be achieved by judicial directions crafted and delivered by judges. To be clear, with all due respect to her, I strongly disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that these directions are not essential—I believe they are. I hope I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, that, as a former prosecutor, I have the strongest sympathy for the victims of sex crime and a pretty clear, I hope, understanding of what a trial can mean for a victim of rape. But I do not think that any of these issues are solved by Parliament taking upon itself a course of action which could go horribly wrong in the wrong hands.
Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, this is clearly a probing amendment that is meant to concentrate our minds on the issue. When I listen to noble Lords talking about the guidance, I am reminded of the immortal words of Mandy Rice-Davies: “He would say that, wouldn’t he?” We have a conundrum. On the one hand, we have legal Lords saying that we have extremely good and clear advice, which is the case, because I have read it. On the other hand, if we listen to the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and the people who communicate to her and the Victims’ Commissioner, we hear evidence that the experience of some victims in the courts, despite all this amazing guidance, is not producing the sort of court atmosphere the guidance is meant to bring about.
We have a conundrum. On the one hand, we have people saying that what we have at the moment is absolutely fine and perfect; on the other, we have evidence from some people who are saying, “In in our case, it was absolutely not good”. Somehow, we need to find a way of resolving that. Parliament dictating that there should be mandatory guidance is probably not the best way to do it. But if the judiciary is not finding a way of rolling this out consistently and appropriately, customised to a particular trial, I would say to the judiciary, “Physician, heal thyself”.
Lord Pannick (CB)
I suggest to the noble Lord that the problem may well not be judicial direction, and that that is not what is causing such offence and hurt to the victims who bravely come forward; it is the way in which they are questioned by defence counsel, which this amendment is not designed to address.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I am not opposed to any judge directing a jury, as they rightly should, not following a script and taking into account the individual case; that is important, as was described. But I imagine that the point of the judge directing the jury in a particular way is not about changing the atmosphere in the courtroom or making people feel better; it is surely to ensure that we get justice in the courtroom. That way, the jury will understand what should be taken into account and what should not. It is going to be uncomfortable. Some of us have experience of being in a courtroom and having those kinds of intimate discussions. That is why a lot of women do not want to go to court at all. But that is surely not the aim of this amendment. Otherwise, it really would be a kind of therapeutic political intervention, rather than one that enhances justice, which is what we all want.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I agree with the positions taken by my noble friend Lady Brinton, the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, and others, on Amendments 53E, 53G and 53H, and I support them. I only wish to speak to Amendment 50. We have had a long and detailed debate, and it is clear that this is a very difficult question on which opinions are thoroughly divided. On the one hand, there is the question of what best practice is, and the point that the compendium endorses best practice and it is generally followed. On the other, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, pointed out, there is the experience of others who are not simply convinced but convinced on the evidence of the work they do, particularly with victims, that these are not always the directions given, that there are difficulties and that the lack of direction is something Parliament can address. For that reason, of course, this amendment is not going to cure a wrong, but it does address a wrong. I therefore come down in favour of the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt. Much judicial training is, of course, exemplary, but it is not universal and it is not universally effective, just as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
It is compulsory, so it is universal. All judges who try these cases have to have the training.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I am not for a moment suggesting that the training is not universally given. The question is whether it is followed, the extent to which it is followed and the way in which it is followed. That is the heart of it, otherwise we would not have the lived experience of the Victims’ Commissioner and of victims who believe that rape myths are perpetuated at the trials involving them. The prevalence of rape myths is shaming for us all, as I think everybody who has spoken acknowledges. It is welcome that Mr Justice Bennathan’s summing up in the Brand case gave a very clear direction: “Whatever women wear, wherever they go, indeed whatever they drink, they retain the right to say no and to demand justice from the criminal courts when sexual predators … act without their consent”. None of that should need saying, but it clearly does. The directions in the compendium are designed to ensure that it happens. Last Monday, when the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, asked a Question on the topic, I reminded the House of the worrying prevalence of the circulation of rape myths among young people, and how few 18 to 24 year-olds compared with people of older generations recognise, for example, that rape is still rape if the victim does not physically resist and fight back or that there can be rape within marriage or an established relationship. In responding, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, blamed the particular prevalence of rape myths among young people on the perversity of material circulating on many internet sites that young people read more than others. I agree with him and we must respond to this, including in sex and relationships education. The argument that directions should not be compulsory was advanced by the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Faulks, and tentatively supported by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who found herself in a dilemma as to where she ultimately comes down on this. As the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, and others reminded us, the need for directions is mandated, but even that is subject to the exception that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, reminded us of, that a judge would not be required to give such a direction if satisfied that it were unnecessary, having regard to the circumstances of the case. The content of directions is not mandatory; that is of course a matter for judicial discretion and will always remain so. I accept entirely the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the compendium covers directions that ought to be given, but that does not mean that that norm—I accept that it is the norm—ought not to be incorporated in statute. I am not sure we should refrain from legislation, either, for fear of future reversal by others less enlightened than this Parliament today. The prevalence of rape myths, particularly among disproportionate numbers of young people, is one reason why younger women still think our society is deeply misogynist. I know that from my daughters and others of their age, who believe it; I believe that rape myths have a great deal to do with that. This amendment is only one step towards addressing the prevalence of rape myths, but it is a step that would help to address injustice in our criminal courts, so we will support it.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, if the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, finds a point difficult, it must be almost by definition a difficult point. I have listened to the debate and very sound points have been made on both sides, but ultimately these Benches are unable to support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt. I will take a few minutes to sketch out why. This amendment seeks to require judges to direct juries on myths and stereotypes that might affect the jury’s assessment of evidence in a trial for a sexual offence. As everybody has said, we are all extremely concerned to make sure that all trials, but in particular sexual offence trials, are conducted in a proper way. This also extends to domestic abuse offences. Together with my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford, I took the Domestic Abuse Bill 2021 through this House. I will say candidly that, before taking the Bill through, this was a subject about which I knew very little. The reading, the understanding and the people I met as I took it through the House and it became an Act deepened my knowledge of the subject and, frankly, introduced me to a part of life that I did not really want to know about, but now do. It is something we have not confronted fully in our law. Coming back to this amendment, first, I suggest that it is unnecessary to place this in statute. The Crown Court Compendium has been referred to. It says that the Court of Appeal has already accepted that “a judge may give appropriate directions to counter the risk of stereotypes and assumptions about sexual behaviour and reactions to non consensual sexual conduct … There may be cases where guidance on myths and stereotypes may be appropriate to benefit a defendant”. Judges are therefore able to issue some directions to the jury, if they believe them necessary. The repeated use of the word “may” in the compendium is at the heart of this debate: should this be discretionary or mandatory? Of course, the amendment—which has been, as one would expect, very carefully drafted by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt—would not require any particular direction as to verdict or sentence, or any particular form of words in the direction. But it does require a direction. In fact, it requires one twice: either at the beginning of the trial or when the issue is first raised, and then again in the summing up. At least as I read the amendment, that would be the effect of proposed new subsections (1), (3), (4) and (5). Reference has been made by a number of contributors to the report of the Law Commission Evidence in Sexual Offences Prosecutions from July 2025. I suggest that that response may well provide the answer to the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, who both said, “Well, if it’s still going on, obviously some judges are not getting it right”. As I read the report, the Law Commission accepted that there were cases where directions were improperly given or improperly not given. None the less, it recommended not imposing a general obligation but having improved judicial guidance and a strong expectation that directions would be given. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, that the mere fact that the Law Commission came to that conclusion does not mean that we have to follow it. It does not absolve us of our responsibility in this House, but I for one always think twice—if not three times and often four—before departing from the views of the Law Commission, which are generally very well thought through. I listened very carefully to the four precedents that the noble Baroness put forward. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, I will also check Hansard , but at first listening it struck me that they appeared to be examples of legal consequences of evidence being given to the jury rather than of the imposition of a general duty to correct supposed misconceptions. It did not strike me that any of those examples were absolutely on point, although I accept that they are examples where Parliament intervened in a more general sense. The real question is whether this should be left to judges on a discretionary basis or made mandatory. I listened very carefully yesterday to the Lady Chief Justice, who warned that Parliament must be “extremely cautious” before legislating to dictate when directions ought to be given to juries in rape trials. I respectfully and wholeheartedly agree with the Lady Chief Justice on that. I do not think it either necessary or desirable to mandate in primary legislation how the judge is to conduct the trial.
I am also worried, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, pointed out, about the precedent that this might establish. That is what perhaps ties this amendment to the previous one. It is very tempting to cross a Rubicon when there is an attractive reason to do so, but once that Rubicon is crossed it is crossed for everybody, in all circumstances. I am very concerned about that.
Finally, let me take just 30 seconds to say a word about the other amendments in the group on judicial training. Judicial training is obviously critical; it is required in various areas and provided at a very high standard. Obviously, I will listen carefully to what the Minister says in response, but the general approach of the Government, certainly when I was on that side of the Chamber, was that, although the funding of training is ultimately a matter for the Government, its content is always left to the judges. Amendment 53H appears to mandate particular training in fairly broad terms, which might overstep and contravene that distinction, which is actually quite important constitutionally.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
My Lords, this has been an extremely important, powerful and timely debate, with strong views expressed in different directions. I thank my noble friend Lady Levitt, both for her amendment and for giving the Committee the opportunity to have this rich and important debate. It is clear from this debate that there is much on which we all agree. First, we all agree that rape myths have absolutely no place in our courts or, indeed, in wider society. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referenced my response to the Private Notice Question. I think that the media—online and traditional—as well as employers and civil society all have important roles to play in challenging rape myths. The law also has a significant part to play. Victims should never feel like they are the ones on trial, and we are already taking steps to change the culture in our courts. On the point from the noble Lord, Lord Russell, I pay tribute to the victims in the Brand case and in so many others for showing the courage to ensure that justice is done. In this Bill, we are changing the law to stop irrelevant evidence that relies on rape myths being weaponised against victims. The Lord Chancellor is standing up a rape justice taskforce to tackle not only inefficiency in rape cases but this precise challenge. The independence of the judiciary, as well as judicial discretion, are both cornerstones of the rule of law and of ensuring a fair trial. It is also right that steps are taken to ensure that directions are given consistently. My noble friend Lady Levitt placed some emphasis on that, which is one of the points of issue on this amendment; the noble Lord, Lord Russell, also mentioned it. So the Government agree that it is right that steps are taken to ensure that directions are given consistently and in line with the agreed standards set by the judiciary. In response specifically to the questions asked and the very powerful case made by my noble friend Lady Levitt, I will say today that the Judicial College has committed to updating the Crown Court Compendium to state that directions should be given in all sexual offence trials—this goes straight to my noble friend’s point—at the outset of the trial and when summing up, subject to judicial discretion. This new requirement would set a clear expectation. In the light of that, the college also intends to update sexual offences training for judges. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, raised the question of training for barristers. The job of regulating, setting standards for and training barristers is a matter for the Bar Standards Board, and it is for it to take this forward. It is already developing specialist standards for barristers acting in rape and serious sexual offences cases. As has been reported, the Lord Chancellor wrote to the Bar Standards Board this weekend to ask for a meeting to discuss progress on its planned standards. He made it clear that harmful rape myths should not be perpetuated. I am confident that the measures I have set out will ensure that directions are given consistently, as my noble friend Lady Levitt challenged us on. However, I understand that we have heard concerns expressed by my noble friend and others from all sides of the argument, and Minister Sackman and I are happy to meet with her and other such interested Peers, ahead of Report, to discuss the concerns that underlie this amendment and the measures that I have set out. We are happy to consider anything more that the Government can do, within the well-established parameters of judicial independence and discretion. I hope I have reassured my noble friend Lady Levitt and, on that basis, shall invite her to withdraw her amendment in a moment. I turn to Amendments 53E and 53G from the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Neate. These amendments are very similar in their intent. Amendment 53E seeks to place a duty on the Lord Chancellor to ensure sufficient resourcing for judicial training on areas related to vulnerable witnesses, domestic abuse, sexual violence and trauma. Amendment 53G focuses specifically on the funding for this judicial training and the duty on the Lord Chancellor concerned with child arrangement proceedings. The Government recognise the importance of specialist training being delivered to our judiciary, and the Lord Chancellor already has a statutory duty to ensure appropriate resourcing of the courts, which includes judicial training. Statutory responsibility for judicial training is rightly held by the Lady Chief Justice. A comprehensive programme of induction and continuation training is in place, which is designed to embed the necessary experiences and skills to deal with these cases. The Judicial College keeps judges up to date with a wide range of resources, as I just set out in relation to rape and serious sexual offences. The Crown Court judicial induction has a dedicated session on vulnerability, which sets out automatic eligibility for complainants in cases in these areas, including special measures. Domestic abuse training is not a stand-alone course or single intervention, and is instead embedded throughout the training programme, focusing on domestic abuse dynamics, coercion and the impact on children. The Judicial College draws on experienced practitioners and external experts, including survivors of domestic abuse and psychologists. In May, the college published a summary of judicial education in domestic abuse, and the college keeps judges up to date with a wide range of resources. The Government are therefore content that there is sufficient provision for this training provided by the Judicial College. Finally, on Amendment 53H, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Neate, I agree that it is essential that domestic abuse training is provided to all court staff. I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness that HMCTS court staff must complete domestic abuse awareness training within three months of joining HMCTS. Existing staff are expected to complete the training every two years. In addition to the domestic abuse awareness training, in August, we introduced trauma-informed training for court staff. This aims to help staff to better understand how traumatic experiences, particularly domestic and sexual abuse, can affect the way that people communicate, behave and engage in court and throughout court processes. It has been developed to support the Government’s commitment to improve how courts support victims and witnesses. To preserve judicial independence, as I have said, statutory responsibility for the training of the judiciary rests with the Lady Chief Justice and is fulfilled by the Judicial College. With these reassurances, I hope my noble friend Lady Levitt will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I am very grateful to all Members of your Lordships’ House who have spoken in this debate, which is so important not just to victims but to wider society. There is not much disagreement between us about the issue. The question is not whether these directions have value but whether relying on discretion alone is enough. This ground has been covered comprehensively. The only point I make in response to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is that I was puzzled when he said, “If it’s not done, you will receive a brown envelope from the Court of Appeal”. The whole point is that the prosecution cannot appeal, so there is no way of challenging a judge who does not do this. I am not persuaded that this amendment would produce any dramatic change in practice. As I thought I had made clear—I say it again for the avoidance of doubt—I am not prescribing the content of any directions. That would, of course, be a matter for the discretion of each trial judge, according to the circumstances of the case. Those judges who are already following best practice would be entirely unaffected. The amendment would bite only if there were cases in which appropriate directions were not given. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the compendium is wonderful. I have relied on it extensively when crafting directions. The training, the advice, the words from the Court of Appeal and the compendium have been around for 20 years. If that is so, why are there still cases in which this is not being done? I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his offer to meet. I know that the Government take this really seriously, and I applaud both the Prime Minister and the Lord Chancellor for the things they have said. I hope it will give support to victims to know that this is being addressed directly. I remain of the view that it is an important issue to which we may return on Report, but for today I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 50 withdrawn.
Amendments 51 and 52 not moved.
House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.53 pm.
Source: UK Parliament Hansard API. Debate ID: 5438048.