V

Viscount Hailsham (Con)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 16 November 2026

Debate

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Contribution

My Lords, in moving this amendment in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, I apologise for the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. As noble Lords know, she is among the most assiduous Members of this Committee and, indeed, the House. She was here for the debate on the first group of amendments but, alas, she has a long-standing commitment that precludes her attending this particular group, at least at its start. I hope the Committee will accept me as a most unworthy substitute and will accept her apologies. The purpose of Amendment 48 is to ensure that an advocate cannot be held in contempt, or subject to regulatory sanction, simply for reminding a jury that a judge is not entitled to direct them to convict. As we all know, judges are entitled to direct the jury to acquit but not to convict. That is a well- and long-established principle of law. It goes back to Bushel’s case in 1670 and was reaffirmed by the great Lord Chief Justice Lord Mansfield in the case of Shipley, which was decided in 1784. On that occasion, Lord Mansfield said: “It is the duty of the judge … to tell the jury how to do right, though they have it in their power to do wrong, which is a matter … between God and their own consciences”. That principle has been reaffirmed by the House of Lords in the case of Wang, and it has been followed since then in our jurisdiction and in some Commonwealth countries, particularly in Canada. The principle was addressed directly by that great jurist Lord Devlin in the collection of his Hamlyn lectures entitled Trial by Jury. He said that “by far the greater purpose that is served by trial by jury is that it gives protection against laws which the ordinary man may regard as harsh and oppressive”. I interpose the thought that that is even more important when Executives make frequent recourse to Henry VIII clauses, or, as my noble friend Lord Howard remarked, Joseph Stalin clauses. Lord Devlin went on to say that trial by jury “is also an insurance that the criminal law will conform to the ordinary man’s idea of what is fair and just. If it does not, the jury will not be a party to its enforcement”. In the 18th and 19th centuries, there were examples of juries following this approach because they frequently refused to convict when a person was charged, for example, with stealing a sheep, which at that time in history was a capital offence. There are indeed more recent examples, as the Committee will know, the most well-known perhaps being that of Clive Ponting. Mr Ponting was a civil servant. He acted as a whistleblower—he alleged that Ministers had misled Parliament over the sinking of the “Belgrano”—and was charged under the Official Secrets Act. The judge correctly directed the jury that Mr Ponting did not have a defence in law but the jury refused to convict, presumably because they felt it was unconscionable to do so. There is another such case, the instance of Michael Randle and Pat Pottle. They were a couple who assisted George Blake to escape from prison and subsequently flee to Russia. They admitted that fact in a book that they wrote, and 26 years later they were prosecuted. The judge said they had no defence in law, and he was right, but the jury refused to convict, probably because they took a view that, after 26 years, it was unconscionable to convict. It is sometimes argued, and perhaps it will be argued by the Minister today, then what is called the jury equity is contrary to the oath sworn by jurors. I suggest that that is a mistake. The juror’s oath is in these terms: “I swear by Almighty God that I will faithfully try the defendant and give a true verdict according to the evidence”, and the affirmation is in like terms. It is an offence for a juror to try the issue otherwise than on the basis of the evidence. That is the effect of Section 20C of the Juries Act 1974, which was inserted by amending legislation in 2015. However, I suggest that a juror who has heard the evidence and decides that he or she cannot in conscience convict is not in breach of law or of the oath. That is to be contrasted with a juror who indicates in advance that he has no intention to acquit or to convict. That is actually what happened in the case of Mr Davey. Mr Davey was scheduled to be a juror in a case involving an alleged paedophile. Having been sworn, he put on to his Facebook the following: “Woooow I wasn’t expecting to be in a jury Deciding a paedophile’s fate, I’ve always wanted to” convict “a paedophile”. In fact he used a very vulgar word instead of “convict” but, as this is polite society, I am not going to use it. He concluded: “& now I’m within the law!” It is quite plain that advocates must respect judicial rulings. A judge is entitled to direct the jury that there is no legal defence to an offence charged on the indictment. What the judge is not entitled to do is to direct the jury that they must convict. That is the law, and I can see no reason in principle why an advocate, in his or her final speech to the jury, having addressed the directions of the judge, should not conclude by telling the jury that whether they acquit is a matter for them. I beg to move.

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