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Lord Pannick (CB)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 16 November 2026

Debate

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Contribution

My Lords, I declare an interest as a practising barrister, although it is a very long time since I appeared before a jury. More recently, I certainly appeared before a jury as the recorder, on which occasion of course they complied with all my directions—at least, I hope they did. The Committee may wish to be reminded of what has provoked this amendment. There were criminal proceedings earlier this year against a defendant, Charlotte Head, a member of Palestine Action. She was accused of criminal damage after she broke into a factory near Bristol and, after a retrial, she was convicted and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Her case is completed. Another defendant was convicted of the more serious offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm on a police officer. Members of the Committee may remember that terrible case: the police officer, a woman, had her spine fractured after she was hit with a sledgehammer. That defendant was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. Miss Head had claimed that she had a defence of reasonable excuse for the criminal damage, in that she was seeking to destroy weapons that would otherwise be unlawfully used in a so-called genocide in Gaza. That was her defence: reasonable excuse. The judge ruled that there was no defence of reasonable excuse. He therefore directed that views on Gaza and genocide were irrelevant to the trial, and that evidence going to such issues should not be relied upon in counsels’ closing speeches. The judge also directed that the jury were not to be informed that a judge may not direct the jury to convict—so-called jury equity—and that counsel, in their closing speeches, were not to invite the jury to disregard the court’s rulings of law. Contempt proceedings are pending against defence counsel for allegedly—I emphasise, allegedly—disobeying those rulings. That is the background to this amendment. The Committee may wish to know that this amendment is topical and that, I suspect, is why it has been brought forward. Those contempt proceedings are, as I say, ongoing against the barrister and will be heard by a High Court judge or judges, subject to appeal. The proceedings will determine whether a judge may, in those circumstances, lawfully instruct defence counsel not to refer, in a closing speech, to jury equity. I express no view whatever on whether the judge was so entitled and no view, of course, on whether the barrister was in contempt of court. What seems plain and obvious is that it is much better for Parliament to wait for the determination of those pending proceedings before considering any legislation on this topic. The judicial decision that we are awaiting may establish that counsel has the right to address the jury on jury equity, in whatever form it takes—that which appeals to my noble friend Lord Macdonald, or that which the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has referred to. The judicial decision may accept that proposition. If it does, and the court reaffirms that basic right of counsel, this amendment is entirely unnecessary. If, by contrast, the decision of the court determines that an advocate does not have this right, or has the right only in limited circumstances, the scope of the advocate’s powers and duties at common law and the reason for the court’s decision will greatly assist any future parliamentary assessment of this issue. So I suggest to the Committee that this amendment may well be unnecessary but is, in any event, premature.

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