Contribution
My Lords, if I may, I will intervene between the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. When this House sat in its appellate capacity, there was a custom sometimes for judges who took a different position to earlier judges to say that they had the misfortune to disagree. Well, I have the misfortune to disagree with my noble friend Lord Hailsham, but I have the fortune to be supported by the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and Lord Pannick, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, in his very short and unambiguous contribution.
The main points have been set out, but I suggest that one has to distinguish between three quite separate principles, and it is important that we do not get them mixed up. The first principle is that a jury cannot be compelled by the judge, or, frankly, by anybody else, to convict. That is the principle at the heart of the speech given by my noble friend Lord Hailsham. That is the principle that has been set out in a number of cases at the highest level. That is the principle that Lord Devlin, in an extrajudicial capacity in the Hamlyn lectures, was talking about. The second principle is that a jury is under a duty to apply the law as directed by the judge. Thirdly, it is suggested that an advocate is entitled to remind the jury of the first proposition, notwithstanding the second proposition and also notwithstanding an express order of the judge.
I suggest that the first proposition, as we heard from my noble friend Lord Hailsham, is plainly right. The second proposition—that a jury is under a duty to apply the law as directed by the judge—is also right. But the third proposition is both wrong and does not follow from either of the first two propositions. I respectfully agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, that juries can be annoying. Juries are one of the glories of our criminal justice system. They have tremendous public support. It is one of the reasons why we on these Benches have been fighting against some of the Government’s original proposals on juries. So I entirely accept that juries can be annoying, and in certain circumstances they seem to bring back verdicts that are bizarre, perverse or unusual—call it what you will.
But this amendment goes far too far. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the particular origin—frankly, a political origin—of this amendment. But if this amendment were to become law, its effects would go very much further. I will give an example of how its effects would work in a way that I suggest the proposers of this amendment—especially, I say respectfully, the two who are not in their place today—would find incredibly offensive and perverse.
Take a rape trial. Suppose defence counsel seeks to suggest that a complainant’s clothing amounted to an invitation to sexual intercourse. Of course, we all regard that as offensive. The judge would rightly—I underline “rightly”—prohibit that submission from being made to the jury. Could counsel, on the basis of this amendment, none the less remind the jury that, never mind what the judge has said to them, the jury cannot be compelled to convict, and then claim statutory immunity from contempt of court proceedings as well as—this is in the amendment—regulatory immunity from proceedings brought by the Bar Standards Board? That would be a preposterous result. Respectfully, I can especially imagine the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, on the “Today” programme the morning after, fulminating about what an appalling result that would be. I suggest that this amendment is sufficiently widely drafted that it would invite precisely that argument. Why, I ask rhetorically, should we introduce that uncertainty?
I invite the Committee to look at proposed new subsection (2), which, as I have mentioned, refers not only to contempt of court proceedings but to judicial sanction. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said something about the background to this amendment. I do not want to comment, and obviously will not comment, on that particular case, but I want to say something about the principles involved, because they are thrown up by this amendment.
If I need to, I declare my interest as counsel, although I have only ever done one criminal case. In the Tottenham magistrates’ court, I defended somebody charged with driving without due care and attention—mainly because they were a member of a band and I had just done a rather expensive royalty case for them previously in the Commercial Court. They thought that, because I could do the latter, I could do the former—a proposition that was undermined by their conviction. Although I make that declaration, it is not of any real value.
The answer in any court—whether it is a magistrates’ court or, frankly, the Supreme Court—to a judge who refuses to allow an advocate to say something is to appeal. That is the way the system works. That is the way—if I may put it, not disrespectfully—the game is played. Indeed, in preparing for today’s debate, I happened to notice that in today’s papers there is a case going the other way. A barrister has been sanctioned by the Bar Standards Board—I think for 12 months—because, in that case, the judge required counsel to put a particular question to a witness and the barrister did not want to. With the jury there, he said to the witness something like, “I don’t really want to ask you this question, but I’ve been told by the judge that I have to, and it’s all ridiculous”—I paraphrase, but it was something like that. Again, he was flouting the order of the judge.
Therefore, whether it is something you can say, something you cannot say or something you must say, the way courts work is that the judge is in charge. It seems to me clear that judicial independence is at the heart of our system of justice and the rule of law, and jury independence is one of the great protections of our criminal justice system. But jury independence does not require advocate immunity, and neither of those requires the erosion of the trial judge’s authority to ensure that verdicts are reached according to law.
I look forward to the Minister’s response. Although I am tempted by the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that we should, so to speak, kick this into the long grass, I would be interested to see whether the Government, like these Benches, would oppose this as a matter not only of timing but of principle.