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Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 16 November 2026

Debate

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Contribution

My Lords, I oppose this amendment, not because I do not agree that the principle of jury equity exists—it is clear that it does and the Court of Appeal has made that clear—but because the amendment goes a good deal further, if I may respectfully say so, than the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, suggests. It gives, in my respectful submission, an inaccurate and wholly inadequate definition of what jury equity is. Amendment 48 says in proposed new subsection (3): “For the purpose of this section, ‘jury equity’ means the principle that jurors cannot be required to reach a verdict … by reason of any judicial direction or any threat of sanction”. That is obvious, but jury equity is much more than that. That it is more than that is hinted at in the Member’s explanatory statement, which says: “This new clause seeks to prevent criminal trial advocates being barred from reminding juries of the common law principle of jury equity”. In English law, the principle of jury equity is that the jury has the power, in the exercise of its independent judgment and conscience, to acquit a defendant even where the evidence appears to establish that the offence has been committed by that defendant and the law would otherwise require a conviction. That goes far beyond any question of a judicial direction. The essential distinction is between the jury’s legal duty to apply the law on the one hand and its practical power on the other, over which the judge has no control, to refuse to convict. This is because although the judge may direct a jury to acquit—and judges often do—a judge can never direct a jury to convict. Some of the examples in which a jury may decide to acquit in these circumstances could be: if they believe the law, although technically applicable, would produce an unjust result in the particular circumstances; or the prosecution is oppressive; or the defendant’s conduct is morally justified, notwithstanding its technical illegality; or that a conviction would offend the jury’s collective sense of judgment. Again, all this goes far beyond the question of a judicial direction. None of this is in any doubt, but my view is that the amendment would carry with it a severe practical danger. It pokes the bear, threatening the existence of jury equity as a viable doctrine, for it also says in another subsection “no advocate is prohibited from reminding the jury of the principle of jury equity”. This appears to be a right granted to advocates without qualification. Its results are wholly unpredictable and likely to lead to anxiety and confusion in the minds of jurors. On the one hand, the judge will be telling the jury that they must convict where the evidence makes them sure that the defendant has committed the offence. On the other, defence counsel will be saying, “Hang on, members of the jury. That’s all very well, but even then, jury equity allows you to acquit if your conscience demands it”. This is a recipe in a criminal trial for absolute chaos. In my view, the power of jury equity granted to juries should be left as it is. That is to say: respected by the law and left to their collective conscience, untrammelled by statute, whose intervention is likely to call into question the principle itself and lead to calls for it to be curtailed.

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