Contribution
My Lords, like other Members of the Committee, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, for raising a most important issue. My noble friend Lord Russell of Liverpool correctly said that it is vital that men as well as women speak on this subject. I hope he will accept that to oppose this amendment does not mean that I or others are any the less concerned about sexual stereotypes and myths in rape and other sexual offences cases.
I oppose the amendment because chapter 20 of the Crown Court Compendium sets out in considerable detail rulings of the Court of Appeal over many years and directions to be made by the judge to the jury in this context. The guidance makes clear a number of vital points. The first, at paragraph 15, is that the judge should—I emphasise “should”: it is mandatory—alert the jury to guard against making “unwarranted assumptions” in sexual offences cases. It is important that the judge should alert the jury to guard against this.
Secondly, the compendium then sets out in considerable detail a range of such unwarranted assumptions. They concern a complainant’s
“delay in making a complaint”
and
“inconsistent accounts given by the complainant”,
neither of which should be held against her; the
“lack of emotion/distress when giving evidence”;
the clothing she wore on the relevant day; the fact that she may have had a previous sexual relationship with the defendant, and that there may have been
“some consensual sexual activity on the occasion of the alleged offence”.
The directions are very clear: each of those myths and stereotypes is unwarranted and should not be held against the complainant in assessing whether her account should be believed.
The third point that the compendium makes, which the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, referred to, is that it is vital that the judge directs the jury in a “fair and balanced way” and puts the direction in the context of the evidence in the case and the arguments that had been advanced by counsel. I share the concern expressed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about the conduct of some defence counsel in this context. That is not addressed by this amendment, but it is vitally important.
Fourthly, the directions
“must be crafted with care and … discussed with the advocates in advance”.
Fifthly, a sensitive and important question is giving thought to the most appropriate time for the judge to give these directions—at the outset of the trial, during the trial or in the summing up. Judges must weigh up all these factors. The compendium then sets out in considerable detail specific directions which need to be adjusted to fit in with the circumstances of the case and the arguments that have been advanced.
To give the Committee the flavour of just how comprehensive and sensible these directions are, I refer to example 12, which is headed
“fear; although no use or threat of force, physical struggle and/or injury”.
The direction to the jury is that
“it is important for you to know that just because D did not use or threaten to use any force on W, and W did nothing to prevent D from having sexual intercourse and was not injured, this does not mean that W consented to what took place or that what W said happened cannot be true. Experience has shown that different people can respond to unwanted sexual activity in different ways. Some may protest and physically resist throughout the event. But others may be unable to protest or physically resist. This may be out of fear or because they are not a very forceful person. In law there is a difference between consent and submission”.
These are detailed directions on a specific myth or stereotype and there are many more that cover the whole range. I did not understand why the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, criticised these directions, except perhaps in relation to domestic abuse, for which there are specific directions.
Why are these directions not mandatory? It is because everything depends on the circumstances of the individual case. However, there is an obligation on the trial judge to give appropriate directions in a sexual offences case. That has been made clear at least since the Court of Appeal judgment in the Miller case, as long ago as 2010, which my noble friend Lord Faulks referred to. The courts have regularly told judges that this is what they must do. If they are not doing it, with all this guidance in the compendium and all these requirements in Court of Appeal judgments, it is slightly unrealistic to think that Parliament enacting a specific provision will make all the difference.
In any event, neither the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, nor any other noble Lords, have referred to any evidence that judges are not complying with their obligation to give these directions. I also mention—as, in fairness, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, did—that the Law Commission looked very carefully at this subject and recommended in its 2025 report that there should not be a statutory requirement to give directions in this area because it feared, rightly, that that would damage the flexibility required in this context.
I have as great a concern about myths and stereotypes in sexual offences cases, but I do not accept that a statutory requirement is the answer.